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SUMMARY
This thesis analyses the adoption of a mix of franchised and company-owned outlets
among firms, namely, contractual heterogeneity within the finn.
Contractual heterogeneity is explained by the existing literature as due to
heterogeneous characteristics of the downstream outlets of a company. Such
correspondence, however, is arguably at variance with reality. Furthermore, this
literature has not been able to provide an answer to contractual heterogeneity in the
presence of downstream homogeneity.
This study contributes to the subject by proposing one such answer. The investigation
is presented in two main parts. The first part provides a theoretical analysis of the
problem and sets out a model representing the explanation proposed. The second part
consists of an empirical investigation of the hypotheses set out in the first part. This
empirical investigation is based ofdata collected by means of a survey of UK firms ·c_·
conducted specifically for the purpose of this study. The empirical analysis is
performed by means of both a qualitative and an econometric study.
The explanation uncovered by our theory, supported by our empirical results, shows
that under certain conditions contract mixing represents a separating equilibrium
which enables the company upstream (principal) to overcome problems related to
hidden action, hidden information and uncertainty downstream. Under certain
circumstances such organisational structure represents the 'optimal choice' for the
principal in the trade-off between incentives and risk sharing. At the same time, it
proves to be optimal for the heterogeneous agents (downstream) by providing them
with their maximum level of expected utility. To the best of our knowledge this is the
first study that investigates both sides of this agency relationship.
In other words, this study demonstrates that the choice of a 'mixed' organisational




"What is a finn?" Different answers in the literature have been given to this question
all sharing the idea that, according to an optimisation criterion, a finn is a unit capable
of producing, or selling, more efficiently than its constituent parts can do separately.
According to Coase (1937), an economic organisation can take one of two general
forms, markets and firms, This idea that the borders of the finn are so neat leads to a
sharp distinction between those transactions that take place among firms and those
that take place within firms. The gains arising from trade lead to market exchanges,
but the presence of transaction costs induces firms to internalise these exchanges
(Williamson, 1975).
The work of Coase (1937), Williamson (1975), and Klein, Crawford and Alchian
(1978), emphasises that transaction costs are large and pervasive in reality. As a
consequence, the parties cannot write a contract which takes into consideration all the
different states of the world and all the events that can occur in these different states;
rather contracts will be incomplete. "Incompleteness of contracts opens the door to a
theory of ownership," (Hart, 1993). The theory of residual rights of control is basically
related to the notion of ownership. This idea of a strict relation between ownership
and residual rights of control is the basis of a theory of integration developed in
Grossman and Hart (1986). In fact, this paper argues that in a world of incomplete
contracts there is an optimal allocation of residual rights of control; to the extent that
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ownership comes commensurate with residual rights of control, there is an optimal
allocation of asset ownership.
Time, and theory, have passed since Williamson (1975) regarded the firm as an
alternative choice between markets and hierarchies. The recent approach to the firm,
and Williamson (1985) with it, on the contrary, depicts the firm as an organisation
which lies somewhere in a continuum spectrum of possible contractual arrangements
between the two extremes set by market and hierarchy.
Firms' organisational structures, we argue in this study, are mainly determined by
their capability to adapt to new -both internal and external- constraints.
Recent theory in the economics of organisations, in fact, has been studying the firm as
a nexus of contractual arrangements among the parts that constitute it. The driving
factor behind the contractual packages that regulate these relationships are generally
identified by this theory in the agency relationship. Such is the case of creating
incentive compatibility in order to avoid monitoring problems (inter alia, Jensen and
Meckling, 1976), and such is the case of a contract mix of franchising and vertical
integration, on which this study is going to focus.
Contract heterogeneity within the firm confirms that such a sharp distinction between
firm and market does not exist in reality. On the contrary, some hybrid types of
organisations exist which incorporate elements of both organisational forms. The first
kind of intermediate case analysed in the literature is that of sharecropping (Cheung,
1969). Moreover, according to an approach pioneered by Rubin (1978) and
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Mathewson and Winters (1985), franchising can be seen as a hybrid form of such
economic organisation.
In the first part of this work we will analyse the main themes of the theoretical
literature on share contracts, on franchising, and on 'contract mix'. The basic
framework of these theories is an upstream manufacturer, who derives monopoly
power from a trade name. This firm can operate company-owned outlets, or it can sell
the right to use its trade name and market its products to an independent retailer
through franchising. Vertical restraints are analysed in this literature as a response to
principal-agent problems. "A standard paradigm in this literature has an upstream finn
selling its output to a self-interested downstream agent for transformation and resale
to customers. In the absence of contractual restraints, the agent's choices of retail price
and quality-enhancing effort generally will not be in the best interest of the upstream
principal. The purpose of the contract is to induce the downstream finn to take actions
that maximise the profit of the upstream finn," (Shepard 1993, p.58).
Designing the optimal (value-maximising) organisational form for a given company is
a difficult theoretical question. In the case of a retailing chain, for example, the
company must not only decide between vertical integration and vertical separation -
delegation- of its outlets, but also what is the optimal contract in each case. Such a
decision is expensive to the company because of costly contracting. The existence of
costs of structuring, monitoring and enforcing a set of contracts among agents with
conflicting interests, in this instance, highlights again the role of agency problems in
shaping the structure of organisation, emphasised by many authors. For example,
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Brickley and Dark (1987) remark, "the costs associated with various types of agency
problems is seen as a major determinant of organisational form," (Brickley and Dark,
1987, p.402).
The economic literature on general agency issues is very broad. The more formal
branch aims to analyse the nature of sharing contracts in the presence of some
stochastic elements such as, for example, in the demand or in the cost structure of the
firm. The other branch of this literature mainly tries to explain the separation of
ownership and control within firms, focusing on observed contracts and practices
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). This work analyses and makes use of the results of both
of these branches of the theory.
Despite the vastness of the literature on 'the organisation of the firm', no answer has
been provided to the existence of 'partially-integrated' firms, where vertical
integration is mixed with share (franchise) contracts. Many researchers have recently
turned their interest into trying to explain why firms adopt such hybrid organisational
structure. All of them, however, mostly perform empirical analyses that show the
relevance of some specific factor (i.e., monitoring costs, moral hazard, transaction
costs, etc.) but fail to explain why such a contractual mixture exists. In fact, the
general conclusions of these works fail to provide an answer consistent with the
empirical observation. In the literature overview presented in this study we are going
to describe these models and show their fallacies in explaining the phenomenon under
investigation. Actually, as Lafontaine (1992) remarks, almost "all theoretical models
themselves do not really address the issue of the contract mixing but rather
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concentrate on the determinants of the share parameters," (Lafontaine, 1992, p.264).
This theoretical puzzle gains momentum in the light of the increasing adoption of
heterogeneous contractual arrangements within the finn 1•
We intend to suggest, and will try to prove with this study, that heterogeneous
contractual arrangements, and the observed increasing adoption of franchising, can be
explained by their capability to bring the interests of the manufacturer and the dealer
into closer alignment. In other words, we intend to show that 'incentive
compatibility', and the capability to elicit the right human capital, make this
organisational fonn the best choice for both the principal upstream and the agent
downstream.
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994), investigate the firm as an incentive system. In this
study they observe that despite the large attention devoted by recent economic theory
to the 'make or buy decision', no unitary framework of investigation has resulted.
More specifically, the finn's decision these authors investigate consists of whether to
obtain an intermediate input from an agent who is part of the finn (employee), who
works under the employer's rules, and direction, by means of the employer's tools, in
exchange for a fixed wage, or, instead, to make use of an independent, external agent
who is contracted for producing this intermediate input with his own tools, and rules,
IAccording to Lafontaine and Shaw (1996), in 1994 the estimates of franchising sales activity
represented about 35 per cent of the entire US retail sales (see also Dicke, 1993). Furthermore, as
reported by Dant (1995), the franchise option is not only considered by new companies entering the
market, but also by well established firms (IBM, or Kodak, for example, have been actively examining
the franchise option).
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and is paid on the basis of his supply. Holmstrom and Milgram, analogous to what we
suggested above, argue that most studies on this topic have focused on only one
specific aspect of this relationship. Among those, for example, Coase (1937)
underlines the decision-making power of the employer in determining the employee's
activities; Klein et al. (1978), Williamson (1985) and Grossman and Hart (1986)
emphasise the role of assets ownership; while Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and
Holmstrom (1982), together with many other scholars, highlight the agency
characteristics of this relationship by focusing on its monitoring and compensation
aspects.
In their paper Holmstrom and Milgram (1994) explain what they believe the above
authors, and theories, have completely omitted in their analyses, namely, how
different incentive choices are intertwined. In other words, they investigate whether a
co-ordinated use of (i) performance related pay, (ii) assets ownership, and (iii) direct
control on the worker, can explain their covariation. These authors state that in order
to explore the issue one has to ask "what explains the choice between different
incentive systems: why are some workers employees and other workers independent
contractors?" (p.973). The answer this paper provides to the question makes use of a
multi task principal-agent model previously developed by the same authors (Holstrom
and Milgram, 1991). Within that framework of analysis, their answer relies upon
introducing exogenous parameters that determine the system solution, e.g., variations
in the costs of measuring performance, assets specificity, uncertainty about future.
More specifically, this answer is provided by the determination of the exogenous
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parameters that lead to co-movements in the incentive systems investigated. In other
words, what we described above as the capability of the firm to adapt to different
constraints, which cannot be exclusively identified in the impossibility to write
'complete contracts' (i.e., transaction costs).
The theoretical analysis developed by Ho~strom and Milgrom compares favourably
with some empirical results obtained by Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) and
Anderson (1985). In these two studies the authors investigate whether the transaction
cost hypothesis can explain why industrial selling is sometimes carried out by in-
house employees, and some other times by independent sales representatives, while
often the two systems are both adopted at the same time. Their results, consistent with
Hojs;;om and Milgrom's findings, show that the most important variables in
explaining the choice between outsourcing and internal production are the "difficulty
of evaluating performance" and "the importance of non-selling activities", while the
variables adopted to measure the transaction costs as described by Williamson (1985)
all prove less significant'.
Furthermore, Holstrom and Milgrom report that their results are supported, even
though less directly, by empirical findings by Shepard (1993) and Slade (1996) who
2 Empirical evidence on the 'transaction cost' hypothesis is reported by Lyons (1994). The fmdings of
this study, however, do not extend to our case as they apply to subcontracting in manufacturing, where
the production technology involves large sunk investments in specialised capital equipment, which is
not generally the case in the retailing sector. Indeed, Lyons (1994) finds that subcontractors are more
likely to have a formal contract if the share of output going to their most important customer is large, if
the output is specialised, and particularly, if they are using a specific technology. In the case analysed
by our study, both output and technology are standardised.
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analyse 'hard to monitor' extra-services in gasoline retailing markets. However, when
compared with the case of franchising, these results are not always consistent with the
predictions of the theory. Their compatibility is limited to the extent of recognising
the presence of a strong correlation between incentives for enhancing the market value
of the outlet and the incentives for immediate sales, while they contrast on other
important predictions. More specifically, Holmstrom and Milgrom find that the
probability of in-house production is positively related to 'monitoring difficulties'.
(
Conversely, empirical finding" on franchising (Brickley and Dark, 1987), show that
the above relationship is negative in that the probability of delegation of the outlet
downstream to an independent agent, i.e., franchising, is increasing with the difficulty
of monitoring the outlet downstream. This main contrast is explained by the authors as
due to the basic differences between franchising and industrial selling. In fact, they
argue, this comparison "leads to an important lesson: it is essential to tailor agency
models to the empirical context they intend to illuminate," (Holmstrom and Milgrom,
1994, p.988). Indeed, as they point out, the fact that contracting out and employment
are relationships characterised by a series of specific attributes, "ranks as one of the
most significant regularities to be explained by a theory of the firm," (ibid.).
In this work we set t~}~get for a case of 'vertical integration-delegation' mix, when
this results in the contemporaneous adoption of franchising and company-ownership
(management) contracts. We pursue this avenue in a way that differs from the
standard literature approach to the topic in several ways. Among these, most
important, we point out that theoretical and empirical research on firms'
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organisational decisions has always focused its main attention on the principal's
choice, and its constraints deriving from the need to provide incentives to the agents.
In this study we adopt a different approach. After characterising our agency
framework as deriving from the characteristics of the specific case analysed, as
suggested by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994), we look at it from different
perspectives. First, following the standard approach, we look at it from the firm's
perspective within the framework of the theory of the firm and of organisational
(namely contractual) choice. Then we change perspective, and look at this relationship
from the point of view of the agents. In so doing, we make use of those theories in the
labour economics literature that fit the context of this relationship (i.e., workers'
selection models and managers' compensation design models). Last, to link these two
different perspectives, we look at some research carried out on 'entrepreneurship',
which can shed some light on the agents' contractual choice, and the decision between
being a fully insured agent (manager) or a 'semi-independent' agent (franchisee), and
show how these choices of the agents downstream affect (and to a large extent
determine) the choices of the principal upstream.
As remarked above, although there has been growing interest in contract theory,
which has resulted in a large increase in empirical research on heterogeneous
contractual arrangements' no definite answer has resulted from it. Furthermore, this is
often flawed by the fact that lack of data on single contracts leads these works to adopt
3 See Lyons (1996) for a thorough review of empirical studies on inter-firm contracts.
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some kind of general information at company level or even at industry level. We
believe that a proper investigation on contractual agreements within the finn cannot
abstract from contract-specific data. This study represents an attempt along this way.
The structure of this work is as follows: in the first chapter, after a description of the
characteristics of the franchise contract, we present an overview of the relevant
theoretical and empirical literature on 'contract-mix'. In chapter two, then, we attempt
to model the basic rationale that, we believe, could explain why manufacturers
delegate part of the ownership of the outlets of their retailing network. We follow this
route mainly by looking at how firms select managerial compensation schemes.
Franchising, indeed, "can be viewed as near one extreme of the managerial
compensation continuum, i.e., compensation is incentive-based, versus some mix of
salary and incentive compensation for the managers of centrally owned units,"
(Brickley and Dark, 1987, p.402).
This first theoretical part, is then followed by a second part which focuses on
empirical analysis. It presents an empirical investigation we performed in order to test
the literature's established theories versus the theory proposed by this study. This
empirical investigation proceeds in three steps:
1. Survey: Qualitative Analysis
2. Econometrics of survey data
3. Econometrics of 'Franchise World Directory' data.
We then gather the treads of the theoretical and empirical results, and illustrate the
17
conclusions that can be drawn from our research.
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PART I: THE THEORY
1. The Literature on Contract Mixing
1.1. Introduction
In this chapter we review the main theoretical and empirical models which have been
developed to explain the coexistence of vertical integration and vertical separation
patterns, namely, a mixture of different organisational forms, within the same finn.
First, we look at the nature of the franchise contract, which is the typical form of
vertical separation usually combined with vertical integration, i.e., company
ownership. After that, we analyse the different explanations which have been given to
this phenomenon by the existing literature. In particular, we look at agency,
transaction costs, strategic motives, asymmetric information, (moral hazard and
signalling), and uncertainty (risk sharing, capital market imperfection, locational
factors and monitoring costs).
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In chapter two we develop at greater length these factors jointly with some others
which have not received much attention by the established literature.
1.2. Incomplete Contracts and the Nature of the Franchise Contract
Among the different contracts usually mixed with company ownership, many authors
have reported that an increasing majority consists of franchising contracts. This is
particularly so as the franchising contract can represent an efficient form of 'incentive
contract' which minimises agency costs4. In fact, not only does it provide an incentive
for hard-work to franchisees, but it also transmits part of the profits from the
franchisees to the franchisors via the franchise fee and the royalties.
There are two different types of franchise arrangements, 'Traditional Franchising', and
'Business Format Franchising'. As reported by Kaufmann and Lafontaine (1994), the
US Department of Commerce classifies franchises according to the main component
of the transaction. 'Product and Tradename Franchising' (or 'Traditional'
Franchising), involves franchised dealers who "concentrate on a company's product
line and to some extent identify their business with that company. This type of
4 The word 'franchising' comes from the French word 'franchir', that is, to share.
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franchising is limited to car-dealership, soft-drink bottlers and gasoline service
stations. In 'Business Format Franchising', the franchise relationship includes not only
the product, service and trademark, but the entire business concept itself -a marketing
strategy and plan, operating manuals and standards, quality control, and a continuing
process of assistance and guidance. Examples include restaurants, business and
employment services, and real estate agencies, etc.," (Kaufmann and Lafontaine,
1994, p.4l7). In our study we use franchising to refer to the latter.
The main characteristic of the franchise organisation is the presence of market-like
and firm-like links.
"A franchise agreement is defined as a contractual arrangement between two
independent firms. whereby the franchisee pays the franchisor for the right to sell the
franchisor's products and/or the right to use his trademark at a given place and for a
certain period of time. " (Brickley and Dark, 1987, p.402).
The franchisor is a company that has developed some product or service to sell; the
franchisee is a firm which is set up to market this product or service at a particular
site. The franchisee runs the business in a manner stipulated by the franchisor, who
may provide him with some sort of managerial assistance. Moreover, franchise
contracts involve the payment from the franchisee to the franchisor of a proportion of
the total franchise profits by means of either a royalty rate or a lump sum franchise-
fee or both.
The main explanations provided by the existing literature on the use of incentive
21
contracts such as franchising, and associated vertical integration patterns (namely
PVI), rest on the following topics: transaction costs (Klein, Crawford and A1chian,
1978; Williamson, 1985) risk sharing (Martin, 1988), moral hazard (Fama and Jensen,
1983; Mathewson and Winters, 1985; Brickley and Dark, 1987), capital market
imperfection (Rubin, 1978) and locational factors. In the following sections we are
going to present an overview of the main hypotheses formulated by these theories and
to illustrate their limits in providing an explanation to the contractual heterogeneity,
i.e. to the mix of franchise contracts with vertical integration.
1.3. Franchise Contracts in a 'Transaction Costs' and 'Agency'
Framework
According to Coase (1937), transaction, co-ordination and contracting costs are key
variables which explain the extent of vertical integration.
Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), elaborating on Williamson (1975), point out that
the cost of using the market has to be increased by the possibility of post-contractual
opportunistic behaviour. After a specific investment is made, quasi-rents are created,
which give rise to the threat of opportunistic behaviour. These authors state that as
assets become more specific, appropriable quasi-rents increase the cost of using the
market (i.e., of contracts) more than the costs of vertical integration. After
22
examining different cases in the light of this argument, however, Klein, Crawford and
Alchian (1978), conclude: "we have little idea why one solution appears to have been
efficient for one project and another solution for another project. This merely indicates
that as we move towards more complex ownership relationships, the problem of
efficiently structuring the economic relationship, either within the firm or via
contracts also becomes highly complex," (p.325).
Klein (1980), develops on asset specificity and opportunism as described in his earlier
work (Klein et al., 1978), by illustrating the franchise contract as an example of
'unfair' contractual arrangement due to its 'bond-posting', or 'hostage-taking'
(Williamson, 1983), characteristics. Klein's study highlights how transaction costs
deriving from the adoption of incomplete contracts may explain some 'unfair'
contractual provisions, "this is the case of having the agent to post a bond which is
appropriated by the principal if he cheats," (Klein, 1980, p.358l However, this
'bond-posting' feature of the franchise contract cannot, per se, be identified as an
'unfair' contractual arrangement". This, we believe, and will try to show in the
following chapters, is due to the fact that it rather represents a 'human capital'
selection device which, at the same time is able to guarantee the agent's good
5See also Klein and Murphy (1988) on how to motivate employees to perform along contractually
unspecified elements of the relationship.
60r a contractual arrangement adopted to suppress competition (Klein and Saft, 1985). Williamson
(1983, 1985) underlines that the failure to recognise that the use of 'hostages' is due to the fact that they
constitute 'credible-commitment' instruments, rather than unfair contractual practices, has led to
repeated policy mistakes.
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performance. If the franchisor were to cheat by appropriating this bond, we would
expect such behaviour to result in the impossibility to recruit new franchisees.
Analogously, despite stressing the importance of transaction costs, Williamson (1985)
suggests also that 'hostages' could have ex-ante screening properties. This last idea,
however, has not been followed up in the literature. Conversely, we believe this is
where the core explanation to contract heterogeneity lies. We will try to show that the
self-selection properties attached to this contractual arrangement (bond), carry a much
larger explanatory power than any 'transaction cost' interpretation of it. This is even
more so if we consider the fact that the written contractual provisions covered by the
franchise contract have been growing to such an extent that this can almost be
identified as a 'complete' contract (Hadfield, 1990).
Kwon (1993), has proposed an explanation of the increasing adoption of hybrid
organisational forms mainly based on transaction costs. As, he argues, large
transaction costs can in some cases offset the advantages of the franchising contract,
mixing franchising with vertical integration patterns is a way to enhance the
franchising system efficiency giving rise to mixed organisational forms defined as
Partial Vertical Integration (PVI).
Even though we recognise the importance of transaction costs in influencing the
company's organisational choice, it is our opinion that the main explanation for the
adoption of this PVI structure, as mentioned above, rests elsewhere. Our point is
supported by the result of many interviews with franchisors and franchisees (see
Kursh, 1968, Izraeli, 1972, Mendelsohn, 1979, Ones, 1992). What generally resulted
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from these interviews is that the franchising contract, in a sense, can be regarded as a
kind of contract that minimises transaction costs. This comes from the fact that
despite being an incomplete contract, the franchise contract is widely comprehensive
as it takes into account almost all the contingencies that may arise within the
contractual relationship', in this way minimising the possibility of opportunistic
behaviour from either party. Moreover, this argument is supported by the fact that an
extremely low percentage of contract breaches has been observed within franchising
systems (see Ones, 1992a. We obtain analogous results in our empirical investigation
reported in the second part of this study).
The use of a manufacturer's brand name by a retailer involves a number of potential
agency problems.
"After a contract has been struck to provide for the retail distribution of a product,
the retailer must make decisions on prices, sales effort, and any input (for example
servicing) into the quality of the final product; the manufacturer continues to invest in
(national) advertising, product quality and the product's brand name. In general, if all
decisions could be completely specified in the contract, the efficient (joint profit-
maximising) choices could be guaranteed. But costs of enforcing a complete contract,
in particular the costs of monitoring the decisions of contractual parties, lead to an
incomplete contract. In an incomplete contract, principal's or agent's decisions
1 Hadfield (1990), reports an overview of the features of the typical franchising contract and remarks
the breadth of coverage as, she affirms, "the contract contains clauses pertaining to nearly every detail
of operation," (Hadfield, 1990, p.943), which is increased yet further if we take into account the amount
of rules contained in the franchisor operation manual.
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unspecified in the contract will be undertaken ex post on the basis of the
unconstrained self interest of the decision maker given the incentives provided by the
contract; to the extent that this self interest deviates from the collective interest of all
parties to the contract, an efficiency (agency) cost is incurred. /I
(Brickley and Dark, 1987, p.504)
The principal-agent problems that can arise in a retail contract come from the fact that
the agent (retailer) may shirk on the quality of the input provided because he does not
obtain all the benefits accruing from the increased quality. The manufacturer, on the
other hand, may have less than a full incentive to maintain a strong brand name, or,
may act opportunistically, taking advantage of the franchisee's sunk investment (Klein
et al., 1978; Williamson, 1985). Therefore a double-side moral hazard problem may
arise. Since there is a potential for such problems, some authors represent the
franchise contract as an efficient organisational form which minimises agency costs,
including monitoring costs. Actually if principal-agent problems are an important
factor in the determination of the organisational form, they can have a large negative
influence on the vertical integration decision. If there is geographical dispersion
among the outlets so that monitoring costs are high, the franchise contract can be seen
as a substitute for vertical integration. This is so because "it can not only give an
incentive to hard-work by franchisees, but also transmit the profits of franchisees to
the franchisor through the franchise fee, royalties, and the wholesale price mark-up.
So franchising of all outlets may be the long-run equilibrium after expansion of a
franchise system has been completed," (Kwon, 1993).
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Vertical efficiency is, however, restricted by contractual constraints, Kwon suggests.
If we consider, for example, the incomplete information concerning future demand
and retail costs, then the contract should include risk sharing, which leads to an
incentive problem. Moreover, if the franchisee has some bargaining power against the
franchisor, contractual efficiency can be further limited and such factors as
investments in outlet facilities, services provided, etc., cannot be perfectly observed,
therefore they cannot be a basis for legal action.
As a consequence of this, the choice of a manufacturer to retain some outlets and
franchise others, i.e., to revert to vertical integration only 'partially', can enhance the
efficiency of the organisation for several reasons. By running some outlets, the
f
manufacturer can acquire information which enable/him to write an efficient contract.
Additionally, ifhe retains high-demand outlets he can avoid the losses he would incur
by dealing with a 'powerful' franchisee. Moreover, he may invest more or provide
services more efficiently than a franchisee would do and so his outlets may increase
competition among franchisees, if competition can be seen as yielding vertical
efficiency.
In this study we are going to show that the above arguments are flawed in many
respects, and that, despite the existence of these features, some of them are necessary
but not sufficient to explain the adoption of heterogeneous contracts within the firm.
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1.4. Strategic Motives for Vertical Separation
Although the main theories about these kinds of contracts emphasise the incentive
aspects of separation by assessing the existence of traditional agency reasons for
vertical separation, there has recently been some interest in strategic motives''.
Slade (1992), builds up a theoretical model in which only strategic motives can
explain the choice of vertical separation. According to this model she identifies a first
best contract, i.e., a contract which solves the agency problem, and the cases when
manufacturers may benefit from delegating pricing authorities to retail outlets.
Moreover, she finds empirical regularities in a gasoline retailing market consistent
with this model of strategic vertical separation.
J,~~..,. ,,_.,(,.,._ .
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The idea underlying this paper is that "Vertical separation \ is often seen as a way of
harmonising the interests between upstream and downstream firms (Coase, 1937).
Vertical separation, in contrast, can harmonise the interests of competing
manufacturers," (Slade, 1992, p.3). The background to this model is Schelling's (1956)
idea that principals may benefit from delegating authority to agents. This idea has
been formalised by Kurz (1977) who demonstrates that delegating to an agent the
authority to playa game corresponds to a two stage game where players first choose
their utility functions. In the first stage of this two-stage game, which comes from Rey
8 For example, Vickers (1985), Rey and Stiglitz (1985), Bonanno and Vickers (1988).
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and Stiglitz (1985), manufacturers choose the terms of the contracts offered to the
retailers, and, in the second stage, retailers play a game in prices. In particular, if
"...two manufacturers playa game in prices, they could achieve the joint-profit-
maximising outcome if each believed that the other would exactly match his price
changes. However, in the Nash equilibrium of the static game, each has a zero
conjecture and the outcome is inside the Pareto frontier," (ibid.). If, instead, we
consider a two-stage game, involving the delegation of price authority, completely
different results are obtained. Consider a first stage in which manufacturers choose a
wholesale price at which they sell the product to retailers, who have to pay a fixed fee.
Then, in the second stage, a game in retail prices is played if the retailers accept the
contracts. In this framework, if the manufacturer increases the wholesale price, the
retail price will rise as well. Moreover, if prices are strategic substitutes, prices of the
rival retailers will rise. Therefore, the delegation of pricing authority may generate a
certain degree of matching in prices, where this degree depends on the slopes of the
stage-two reaction functions, on the size of the increase in the retail price due to the
increase in the wholesale price and on the degree of substitutability between the two
products, namely, the cross price elasticities of demand. In the precise formulation of
this model, there are upstream duopolists who produce differentiated products at
constant marginal costs. These manufacturers have the possibility to sell their product
to consumers directly, or they can sell it to an exclusive dealer at a certain wholesale
price. The first case is of vertical integration, the second, of vertical separation, which
is modelled as a two-stage game. This model, however, relies on several strong
assumptions which are not likely to hold in practice. Firstly, there is assumed to be no
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uncertainty. This assumption is drastic and, as we will make clear later, not realistic. It
implies that there are no agency problems such as moral hazard or risk aversion and,
therefore, that there is no need for the manufacturer to insure the retailer. Secondly,
Slade assumes contracts can be observed. Additionally, contracts cannot be
renegotiated, each manufacturer has only one retailer, the contracts are linear and,
finally, that the stage-two game is static.
Slade tests this model by studying the correlation between contract type and station
characteristics in the retail gasoline market. While this work provides empirical
support to strategic motives for vertical separation, she finds that none of the existing
models can explain empirical regularities. However, even though she finds empirical
evidence consistent with her theory, the predictions of her model cannot be considered
universally valid because they rely on some assumptions which seldom hold in reality
and which conflict with the incentive motive. That is, her model focuses on the fact
that potential franchisees have no information about the prospective profitability of
the franchise, while it neglects all the other problems which arise from the asymmetric
information existing between the principal and the agent.
1.5. Models Based on Information Asymmetries
So far we have merely sketched the main factors that explain the choice of share
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contracts, and in particular of the franchise contract, as being asymmetric information
on either the agent's or the principal's side, which gives rise to moral hazard problems
on the side of the principal (franchisor), and on the part of the agent (franchisee), risk,
locational factors (and monitoring costs) and the franchisor's need for capital. We will
now analyse each of them in more detail.
1.5.1. Signalling Models
Gallini and Lutz (1992) set up a model where franchisors have private information
about the value of their franchise that they try to communicate to potential franchisees.
Their explanation of the simultaneous existence of franchised and company owned
outlets rests on the observation that franchisors often acquire private information, not
available to franchisees, on product demand through their marketing efforts. Under
this assumption of asymmetric information, they show that a franchisor makes use of
both direct ownership as well as the franchise contract to convey information about a
new product. The originality of this model rests on the fact that, in contrast with the
alternative explanations advanced in the literature, the authors' explanation for the
dual distribution relies neither on capital market imperfection (see below), nor upon
location-specific factors. As they remark, although franchising is a thriving
organisational form, the economic success of a franchise, especially of a new product,
is not guaranteed. Therefore purchasers of new franchises operate in uncertain
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markets, commit themselves to large sunk investments, and their profits depend on a
complex relationship with the seller of the franchise. Although the potential
franchisees may have access to the same marketing data as the franchisors, they are
less able than the franchisors to identify whether a product's success is location-
specific, is attributable to the efforts of the owner or is due to high demand. Therefore
a franchisee will want some assurance that the franchise is profitable. Under this
assumption of asymmetric information, they show that the franchisor will use two
instruments to convey information about the new products: a dual distribution, that is,
selling products through company-owned and franchised outlets, and a royalty in the
franchise contract. Their analysis is based mainly on Leyland and Pyle's (1977) study
of how an entrepreneur can signal high profitability of his product/project to potential
shareholders by investing in the project himself, while he is not willing to invest his
money in low value projects. In addition to predicting when a finn with private
information will directly invest in the product (as in Leyland and Pyle), their model
explains the specific form of that investment, i.e.i direct investment in company
ownership vs. share contracts with franchisees. That is, they analyse the trade-off
among multiple instruments for signalling.
Moreover, their explanation does not rely either on the capital market constraint
argument or upon the locational theory, and the predictions of the signalling model
differ sharply from those of the two previous standard theories. Namely, the signalling
explanation for dual distribution predicts that, over time, the proportion of company
owned outlets falls as the franchisor's private information is revealed to prospective
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franchisees.
Note, however, that this model does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the use
of different kinds of organisation within a firm because it relies on only one aspect,
i.e., the case of new products, which is not the principal aspect of the several problems
that the asymmetric information argument presents in our analysis.
Lafontaine (1993) investigates whether signalling motives can explain franchising. In
this paper she shows that franchisors who are just becoming involved in this
contractual option, signal their type through the decision to operate outlets directly,
and by means of their choice of the contract terms. This argument, though, would
make sense only if this mixed-contractual choice were adopted by newly established
firms, or firms that have just decided to enter franchise, this is not what is observed in
reality where mature firms keep the ownership of part of their outlets. Second,
Lafontaine's claim that royalty rates and franchise fees are used to signal to potential
franchisees the value of a franchise, does not enjoy evidence from her data. This, she
argues, suggests that there are other factors beside the signalling motive that influence
both contract typology and contract terms choice of the company.
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1.5.2. Moral Hazard Models
Brickley and Dark (1987) identify several agency problems associated with franchised
and centrally-owned units. Companies involved in franchising usually have valuable
brand names. Therefore they have to control the actions of the agents throughout the
organisation to ensure the continued value of the trademark because both managers
and franchisees may have no interest in spending excessive effort in maintaining the
quality and the reputation of the product. The managers may shirk orland take
perquisites, while the franchisees may supply lower quality than required.
According to Fama and Jensen (1983 a, b), there can be two possible ways to control
the behaviour of the agents in the firm. The first could be having monitoring systems
that limit the discretion of the decision agents, and the second could consist in
delegating the ownership of residual rights to the decision agents who will bear the
wealth effects of their actions. But, on the one hand, companies with valuable brand
names are not likely to give the residual rights to the decision makers of all the units
since some central control is necessary to maintain the trademark value, while, on the
other, centrally operating all the units may be very costly because building up a
monitoring system to control the behaviour of the employees can be very costly,
especially when all the outlets are dispersed on a wide geographic area. It follows that
franchising can be seen as a hybrid between the two methods of controlling agency
problems, that is, monitoring systems and residual ownership. In practice, even if the
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franchisee is the residual claimant of his unit, he does not have full decision rights; the
central company retains some decision rights plus the authority to monitor the
franchisee for product quality and to terminate the contract in case this quality is not
maintained. Free riding by the franchisee can be a problem when there is an incentive
to supply lower-quality goods. This incentive is particularly strong when the
probability of repeat sales to a customer is low. After receiving a low quality product,
a customer is unlikely to return to the chain, thus hurting other franchisees and the
value of the franchisor's trademark. Moreover a franchisee may have less than full
incentive to advertise the product since some of the benefits of this advertising will go
to other retailers.
There are, however, some trade-offs associated with the choice of the organisational
form. The managers of the company-owned outlet receive fixed salaries while
franchisees are residual claimants of the unit's profits. Therefore, while in the latter
case, the franchisees will bear the costs and benefits of their actions, in the former
case, managers will not bear such costs. As a consequence, managers may have an
incentive to shirk and take perquisites.
Mathewson and Winter (1985) focus on the franchise contract and the potential
agency problems that derive from it. They identify the same potential moral hazard
problem: "The manufacturer upstream gains profits through a positive wholesale
mark-up or revenue sharing as local demand increases (a vertical externality), and to
the extent that the retailer's quality input adds to the national brand name of the
product, both the manufacturer and other retailers benefit." But in a share contract,
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such as the franchise, they argue, moral hazard problems can arise for both parties.
"Similarly, the manufacturer has less than full incentive to maintain a strong brand
name. If the set up costs of establishing the bulk of the manufacturer's retail
distribution system have been sunk by retailers, then the existing retailers must be
earning quasi rents (returns on the contract specific investments), which are
maintained if the brand name is maintained. Retailers therefore share in the benefits of
a strong brand name;' (Mathewson and Winter, 1985, p.504). In this model, the
franchisor, or principal, creates a brand name for a single product through national
advertising. He leases the exclusive right to produce and sell it to a franchisee, or
agent, who adds additional quality to the product. There are two potential free-riding
or externality features to this arrangement: firstly, the agent can free ride (vertically)
on the national brand name; and secondly, with transient customers, any agent can free
ride (horizontally) on the local quality of other agents. With national brand names
created and leased by the principal, vertical externalities are always present". The
basic informational asymmetry that is central to this model is exactly the opposite of
the one analysed by Gallini and Lutz (1992). The basic assumption of this model is
that the local demand for the franchised product is uncertain. There can be two states
of the world: state I: low demand or 'bad times', and state 2: high demand or 'good
times'. The uncertainty of success at any given retail site and the division of the costs
of developing the business at any site between the principal and the agent seem to be
9 Horizontal externalities are sometimes invoked as the critical source of the franchise restrictions, (see
Rubin, 1978).
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central aspects of most conventional retail franchises. Sometimes, when the
franchisee signs the contract, he does not yet know which retail site he will be
assigned. In this model, the authors assume that the informational asymmetry concerns
the fact that, after signing the contract and being assigned a territory, the agent
costIessly observes the state of local demand before undertaking any further action.
Hence the principal must rely on the agent's actions to obtain information on local
demand. The contract specifies a payment scheme plus the quality of the input of the
franchisee in each of the two states of demand and brand name investment. The
franchisor will monitor the franchisee since there is the possibility of cheating which
arises from the presence of both horizontal and vertical externalities. Since the
franchisor cannot costlessly identify the realised state of demand, there is an incentive
for the franchisee to declare the low level of demand when the 'good state' has
occurred if doing so generates rents to him. If the output is correctly measured by the
franchisor, the franchisee can cheat by reducing local quality to free ride on the
national brand name and realise any possible rents which derive from misrepresenting
the true state of demand. When there are rents which come from local quality but
which cannot be appropriated by the local retailer because of transient consumers,
each franchisee has an incentive to reduce the local quality to the level that yields
output consistent with state-decIaration. Hence in both cases, of vertical free riding
and of horizontal free riding, the rents from cheating arise from saving on local
quality, and, the larger the contractual level of local quality in the 'bad state', the
greater the incentive to cheat.
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Besides the possibility of cheating on the agent's side, there is the possibility of
cheating on the principal's side as well, as we observed above. This possibility, for
vertical free riding in the contract by the franchisor, comes from the fact that the
amount of investment in the national brand name that the franchisor has to make does
not need to be specified in the contract. This is so because, since contracts normally
last for many years, there may be unforeseen events or contingencies which affect this
level of investment, and therefore both parties may be better off if the principal has the
possibility to set it in the light of such events. But the possibility to vary this level
brings about an incentive for the franchisor to reduce it if he does not fully bear the
costs of reducing the amount of investment because of the revenue-sharing
arrangements. The last assumption of this model, then, is that there is noiseless
monitoring of the local quality by the franchisor and its frequency is specified in the
contract.
After setting out all these specifications, Mathewson and Winter proceed to ask which
contract is the first best and why revenue-sharing contracts are used instead of the first
best. The first best contract would elicit optimal local quality decisions and maximum
rents for the franchisors. Such a contract would involve leasing the trademark to a
local retailer for a lump-sum payment and establishing contractually a monitoring
mechanism to detect cheating. But, as the authors show, an incomplete contract driven
only by an asymmetry on the state of local demand between the franchisor and the
franchisee is not sufficient for profit-sharing franchise contracts. They argue that with
noiseless monitoring, some form of a binding wealth constraint for the franchisee is a
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necessary and sufficient condition for a franchise contract. With a zero wealth
constraint, the franchise contract must generate sufficient surplus in the 'bad state' for
the franchisee to pay the royalty fee ex post. However, the profits accruing to the agent
in the 'good state' are necessary to guarantee an incentive for the agent to reveal
truthfully the occurrence of this state. Moreover, these profits must exceed the
expected quasi-rents generated by the agent if he misdeclares the state. "Under such a
scheme, the royalty fee payable to the principal in the optimal contract varies with the
state of demand, that is, a revenue sharing scheme is in force. Rents accrue to the
franchisee if the expected returns necessary to insure truthful transmission of the local
demand states by the franchisee to the franchisor exceed the opportunity cost for the
franchisee. In this case we may observe queues of potential franchisees," (Mathewson
and Winter, 1985, p.5Il).
1.6. Risk Sharing Models
A central feature of the literature on alternative organisational forms is that among the
different economic forces which determine which organisational form is optimal,
"franchise operations are the result of forces that restrict residual risk bearing to
important decision makers," (Norton, 1988, p.20l).
Franchisees can be seen as owner- managers who bear the residual risks of a
39
local operation. Their income depends on the difference between the stochastic
revenue inflows to the local operation and promised payments to other factors of
production. According to Norton (1988), the risk-bearing of franchisees is different
from that of other organisational forms in two respects. Firstly, in many economic
organisations the management of the firm is separate from the risk-bearing function.
Secondly, franchisees become last claimants after paying a franchise fee and a royalty
rate, while some labour contracts make employees, especially managers, residual
claimants in a different way (Lazear, 1981). The explicit payments make franchisees
residual claimants to a higher degree than most employees; moreover, franchising may
reflect the limits to bonding in employment contracts (Eaton and White, 1982).
Risk sharing was first proposed by Cheung (1969) to explain the existence of
sharecropping, which can be seen as one of the earliest examples of incentive
contracts. If we assume that both parties are risk averse, they both benefit from the
insurance that comes from the use of a share contract. Martin (1988) puts forward a
similar argument to explain the use of franchise contracts. He says that to exploit
economies of scale in promoting products and in monitoring all the retailers, a large
number of outlets at heterogeneous locations is needed.
"Different locations have different expected returns and different risk characteristics.
Franchising allows the firm to exploit these economies of scale and at the same time
to shed 'risky' locations and retain more profitable sites as company-owned outlets.
The franchisor may choose to franchise risky locations as a consequence of simple
risk aversion or, if the franchisor is risk neutral, because monitoring costs rise as risk
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increases. A location with substantial variation in sales will require closer
supervision as a company-owned outlet than a location with very little variation in
sales. Hence higher risk may induce higher monitoring costs. The franchisor's ability
to shift the risk to franchisees will be limited by franchisee's risk aversion and by the
expected profitability of the sites. Franchisees will be willing to accept higher risk if
they are rewarded appropriately with higher expected returns. "
(Martin, 1988, p.9S4)
In this paper, Martin makes an empirical analysis of some basic hypotheses about why
many firms rely on a mix of franchising and company-owned outlets for expansion.
The results of his work lead him to conclude that franchising is not a temporary phase
on the path to complete ownership integration. On the contrary it represents a long run
market solution to monitoring and risk diversification problems. Martins' theory,
however, is flawed in many respects, most important, as we will discuss below in
deeper details, in its assumptions about the principal's and agent's attitude towards
risk, and in the suggested way to allocate the risk between them.
According to Brickley and Dark (1987), one of the costs associated with franchising
comes from the associated inefficient risk bearing. "If the manager of a franchised unit
has a large proportion of his wealth and income tied to the performance of the unit, his
investment portfolio will be relatively undiversified," (ibid., p.4DS). This inefficient
risk bearing generates at least two types of agency costs. The first comes from the fact
that the manager can make less than ideal investment decisions than an efficiently
diversified decision maker. The second is due to the higher required rates of expected
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compensation because of the increased risk.
While all the literature focusing on contractual relationships characterised by single-
sided moral hazard find that the trade-off between risk sharing and efficient
production are fundamental in determining optimal linear contracts, Bhattacharyya
and Lafontaine (1995) show that the insurance motive does not need to be invoked at
all to obtain revenue sharing and linearity of contracts. This result, however, is derived
under specific assumptions on probability distributions, utility functions, and, most
important, by assuming that the parties involved in the contractual relationship are
both risk neutral. We rather tend to believe that a closer representation of the attitude
towards risk of the two actors of this contractual arrangement would see the principal
as being risk neutral and the agent risk-averse. This paper, however, concentrates the
analysis on contract terms rather than on the existence of contract mixing.
1.7. The Capital Market Imperfection Argument
A common explanation for the franchising of independent firms, rather than reliance
on expansion by wholly-owned subsidiaries, is that franchising is a method used by
the franchisor to raise capital'". In fact, until Rubin (1978) exposed the flaw of this
10 "Franchisors create these systems because they have too little capital to consider a wholly-owned
chain"; Caves and Murphy (1976). Also Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969) argue that these firms are in
franchising because they do not, or did not, have the necessary capital to expand through company-
operated outlets.
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argument, it was generally considered true that a company, facing a capital constraint,
would have been able to raise capital through franchising at a lower cost than through
other arrangements. This traditional explanation is fallacious in many ways. First of
all, the idea of a franchisor using franchising only when he has not access to capital on
his own implies that, as his company matures and gains access to capital, he should
then transform the franchised outlet into a company-owned one; as a consequence we
should observe a trend towards company operation. Such a trend has not been
observed, on the contrary, as we will demonstrate in more detail in the empirical
section of this work, the converse has been the case. Second, sometimes franchisors
offer finance to their franchisees. Finally, the investment of the franchisee seems
riskier than that of the franchisor because investing in a single outlet is much riskier
than investing in a portfolio of shares of all the outlets in a chain. Therefore, if the
franchisee is required to invest in only one or a few outlets, he will require a higher
rate of return on his capital, thus inducing the franchisor to earn less. But, as Rubin
(1978) has pointed out, this argument makes sense only if we assume that franchisors
are more risk averse than franchisees, which is unlikely to be the case. Moreover, if
this were the case, a franchisor could obtain cheaper capital by offering shares of all
his outlets to his store managers. If we consider the existence of an incentive problem,
however, this argument makes more sense; that is, if the retailers cannot fully
appropriate the benefits coming from their efforts, they would be induced to expend a
low level of effort. The store managers, knowing that, could ask for a higher rate of
return than a franchisee would do. But, in such a case, the franchisor should opt for a
contract like the first best contract of the Mathewson and Winter model i.e., a fixed
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rent contract. However, the presence of incentive problems on the franchisor's side
and the need to insure his franchisees lead to the use of a different contract, namely a
sharing contract.
Nevertheless, Martin (1988) affirms that capital market imperfections, such as tight
credit conditions with high real interest rates and credit rationing, can push a company
to make use of the franchise contract but, he remarks, there are forces that push in
different directions according to whether the franchisor is a mature or immature firm.
If, for example, the franchisor is a mature firm and wants to acquire some outlets as
franchised but cannot because of tight credit conditions, then he can retain these sites
as company-owned, to avoid losing them, and at a later date, when credit conditions
improve, he can franchise them. In the case when the franchisor is a young immature
firm, in tight credit conditions he may have no access to national capital markets.
Therefore, failure to adjust the ratio of company-owned outlets could involve the loss
of attractive sites and thus imply a slower rate of growth. In such a case the franchisor
would franchise the outlet and then recapture it as company-owned when the franchise
contract expires. According to Martin's argument, however, credit market conditions
seem to influence only the short-run mix of company-owned and franchised outlets,
and not also the long-run.
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1.8. Locational Factors and the Monitoring Costs Hypothesis
In discussing about the nature of the finn, Stigler (1968) outlines the concept of
"functions" or "activities" of a finn. His explanation for vertical integration is mainly
based on the notion that the different functions performed by a finn will reach their
lowest cost level at different levels. Rubin (1978) puts forward this argument as a
basis for a theory of finn expansion. Therefore, we can use this concept in the case of
the franchising-vertical integration mix.
According to this idea, we would argue that the franchisor will tend to perform
functions with costs which fall for a substantial level of output, while the franchisee
will tend to undertake functions whose average cost curve reaches its minimum for a
lower level of output. The main activity of the franchisee consists of the management
operations of the business. Since the costs of this function quickly become large
because of the problem of controlling local managers, it may pay to separate this
function from the others directly operated by the finn and transfer it to a franchisee.
Accordingly, Rubin (1978) suggests that physical dispersion is the relevant market
parameter that makes conventional organisation form prohibitive. Obviously, the
further is the operation from the monitor, say the branch headquarters, the higher the
costs of monitoring local operations will be. Hence at a certain point, the monitoring
costs associated with intra-firm specialisation will exceed the benefits. Essentially,
"Franchising loses the efficiency of specialisation but also avoids the monitoring costs
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because the local manager is now an investor whose wealth is strongly dependent on
the performance of the local unit", (Norton, 1988, p.202). This argument also derives
from the work of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and of Jensen and Meckling (1976) on
monitoring and control within the firm. According to these authors, franchising is
usually undertaken when the franchisee is physically removed from the franchisor, and
thus where monitoring of the performance and behaviour of the franchisee would be
difficult. In such a situation it pays to devise control mechanisms which give the
franchisee an incentive to be efficient, i.e., to avoid shirking and consumption of
leisure. If such mechanisms can be set up, both parties would benefit. Consequently, if
franchising is used because the behaviour of store managers is difficult to control,
then it follows that when there is a high concentration of retailers in a certain area, this
problem should be reduced by means of a supervisor who could monitor several stores
together. However, when the outlets are geographically separated, such monitoring
would be more expensive. But when a firm begins to operate, it is not likely to have
many outlets in the same geographical area, and so only after some time, if it is
successful, it can own many retailers in large urban areas since it is worth buying back
the franchises.
Martin (1988) stresses the importance of this argument in the decision of retaining vs.
franchising an outlet. "Hence," he says, "we may expect that remote locations will be
franchised and that geographically concentrated locations will be retained as
company-owned outlets." (Martin, 1988, p.955). Moreover, he adds, franchised outlets
must also be monitored because, as we said above, franchisees have an incentive to
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free ride against the quality choice of other franchisees. The need to monitor the
franchisee's quality choice, however, declines as the proportion of repeat customers
increases, since It ••• the market will monitor them when transient customers are rare"
(ibid.). This reinforces the tendency to franchise outlets in more remote locations.
Monitoring costs, in fact, are likely to be lower in urban than in rural areas because
urban areas are more easily accessible, therefore travelling costs are reduced, and
because of possible economies of scale when a firm has multiple units in a given area.
Furthermore, we have to consider other arguments related to the monitoring costs
hypothesis. First, the variability of demand. When there is high variability of demand,
the manufacturer must monitor more frequently the outlets to avoid the moral hazard
problem reported above i.e., the franchisees' misrepresenting the state of the demand.
Second, the level of local quality that must be added to the product. If the retailer is
supposed to add a high degree of quality to the product, there is a higher risk of
cheating, therefore the franchisor must make a greater effort to monitor the outlets.
According to a rather old argument (Alchian, 1950; Fama and Jensen, 1983),
surviving firms will be organised in a manner that allows delivery of the product at the
lowest price, while still covering costs. "An organisational form survives in an activity
when the costs and benefits of its residual claims and approaches it provides in
controlling agency problems combine with available production technology to allow
the organisation to deliver products at lower prices than other organisational forms. It
(Fama and Jensen, 1983, p.333).
This suggests that when there is a large distance between the site of production and
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the final market, the cost of transporting the products may be too high when compared
with revenues, therefore the manufacturer has an incentive to establish a centre of
production near to the final market. In this way, economies of scale may arise,
especially if the firm has multiple outlets in that market.
Brickley and Dark (1986), however, demonstrate that the transport cost argument is
no longer valid since agency costs playa major role in the choice of the organisational
form.
We will explore these two contrasting arguments in our empirical research reported in
the second part of this work.
1.9. Empirical Works on Contract Mixing
In this section we will briefly review the existing empirical literature concernmg
contractual forms and vertical separation. In particular, we will focus on the papers
which examine manufacturers' decision to mix company-owned and franchised
IIIn this section we present a short overview of the empirical research on 'contract mix' to complete the
picture of the existing literature on the topic. A deeper analysis of this literature is presented in the
empirical part of this work, where we highlight the hypotheses deriving from this literature, and
compare and test them against the hypotheses proposed by this study.
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The most part of empirical studies in this literature have examined the relationships
among contractual forms and agent's choices by looking at vertical restraints as a
response to principal-agent problems.
Brickley and Dark (1987), investigate the effects of monitoring costs and initial
investment on the upstream firm's decision to operate downstream units as franchised
rather than company-owned outlets. They find patterns consistent with franchising to
economise on monitoring costs at remote outlets and with company ownership to
minimise free riding on the reputation of the upstream firm. Hence, their empirical
results support the notion that owning versus franchising reflects a trade-off among
agency problems of the kind reported in the preceding sections of this study.
Analogously, Brickley, Dark and Weisbach (1991) report that, according to their
results, franchising is a method of internalising the costs of shirking and perquisite-
taking to the unit managers. Their analysis further suggests that the costs of
franchising increase with the required per-unit investment due to inefficient risk
bearing considerations. Moreover, in contrast with the traditional capital-constraint
argument, they find that the likelihood of franchising decreases as per-unit capital
requirements increase.
Norton (1988) performs empirical tests on the incidence of franchise contracts as an
organisational form for three industries in the USA. His results suggest that both
principal-agent incentives and informational incentives favour the use of franchise
arrangements. Similarly, he reports some anecdotal evidence from the managerial-
institutional literature which is also consistent with the physical dispersion, brand-
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name capital, and managerial screening explanations.
According to Martin's (1988) results, franchising represents a long-run market
solution to monitoring and risk diversification problems. In this paper he performs a
franchisor life-cycle study which reveals that the proportion of company-owned
outlets declines in the long run. The signs and the significance levels of the relative
profitability and risk variables in this industry model are consistent with the
hypothesis that uncertainty does matter in the franchising choice. These results rule
out the capital shortage as the only reason for franchising because, if this were true,
we should observe franchising only as a transitory phenomenon, which is not the case.
Moreover, given various sites with different risk and expected return characteristics,
the firm will take advantage of the opportunity to diversify the risk and to shed
locations with higher risk-induced monitoring costs.
The results of all the models examined in this chapter, however, lead to the conclusion
that with homogeneous outlets, the chains are fully franchised or fully company-
owned; none of them is able to explain the existence of a mixture of contracts. In the
following chapter we attempt to find an explanation on this avenue. In the second part
of this work, then, we develop the analysis through empirically testable propositions.
To conclude, we have to mention two articles which provide an empirical assessment
of recent developments in the area of agency theory in the context of partial vertical
integration. First, Lafontaine (1992) tests various agency-theoretic explanation for
franchising including risk sharing, one-sided moral hazard, and two sided moral
hazard. "The empirical results are broadly consistent with a two-sided hidden action or
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moral-hazard explanation of franchising, suggesting that there really are incentive
issues on both sides. This result is consistent with previous empirical work (...). The
notion that franchisees are more highly motivated than hired managers, and that this is
a major advantage of franchising, is pervasive in that literature," (Lafontaine 1992,
p.28l).
Second, Shepard's (1993) findings confirm the idea that upstream firms offer contracts
that allocate control in ways that best align the incentives and opportunities of
downstream agents with upstream interests. She presents some empirical evidence
from gasoline retailing which induce' her to conclude that "contractual forms well
suited to providing incentives are used when the downstream production process is
affected in an important way by unobservable agent choices. Forms well suited to
detailed, direct control are chosen when important downstream choices are observable
(...). One of the issues of considerable theoretical and empirical interest not addressed
by this study is how the set of observed contracts is constructed. This article has taken
this set as given, but it is not so obvious that these three forms include the optimal
contract for any given station. Indeed, it is easy to imagine alternative forms that
might better protect the principal's interest. (...) Further work on this issue would be





This chapter provided an overview of the existing literature concernmg to the
presence of different forms of organisations within the same firm, namely, the
coexistence of vertical integration and vertical restraint patterns. In particular, among
the different kinds of contract which arise from vertical separation, it focused on the
franchise contract.
Several messages emerged from this preceding overview. First, vertical restraints may
be seen as a response to principal-agent problems. Second, the use of a mixture of
organisational forms within the same firm is determined by the choice of the optimal
contracts, given agency costs. Third, more recent work highlights the importance of
asymmetric-information problems and such related issues as moral hazard, risk
sharing and monitoring costs. Nevertheless, it is clear from this analysis of the
literature, that none of these models has been able to explain why firms choose a
hybrid form of organisation, which arises from the adoption of heterogeneous
contracts.
We shall attempt to fill this void in the remainder of this study. Firstly, to lay
foundations for our analysis, we are going to make use of the results of some of these
deficient theories which enjoyed support from empirical evidence. In addition, we are
going to look at some models from labour economics, namely, those related to the
selection of potential workers. Finally, we are going to amalgamate and extend them
in order to formulate our problem as one of designing a contract, or set of contracts,
that are optimal from the principal's and the agent's point of view.
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2. The Design of Organisational Forms in the
Presence of Uncertainty and Asymmetric Information:
Integration, Delegation, or Both?
2.1. Introduction
Despite the large number of papers recently produced on the analysis of vertical
restraints and their welfare implications, no clear unitary view has arisen on whether
such contractual arrangements are adopted by manufacturers in order to enhance their
monopoly power rather than for efficiency reasons (see Waterson, 1993, Seabright,
1996, and Dobson and Waterson, 1996). The lack of a unitary view is consequently
reflected in the lack of a clear approach towards public policy implications of such
contractual arrangements. Such is, for example, the case of the UK, where, as
Seabright points out, while the policy measures on mergers and acquisitions are well
defined, this is not the case for vertical restraints.
The general conclusion, which both the theory and public policy (both in EU and US)
seem to suggest is that there is actually no general benchmark response to refer to, but
rather, given the different circumstances in which these contracts are adopted, each
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case should be analysed in its own specific context.
In this study we investigate the case of partial vertical integration CPV!) in order to
see whether the contemporaneous adoption of a form of vertical restraint such as
franchising, and vertical integration can be a possible achieved by the market in order
to overcome information asymmetries and uncertainty related problems, rather than
competition restricting purposes 12. The general approach followed in this chapter
consists of studying whether heterogeneous contracts can be the result of a total
surplus maximisation, of heterogeneous agents on the one side, and manufacturers on
the other, in a competitive framework. Being very limited to this specific case, the
analysis that follows cannot claim generality of its results. Nevertheless, it produces
interesting insights.
More specifically, in this chapter we look at the design of industrial organisational
forms/contracts by considering the case of a typical company that has to distribute its
products/services on the market via a retail network of outlets. In order to do so, this
company has to choose whether to retain these outlets in its ownership within a
vertically integrated structure, or delegate their operation to independent retailers by
means of a different contract, e.g., franchise. Alternatively, it could mix the two
organisational forms, thus adopting a partially vertically integrated structure (PVI).
12 Here we do not study (private and public) welfare effects of vertical restraints. See Dobson and
Waterson, 1996 for an analysis of the issue.
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As was illustrated in the previous chapter, many empirical works report on the
coexistence of these two different organisational forms within the same company,
resulting in the adoption of 'hybrid' organisational forms':'. However, as we pointed
out, the existing literature has not provided a satisfactory explanation of the
phenomenon of PVI. Several types of models have highlighted different relevant
aspects of the issue by stressing the importance of various variables affecting the
organisational choice. Yet, none of these models has provided a thorough explanation
of the observed contract-mix.
With the exception of very few works, the literature on franchising has modelled the
upstream firm decision to franchise rather than own the unit downstream on the basis
of heterogeneity across outlets. This heterogeneity was identified by different
characteristics e.g., initial investment required downstream (Caves and Murphy, 1976;
Brickley, Dark and Weisbach, 1991) the location of the outlet, and its distance from
the company head office, briefly, the costs of monitoring the outlet's operation (inter
alia, Brickley and Dark, 1987; Lafontaine and Bhattarcharyya, 1995), the risk involved
in the operation in a certain location (Martin, 1988; Norton, 1988), the typology of
customers (Klein, 1980; Brickley and Dark, 1987). As Scott (1995) remarks
"heterogeneity across outlets goes a long way toward explaining firm's choices of
franchising vs. company-ownership," (p.70). Applying the results obtained by this
literature to the case of homogeneous outlets would result in expecting a company to
13 Inter alia, Rubin (1978), Brickley and Dark (1987), Martin (1988), Brickley, Dark and Weisbach
(1991), Lafontaine (1992), Shepard (1993) and Kwon (1993).
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be either fully franchised or fully integrated". This result is not consistent with the
empirical observation's. In fact, in real-world markets, covariance between contract
terms and outlet characteristics is not generally observed. On the contrary, only two
customised contracts are adopted (Lafontaine and Shaw, 1996). Indeed, when
reporting the main explanations provided by the literature to the question "what
factors should enter the decision between establishing a particular unit as a franchise
or keeping it under company ownership?" Milgrom and Roberts (1992) assert that
none of them seems to be conclusive and their final answer to the question is "We
know of no satisfactory explanation for this," (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p.S66).
The aim of this study is to investigate this issue. It intends to provide a rationale for
PVI and to show that human capital issues, coupled with risk sharing and incentive
issues drive this mixed organisational choice.
In the present chapter we investigate the question from a theoretical point of view
along the lines of an agency relationship problem. We explore whether the existence
14 As even in the case of homogeneous outlets the existence of hybrid types of organisation has been
reported by most empirical literature, see supra, previous footnote.
14 This theoretical puzzle gains momentum in the light of a recently growing tendency towards
homogeneity in the retailing industry. As reported by the Financial Times (18.1.1995, p.8), the retailing
industry is experiencing an increasing development of large out of town multi franchise dealers. These
sites generally present extremely homogeneous characteristics in terms of distance from city centres,
areas of location, size, layout, etc. Moreover, many chains adopting this organisational form present
perfectly homogeneous outlets in terms of the features mentioned above and even of the layout of the
products. This is, for example, the case of the chains "The Body Shop", and "Tie Rack", where all the
outlets are exactly the same.
IS As even in the case of homogeneous outlets the existence of hybrid types of organisation has been
reported by most empirical literature, see supra, footnote 13.
17 See for example Guasch and Weiss (1980, 1981), and Coyte (1984).
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of these 'hybrid' organisational forms can be explained by the presence of uncertainty
and asymmetric information when uncertainty concerns the state of the demand for the
final product/service, and the informational asymmetries are twofold. First, they take
the form of hidden action, in that the agent, the manager of the outlet, can cheat by
choosing an action which is not optimal from the point of view of the principal, the
manufacturer (moral hazard problem). Secondly, we highlight the presence of
information hidden from the principal relating to the productivity level of potential
agents when they can be of two different types, i.e., high and low productivity, which
gives rise to a problem of adverse selection never investigated by the existing
literature on the topic.
More specifically, we intend to study whether a firm's choice to expand through
vertical integration or, instead, to employ 'partial vertical integration' by means of
franchising contracts, may also depend on human capital issues, in other words, on
hiring the right kind of agents (highly skilled managers and/or franchisees). When the
ability and the motivation of the potential agent are unknown to the principal, the
form of contract can be used as a screening device to generate a self selection process
so that only high-skill workers would choose to sign the contract. A well established
theme in labour economics'{ suggests that "... firms can offer complicated wage-
packages or wage plans and tests to compel heterogeneous potential employees to
self-select according to their abilities," (Martin, 1988, p.205).
To sum up, this work aims at exploring whether the choice of a partially vertically
integrated form -contract mix- can represent an organisational form which enables the
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firm to overcome the moral hazard and adverse selection problems it faces in selecting
managerial compensation schemes, within an uncertainty framework, where the agent
is risk averse and the principal is risk neutral. Unfortunately, analytical intractability
arises when trying to model all these features. As a result, this problem is solved by
means of simulations, with intuition provided by diagrams. Hence, the general
emphasis of this study, as well as the assumptions on which it relies, reflect the need
of our particular investigation, and specifically, of looking for an explanation of PVI
in the retailing sector.
Finally, we perform a comparative static analysis of the model by means of
simulations. These experiments show in what way this organisational form is expected
to change over the cycle. That is, the results of this model show that when demand
increases, the company will expand via a larger adoption of franchising, consistent
with the evidence reported by most empirical literature.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: after a brief discussion of the hypothesis
proposed by this study to explain PVI in section 2.2, in section 2.3 we develop a
model characterised by uncertainty about the state of the world and asymmetric
information between a principal (the finn) and his agent (the manager). In first
instance, section 2.3, the finn is assumed to operate in a perfectly competitive market
while this assumption is relaxed in section 2.4 to one of monopolistic competition. In
each case, the model is solved using non-linear programming, to show the existence of
a separating equilibrium characterised by partial vertical integration of firms. The
changing nature of this equilibrium over the business cycle is then assessed in the
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following sections. Final remarks about the policy implications of these findings are
presented in the conclusion. An empirical estimation of this model is then presented in
the second part of this study.
2.2. Heterogeneous Labour Contracts as a Selection and Incentive
Device for Heterogeneous Workers
Among the various models on incentive contracts'! suggested by the literature, the
sharecropping contract is considered an effective contractual form to enable a
principal to select high-skill workers. Sharecropping, which can be regarded as one of
the earliest examples of incentive contracts, was first explained by Cheung (1969)19
with risk sharing issues. Franchising and sharecropping share many similarities,
18 According to Coyte (1984), the literature concerning employment contracts under asymmetric
information has pursued three main avenues. "First, researchers have considered contracts in which the
supply of employee effort is costly to monitor. Second, the allocation of labour has been examined
when innate person-specific characteristics are unobservable. Third, employment contracts have been
designed when economic agents are uncertain about the state of nature concerning the worker's
marginal product and the employee's reservation wage," (Coyte 1984, p.469). These three branches of
the literature have produced several models which aim to design contracts capable of reducing the
distortionary effect of asymmetric information. Although these models acknowledge the existence of an
incentive for the employer to screen the employees and suggest different screening mechanisms (see
Guasch and Weiss, 1981, for example), they do not take into consideration the impact of these
mechanisms on the optimal employment contract. In the analysis performed here, we will try and
incorporate all of these three mechanisms, and to explore whether they can contribute to explain the
existence of contractual heterogeneity within the firm.
19 Cheung's analysis does not involve any information asymmetries.
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hence, we can examine if the rationale for sharecropping can, and, if so, to what
extent, be applicable to the choice of distribution forms, such as franchised and
company-owned outlets.
The logic of sharecropping contracts rests on the fact that a success-dependent
compensation package would not be accepted by low-skill agents. On the other hand,
high-skill agents would prefer it to a fixed salary because it makes their wealth
dependent on residual income. As a consequence, "... one reason for a firm to choose
franchising as a distribution form would be to facilitate managerial selection, because
competent and motivated agents would accept (prefer) franchisee status," (Norton,
1988, p.20S). Therefore the form of contract may be viewed as a screening device to
select high-skill workers when ability levels are "hidden information" from the
principal (Hallagan, 1978; Allen, 1982).
Hallagan (1978) builds up a model of self selection by contractual choice in the theory
of sharecropping. In this model, he remarks that the coexistence of wages, rents and
share contracts allows landlords to allocate resources more efficiently because it
generates information on the ability of tenants. Those with high ability choose rent
contracts so that they gain all the return to their ability; those with low ability choose
wage contracts since these make their payments independent of their ability, and those
ofintennediate ability choose share contracts'".
20 Hallagan argues against Cheung's risk sharing argument by stating that this result holds also if all
individuals are risk neutral. However, Hallagan's analysis abstracts from any moral hazard issues since
the agent's action can be costlessly observed.
60
Can this principle be applied to PVI?
As reported by Norton (1988), a central feature of the literature on alternative
organisational forms, and particularly on franchising, is that "franchise operations are
the result of forces that restrict residual risk bearing to important decision makers. (oo.)
While some labour contracts make employees (especially managers) residual
claimants by linking their compensation somewhat to the residual income of the firm
(or some relevant sub-unit) via sharing profits, (oo.) franchise contracts differ in that
the franchisee becomes a residual claimant by paying an explicit franchise fee, and
royalty fees," (Norton, 1988, p.201ii.
In this work we argue that the different allocation of risk involved by these two
contracts implements a self-selection mechanism on the agents and determines a
fundamental difference in the incentive structure. The fact that franchisees' income
depends on their performance has two main consequences.
First, following the rationale for sharecropping illustrated above, the franchise
contract only appeals to better skilled agents. In fact it can be seen as a contract that
enables people who are willing to be entrepreneurs, as they are better skilled and more
productive, to overcome the problems they have to face by setting up a private
business, by allowing them a 'semi-independent' option (franchising) at a discounted
risk rate. This comes partly from the franchisor's participation in the investment but,
21 Norton's analysis, however, concentrates the study on the hypothesis that franchising is a contractual
option that enables the finn to grow at a fast pace, rather than explaining the adoption of heterogeneous
contracts.
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more importantly, it is due to the fact that the franchisor has usually a well known and
established brand name which enables the franchisee to save the costs he would incur
in order to build up a good name and a good reputation as he is a stranger to the
market. Hadfield (1990) reports that franchising can be seen as a "low-risk alternative
to an independent small business," (p.959). This argument is supported by empirical
findings of research conducted by R.M. Kight (cfr. Barrow and Golzen, 1988, p.32
and p.67), whose results are reported in Table 1-1 and Table 1-2, where all the points
made above find evidence. Strong evidence in favour of this argument is further
provided by the results of empirical research conducted by our study (see part II).
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Table 2-1
The Advantages of Franchising
Franchisees in Franchisors in
agreement % agreement %
You can make more money in a franchise than 51 47
in an independent business
A franchise is less risky than going it alone 78 88
A franchise offers greater job satisfaction than 95 82
salaried employment
A franchise offers more independence than 92 83
salaried employment
A franchise offers a proven business formula 83 99
A franchise offers the benefit of a known trade 96 99
name




Personal Franchisee Characteristics Required for Success
Franchisees % Franchisors %
Very Important Not Very Important Not
Important Important Important Important
Previous management 0 20 80 2 14 84
experience in the same
industry
Previous own business 12 46 42 16 47 37
experience
Management ability 84 15 1 66 31 3
Desire to succeed 90 10 0 93 7 0
Willingness to work 92 8 0 93 6 1
hard
Creativity 26 56 18 12 44 44
Strong people skills 63 32 5 64 34 2
Financial backing 71 27 2 67 27 6
Secondly, the franchise contract provides the agents with much higher incentives to
supply a high effort in their activity with respect to the managers. This comes from the
fact that the franchisee runs the ultimate risk of bankruptcy or poor performance,
having to bear the losses coming from a low performance, i.e., the investment made
by the franchisee can be regarded as a bond posted on his future performance (Dnes,
1992a). This risk, therefore, works as a powerful regulatory device which is missing in
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a performance related pay management contract= where, in the case of a bad
performance, the manager does not bear any losses, as he still gets his fixed income
level23. Our hypothesis is that this last contractual form will therefore be more
appealing to low-skill agents.
To conclude, risk sharing arrangements such as those devised by franchise contracts,
and PVI, are regarded by Martin (1988) and the literature on 'risk-sharing', as mutual
insurance contracts arising when the principal (franchisor) is more risk averse than the
agent (franchisee). Following our critique to this literature presented in the previous
chapter, however, it seems more plausible to consider the franchisee to be the more
risk averse party of this relationship. With a risk neutral principal Martin's analysis
predicts that the outcome will be complete vertical integration. The model we are
going to present in what follows argues that this is not the case. Conversely, it
22 Some evidence on this argument was found by Shelton (1967). In commenting on his empirical
findings relative to the test of the "X-efficiency" hypothesis in a large company operating a string of
restaurants on franchise and company-ownership bases, this author reports: "The evidence seems too
persuasive to ignore. Despite detailed supervision, which would seem to minimise opportunities for
managerial initiative, restaurants operated by independent franchisee-owners outperformed those
supervised by company managers, even though the company managers are paid on a basis that involves
some incentive compensation for achieving profits. (The company managers can earn a bonus for
profitable operation that could go as high as 33 per cent of their salary, and typically averages 15 per
cent.) The impact of motivation, arising from circumstances where the franchisee-owner ( ...) receives as
income only profits, is revealed in the data that strongly support the importance of X-efficiency."
(Shelton,1967,p.1258).
23Furthermore, performance related bonuses have a limited incentive power in that they would induce
the manager to care about short-term performance rather than the long term value of the business. We
argue that even making performance related payments would not necessarily prevent some managers
from pursuing personal agendas if they attach to them a higher utility than to the extra income (see the
discussion of the rationale for privatisation, Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). That is, these incentive
payments cannot rule out agent's moral hazard.
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concludes that PVI can be efficient in the incentive-risk sharing trade-off when the
principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse.
2.3. Optimal Organisational Forms in the Presence of Uncertainty and
Asymmetric Information in a Perfectly Competitive Framework
Following Holmstrom and Milgrom's (1994) suggestion, we develop a specific
analysis of an agency relationship in order to investigate the specific issue of PVI in
retailing.
Our analysis meets the particular needs of the problem, that is, it investigates the
possibility of the existence of an equilibrium of the type observed in the real case by
means of simulation analysis. Hence, it suffers from many limitations. First, it cannot
provide us with an analytical solution, but rather, we can only state that for certain
values of the parameters, this equilibrium will arise. This, however, is compatible
with our hypotheses. In other words, as will clearly result from the survey analysis
reported in chapter three, we expect such a dual system to be optimal only under
certain particular conditions. Where these conditions do not hold, i.e., as we move
away from the range of the parameter values that generate this solution, such an
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equilibrium can no longer be obtained'". As Stiglitz (1975) already remarked,
bounded rationality and information problems will imply continual experiment rather
than 'perfectly stable' solutions.
Hence, we provide an answer to the problem which faces the restriction of a limited
applicability. In fact, the solution to this problem provides a local optimum, but
cannot certainly rule out the existence of other equilibria. However, this is by no
means the first model in the area that resorts to simulation techniques". Lafontaine
and Bhattarchayya (1995), make use of simulations to predict when an outlet will be
franchised or company-owned in a much simpler framework than the one considered
here. These authors, in fact, analyse the case of PVI in a double moral hazard context
where both principal and agent are risk neutral, and in the absence of agents'
24 It is worth anticipating that some of the firms that responded to our survey reverted their
organisational structure from a mixed one to either of the two extremes, i.e., either complete
franchising, or complete vertical integration, when some conditions changed.
25 Numerical simulations are used in a similar context by De Fraja (1996). In this paper two extreme
cases of several possible organisational forms are considered: the entrepreneurial firm, and the
managerial firm. The solution of De Fraja's model provided by the simulations shows that either
ownership structure could be chosen depending on the values of the parameters, which represent
technology and preferences.
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heterogeneity". The adoption of simulation techniques is generally due to the fact that
problems of this type become quite quickly analytically intractable'". Such is our case.
The model
Following the hypotheses presented above, let us consider a framework characterised
by the presence of both uncertainty and asymmetric information.
The uncertainty concerns the state of the world which can occur with respect to the
demand for the product. Even though the state of demand is affected by the agent's
26 Furthermore, this paper, still relies on outlets heterogeneity in its analysis. More specifically,
Bhattarchayya and Lafontaine assume monitoring to be perfect, which allows them to ignore incentive
compatibility issues for the managers of the company owned outlets. The model collapses to predictions
depending on the monitoring costs which are increasing in the geographical distance of the outlet from
the monitor. Our critique to this approach is illustrated in the previous chapter (the irrelevance of the
geographical distance variable on the contractual choice is confirmed by our empirical fmdings
presented in chapter four of this study).
27 Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) analyse a class of principal-agent problems which concerns only the
case of adverse selection problems, nonetheless, even in the absence of moral hazard, they point out
that analytical intractability can arise. These authors provide a converging algorithm which allows for
computation of optimal solutions in such problems. Furthermore, Grossman and Hart (1983), study a
case characterised by the presence of moral hazard, that brings to a market allocation under uncertainty
which will not give rise to an unconstrained Pareto optimum. More specifically, they expand on
important fmdings by Mirrlees (1975), who shows the fallacy of the procedures adopted by economic
theory to derive optimal incentive contracts. In fact, Mirrlees states that if the solution to the agent's
maximisation problem only provides a local rather than a global optimum, the solution is not unique,
hence it cannot guarantee the optimality ofa risk-sharing contract. Grossman and Hart (1983) provide a
way to solve this problem by means of a convex programming problem. This procedure, however,
relies on the agent's preferences over income lotteries being independent of action. Under these
conditions, they show that it is never optimal for the incentive scheme to be such that the principal's
and agent's payoff are negatively related over the whole outcome range. This result will be of interest
for our purposes as will be showed below. Unfortunately the analysis of Grossman and Hart only
concentrates on a problem of hidden action and abstracts from the possibility of the contemporaneous
presence of hidden information. The lack, to this date, of studies covering all these features, has to be
ascribed to the analytical intractability of this type of problems rather than to the novelty of these issues,
as Myerson (1982) proves.
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·action e, it also depends on an exogenous component B which can neither be
controlled nor anticipated by either the principal or the agent.
For the sake of exposition we shall simplify our problem by assuming that28:
There are only two effort levels in the action set, which can be expressed in monetary
terms as follows:
e E [o.z] where l> 0
The stochastic component B can only take on two values
B E {B g ,Bb} henceforth subscript g indicates' good' and b 'bad'.
The principal will observe the outcome X, but both e and B are agent's private
._&. • 29information .
More specifically, the asymmetric information problem is twofold.
28 In this very simple version of the model the prices are normalised to one. In a following step we
introduce a demand function.
29 The non observability of this effort for the principal, is one of the sources of the information
asymmetry between principal and agent. It can also be regarded as an investment. Such is the
interpretation given to this variable by an influential branch of the theory of the firm, Grossman and
Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), Aghion and Bolton (1992). These authors, however, in line with
the 'incomplete contract theory' assume that this variable cannot be specified by the contract at time 0,
and is non-enforceable, although it can be observed by both parties after it is realised., i.e., information
is symmetric. It would be of extreme interest to explore how the solutions provided to this game by
these two branches of the literature (see Hart, 1995, for a review and critique of the agency and
'incomplete contracts' frameworks) would differ, however, this is beyond the scope of this research.
Nonetheless, we can anticipate that, consistently with the above literature, the solution obtained here
provides, under the specifications that will be illustrated in what follows, an equilibrium involving the
transfer of residual rights to the party making the effort/investment.
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1. Hidden action. We assume that the principal cannot observe the level of effort e
exerted by the agents. As a consequence, there is a potential for employees to shirk.
This possibility comes from the fact that the agents can blame the bad state of demand
resulting from the unobservable stochastic component e, for low performance.
2. There is a problem of hidden information which comes from the fact that potential
workers differ in their productivity levels. For simplicity, let us divide these potential
agents in two groups, 'high-skilled', (henceforth, 'high' types, subscript h), and 'low
skilled', (henceforth, 'low' types, subscript I). The agents know their characteristics
but the principals do not share this information. Agents' heterogeneity is represented
in our framework by the different probabilities these agents attach to the occurrence of
the good state of demand once they exert the effort e=l. These are as follows:
Prob (X = X e/ e = 1) = Pj j = h, /
Ph > ~
Prob (X = X g / e = 0) = 0 vt
If Xg does not occur then Xb < X g does. Note that Pj '* 1 because of the presence of the
stochastic element B.
These probabilities are common knowledge, but the principal cannot observe the type
of agent.
Finally, we assume that there is perfect competition on the market, which determines
that the principal will earn zero profits on each contract (Rothschild and Stiglitz,
1976).
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We intend to study whether under the assumptions of this model the adoption of a mix
of franchise and fixed wage (management) contracts, i.e., PVI, could be an
equilibrium dictated by the need to overcome the moral hazard and adverse selection
problems, while allowing an 'optimal' allocation of the risk in a competitive
framework.
The structure of the game'" can be represented as follows:
Principal offers contract/menu, Agents take action e Realization of () Realization oj
returns XAgents decide whether to accept
I
Istage 0 I
Although this is clearly a dynamic game, the complexity of the framework constrained
us to resort to a static representation. More specifically, we look for the existence of
30 We represent this relationship as a 'once for all event'. However, while this is the case for the vertical
integration case, i.e., when the contract negotiated upon is of 'employment' type, which implies that it
does not fix an end date, it is not so for the case of delegation, i.e., the franchise contract. The provision
of an 'end date' for this relationship -generally between 5 and 15 years-, implies that in the majority of
cases, this contract will be renegotiated. Although we do not explicitly model this, we try and take into
account the consequences that this option generates on the franchising relationship. For example,
unlike other models on franchising which have been stressing the double moral hazard problem (e.g.,
Lafontaine and Bhattarchayya, 1995), we abstract from the principal's moral hazard since we assume
that reputation motives would rule out such case in a repeated game (see Lyons, 1996, for a survey on
this issue). This assumption, despite,' being widely accepted in literature, is supported by empirical
evidence presented in the second part of this study.
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an optimal solution at time zero, which would solve all the subgames in the following
stages. In other words, our problem can be summarised as follows:
Problem: The principal's problem consists of offering a contract/menu specifying a
payment rule at stage zero. The revelation principle shows that in order to maximise
his expected payoff, the principal can restrict the choice to contracts that are accepted
by all agents (individual rationality), that are incentive compatible, and that induce a
truthful revelation of their type by the agents (self-selection). Can such a solution be
represented by PVl?
Let us describe first a generic, implicit formulation of the main characteristics of the
problem, and then present the explicit characterisation of the case under analysis.
The risk-neutral principal's expected payoffEC..Q)will be:
E(Il) =Il(Xg, w).Pj(e) +Il tXi; w).[l-Pj(e)] wherej=h,l ande=O, 1
rs> 0 and a;< 0
That is, this payoff is ·linearly increasing in the returns to the operation X, and
decreasing in the payment to the agents w.
The risk averse agenfs~ payoff will then be
U= U(w, e)
u,» 0, c.« 0 and o;» 0
The agent's utility is increasing in the payment w, and decreasing in the effort e.
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The first best for the principal would be to offer a fixed payment to the agent which
just covers the cost of effort 1, and keep all the profits coming from the operation at
stage 2. In fact, the solution to the maximisation of the principal's payoff, given the
agents' risk aversion, is w=[ See also Arrow (1970).
However, the solution to the problem cannot be characterised by such a (full
insurance) pooling equilibrium as this would not be incentive compatible.
Let us now assume that the principal can offer one or both of the two different
contracts mentioned above, i.e., contracts feasible set:
1. Ajixed wage (contract) 'w ', independent of the outcome. In such a case the agent
will be a manager and the outlet will be retained as part of the company (vertical
integration). 2. A franchise contract 'tw«.wi}'. In this case the agent gets a payment
which depends on the outcome. This implies that the agent will own the outlet and
will pay a fixed fee to obtain this right, this is the vertical separation case. The mixing
of these two kinds of contracts is the PVI case.
Assuming that the contract feasible set only contains the two contracts described
above, tailored to the two different agents' type, might seem a restrictive hypothesis.
However, this is not the case for two main reasons. First, we could assume that there
r
is a continuum of (productivity) agents type, and that there is a threshold level above /
which they can be regarded as 'high' type and below which they are considered low
types. The analysis that follows, and its results, would equally apply. An analogous
point is made by Salop and Stiglitz (1977), who show that price dispersion can arise in
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a market characterised by the presence of agents who differ in their ability. These
authors analyse a case in which there are two groups of consumers who differ in their
information gathering costs concerning the price of a homogeneous product. In such a
framework Salop and Stiglitz obtain a basic 'two price equilibrium', with a low price
for the 'low-cost' customers and a high price for the 'high-cost' custorners'". Second,
we can argue that in the presence of a continuum of types the large transaction costs
that would come from the design of a specific contract for each agent type would
certainly offset the efficiency gains arising from contract customisation.
Proposition 1:An equilibrium can consist of a menu of contracts, i.e., two, one per
each agent's type. The existence of two different contractual forms, i.e., a PVI
organisation, constitutes a truth telling, separating, equilibrium, which generates a
self-selection process of heterogeneous agents, thereby solving a potential adverse
selection problem32 (self selection constraints SS), while being individually rational
"Salop and Stiglitz (1977) make use of three conditions to derive the equilibria in their model. First,
the maximisation of the profits from the principal (manufacturer), second, the competitive condition
that drives these profits to zero, and third, optimal information gathering from the agents. These three
conditions will be adopted in the analysis that follows, with the last one being replaced by the agents
optimising the expected utility coming from their contract. This will also be quite clear from our
graphical study of the problem presented at the end of this section. The analysis of Salop and Stiglitz
leads to a monopolistically competitive outcome. Such will be the case in the more elaborated version
of the model described here. This is illustrated in the section that follows.
32The idea of the implementation of a menu of contracts, two in our case, for screening and incentive
purposes has been studied by Laffont and Tirole (1993) who apply it to the analysis of regulation. As
these authors report, in the case of menus of managerial incentive schemes in corporations, "many
managers are given the choice of cashing their bonuses or stock options or transforming them into
stocks or stock options. They thus face a menu. The option of cashing in on rewards for past
performance can be viewed as a low-powered incentive scheme in which the manager decides not to be
rewarded according to performance in the future. The option of buying (further) stocks or stock options
can be viewed as choosing a high powered incentive scheme. Presumably the second option has a
higher expected reward than the first and will be selected by those managers who are confident about
the firm's future profits," (Laffont and Tirole, 1993, p.82).
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(participation constraints PC) and incentive compatible (incentive compatibility
constraints Ie).
Let us develop the analysis of proposition lone part at a time. We then present the
proof at the end of this analysis.
Proposition lA (agents' side). In the equilibrium high types prefer residual rights,
i.e., the franchise contract Wh={Wg .ws). and low types choose a fixed wage,
management contract, WI = W.
For the purpose of our simulations let us assume that the agent's utility function
exhibits Constant Relative Risk Aversion.
1. High types- franchise contract, Wi-
The trade off between risk sharing and incentives for these types can be solved by the
principal with the offer of a payment schedule that makes their wealth dependent on
the outcome, in other words:
U h = (t .X - f -er i=g,b and e=O.I
where (i-t) is the royalty rate of the franchise contract, with 0:::::t :::::1; and f is the
franchise fee. r is the risk aversion coefficient.
Since fand t are fixed, however, we simplify the set up of the model by defining
Which enables us to represent the franchisees' payoff in terms of an income variable
contingent on the state of demand.
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The expected utility coming to the high type agents from this contract will be
2. Low types- management contract, w-
Unlike the franchise contract, the fixed wage contract, offered to the managers of the
company owned outlets, is not incentive compatible. That is, since the managers get a
fixed wage, they have an incentive to cheat by slacking. Therefore, the management
contract will have to be designed in such a way as to take into account this moral
hazard problem. In order to control for this, we resort to the 'efficiency wages'
argument' ', and in particular to Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), who suggest looking at
unemployment as a regulatory device in the labour market. These authors demonstrate
that when there is perfect competition and all the workers are employed at the market
clearing wage, there is no incentive for the workers not to cheat, as the worst that
could happen is that they are fired, but, as they can be immediately rehired, they pay
no penalty for this misdemeanour. Hence, all the firms will offer a higher wage,
namely, an efficiency wage, thus reducing their demand for labour. The resulting
unemployment induces the representative worker not to cheat for, if he cheats he is
fired. Being fired involves bearing a cost for the manager. This cost comes from being
unemployed until he finds another job, and this cost is clearly increasing in the level
of unemployment.
JJ For evidence on this, see Krueger (1991).
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In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that whenever the manager shirks the bad
state of demand occurs, and that whenever the bad state of demand occurs, the
manufacturer will infer that the manager did not put any effort into his activity, i.e., he
shirked, and will therefore fire him. This last assumption is made throughout the
literature, and, as will be shown by the results provided by the model, does not affect
the solution34.
The low productivity type payoff coming from the management contract iS35:
j
(W- It ifX = Xg and e = 1,
Ut (w, e,H)= (w - I - Hr ifXi = Xb and e = 1,
(w- H)' if e = 0
where w is the fixed efficiency wage, and H is the punishment, or cost, derived from
losing the job.
Hence the management contract will provide these agents with
E[Ulj = PI'(W-I) r + (1- PJ '(w-I-H) r
In order to induce the agent to accept the contract it must be
E[Ulj > Uri
34These results would still hold true by attaching a positive probability to the agents not being caught
when shirking. In fact, such a case would only change the magnitude of the solution values of the
endogenous variables at the equilibrium, without affecting its nature.
35In equilibrium the management contract will only be chosen by low types while the high types will
prefer the franchise contract.
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Moreover, for this contract to generate the right incentives for the agent it will have to
be
E{Ut} > (w-H) r (leD
Finally, for both agents/contracts we have a self selection constraint. The correct
functioning of the self-selection mechanism, such that each agent will pick the
contract designed for his own type is guaranteed by the fact that the level of the
expected utility coming to each agent from the contract designed for his own type is
higher than the expected utility from accepting the contract designed for the other
type of agent. In other words, the probability attached by the agents to the occurrence
of the good state of the demand'" Ph and P, are weights in the payoffs (expected
utility functions) which ensure that the agents self-select.
Proposition ID (principal's side). w*= (Wi. w) is a vector of payment rules which
maximises the principal 'spayoff
Let us assume that the principal's payoff is separable in the share coming from the
low and the high types. These will be respectively
Ili=Xi-w
Ih, = (1-t) .X; +f
36Recall that the probability of occurrence of the good state does depend on the agent's effort, and on a
stochastic component.
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According to the simplification adopted above in Ui, we can rewrite this last pay-off as:
ill, =X; - Wi
Hence, the principal's expected payoff will be
E[fli]= Pi '(Xg - w) + (1- P~' (Xb - w)
In order to test that PVI is a choice driven by efficiency reasons, we maximise the
total surplus deriving from the above outlined agency relationship. Because of the
competition assumption, the principal's profits will be driven to zero, therefore, our
objective function becomes the surplus of the agents (in the next version of the model,
presented in the following section, we will elaborate on this). Given the structure of
the model outlined above, it is solved as a general equilibrium model. Hence, in the
formulation of our objective function, that can be regarded as a social welfare
function, we follow Kreps (1990). According to this author "we might wish to
maximise some sort of weighted sum of the consumer's expected utilities." (p. 675).
In our case we maximise the expected utility coming from the agents' contracts.
Assuming there to be the same number of high and low type agents (this assumption is
relaxed in the following, more elaborate, version of the model), this can be expressed
as an expected social welfare index presented in our maximand equation (8).
Hence, the first simplified set up of the model, solved by simulation techniques, is as
follows:
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E[Ut} > Pt' (Wg -1) r + (l - PJ' (wi-I) r (5)
E[UhJ > Ph '(w-l) r + (1 - P,J' (W -1-H) r (6)






Equations (3) and (4) represent the Participation Constraint for the low and high types
respectively. The self selection constraints for the low and high types are respectively
equations (5) and (6). As we remarked above, we also have an incentive compatibility
constraint for the low types, equation (7).
Proof: The solution
As mentioned above, since models characterised by uncertainty and risk aversion in
the presence of hidden action and hidden information in a competitive framework are
algebraically intractable, we resorted to the use of simulation analysis. OUf problem
was solved as a general equilibrium model by means of the non linear programming
option of the GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling System) software".
37 GAMS is a software designed for the solution of large mathematical programming models by means
of linear and non-linear optimisation techniques. Once the equations of the model are set, the variables
defined either as exogenous (fixed type) or as endogenous (free type), and the objective function
declared, starting from some arbitrary values given to the parameters, then, first of all GAMS checks
whether or not the model is feasible and can provide an equilibrium solution which is consistent with all
the equations. Subsequently, it looks for an optimal solution through an iteration system. See Appendix
2-7.1 for an explanation of the GAMS solution techniques for non linear programming.
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The results obtained by GAMS38 confirmed that this model is consistent and provided
the optimal values corresponding to the endogenous variables and the equations at the
equilibrium solution. They are reported in Table 2-4 and
Table 2-5 below".
38A copy of the model programmed in GAMS is reported in the appendix to this chapter.
39 The output given by GAMS indicates the lower, level, upper and marginal values of the optimal
solution with respect to all the variables and the equations of the model. 'Lower' and 'upper' indicate
the lower and upper bound of the interval of values the variable can take on, 'level' indicates the value
of the variable at the optimum.
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Table 2-4
VARIABLES Lower Level Upper Marginal
E(Il) 0 0 0 -0.969
E(W) 0 1.984 +00 0
HI 0.500 2.00 +00 0
U" 0.100 1.666 +00 0
a; 0.500 2.303 +00 0
HlR 2.000 3.155 +00 0
Hlb 0.300 0.534 +00 0
Table 2-5
EQUATIONS Lower Level40 Upper Marainal
(1) 0 0 0 0.499
(2) 0 0 0 0.470
(3) 0 0 0 -0.500
(4) 0 0 0 -0.500
(5) 0 0 +00 -0.015
(6) 0 0.556 +00 0
(7) 0 0.016 +00 0
(8) 0 0 0 1
These results provide an equilibrium solution consisting of the contemporaneous
adoption of both kinds of contracts (PVI) shown by the existence of a vector of prices
(for the fixed wage and the share contract) consistent with the hypotheses of the
model. However, they depend crucially on the values of the effort cost I and of the
punishment H; that is, if the cost of unemployment is larger than the cost of effort, the
assumptions of this model hold true and provide an optimal solution consisting of a
40When the level corresponding to an equation is zero this implies that the constraint is binding.
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separating equilibrium with two different contracts offered to, and accepted by, the
agents. That is, whenever the unemployment rate is above a certain level which
enables it to work as a disciplinary device, we obtain what followS41•
The principal's expected profits, consistent with the competition assumption, are zero
on both contracts, as equations (1) and (2) report. Again, consistent with the
assumptions of the model, the participation constraints of both types, represented by
equations (3) and (4) prove that these contracts provide the agents with their
reservation utility levels". The incentive compatibility constraint on the low types
(equation 7) is not binding, which implies that the contract is designed in such a way
that the agents get a higher utility by making the right effort in their job than they
would get from shirking. This is a different A_?uresults with respect to the standard
literature, where it is generally found that the agents will be offered a contract that just
about ensures that they exert the effort required but does not leave them any rents. The
existence of rents proved by our results confirms the proposed efficiency wage
hypothesis. The self-selection constraint of the low types is binding (equation 5),
while the one of high types is not binding (equation 6). Thus confirming that high
types will earn rents due to their informational advantage (see next section for
evidence on this point). In other words, the high types will earn a surplus
(informational rent) which will discourage them from pretending to be low types.
41 In this first formulation of the model the level of unemployment, and therefore the punishment, are
exogenous. However in the following, wider, formulation of the analysis (reported in next section), it
will be endogenised in the model.
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Since this model implies the adoption of non-linear programming calibration
techniques, the optimal solution obtained presents particular characteristics. First, the
equilibrium obtained tells us that this model holds true, and provides a first best
solution of the 'contract mix' type, only for certain values of the parameters of the
problem, that is, this is a local optimum. Second, as we move away from these values,
the model becomes unfeasible, and shows that PVI cannot be regarded as a global
optimum 43. This is consistent both with the general results in literature, as we explain
below, and with our hypotheses". In fact, by this model we suggested that contractual
heterogeneity represents an optimal solution when both the firm and the agents face
certain constraints and choose their contracts within a certain environment (i.e.,
attitude towards risk of both actors at play, unemployment rate, cost of effort, etc.).
This will be clear from the analysis of the responses to our survey presented in the
next chapter.
In the last part of this section we are going to complete the analysis presented so far by
a graphical derivation of the equilibrium for this market.
42 The reservation utility level is endogenous to the model. It is determined by the competition
conditions (see Varian, 1992, p.464).
43 We will not concentrate on the effects of changes in risk over this organisational structure (see
Lafontaine and Bhattarchayya, 1995). When simulated different coefficients of risk aversion, the model
gave similar solution. However, with agents' risk neutrality, the GAMS outcome was that the model
was not feasible.
44 We do not concentrate on specifying the interval of parameter values for this solution to be feasible
since, given the formulation of the model, this would not be informative. In the following part of this
study we will try and illustrate some real cases where changes of some features, e.g., moral hazard,
implied firms changing their organisational/contractual structure. A scenario analysis is performed in
the following sections to investigate comparative statics of the more elaborate version of this model
presented in next section.
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In this geometric investigation of the equilibrium we proceed as follows: a potential
equilibrium (contract/menu of contracts) satisfying the zero profit condition is
proposed. We first check (i) whether this is feasible, i.e., satisfies the agents'
participation constraints, and if this generates the right incentives for the agents to
exert effort. Then, (ii) we examine whether this contract/menu maximises the agents'
utility. In other words, we check whether a deviant principal could increase his profits
by offering a different contract/menu that would yield higher utility to one or both
agents type. If the latter is the case, then the potential equilibrium is not an
equilibrium.
Again, let us proceed by steps. First, let us look at the case of the low-type agents.
Lemma 1. The need to control for moral hazard of low-type agents rules out the
choice of a 'full insurance' contract and induces the adoption of a 'potential'
unemployment penalty (H) on the principal side. The management contract































Proof Point 0 is the starting point for the managers. Starting from this point, a 45
degree line departs, this being the locus of full insurance contracts for the managers.
The contracts lying along this line in fact give to the managers the same share of
returns in the good and bad state of the world, Xg and Xb, measured respectively on
the horizontal and vertical axis. The discussion is analogous for the principal, starting
from point Op. However, as we discussed above, when the bad state of demand occurs
the manager is fired, thus incurring a cost of H. This loss of H will reduce the space in
our diagram to [H, b, Op, (Xb -H)]. Therefore, in such a case, we have a new 45 degree
line departing from point H. Moreover, we assumed that whenever the manager does
not exert effort the bad state of demand occurs with probability 1. This implies that
the manager's payoffwill be (w-H), hence, his indifference curve will be a horizontal
straight line corresponding to this value, i.e., VI in Figure 1. The intersection of this
indifference curve with the full insurance (45 degree) line departing from point H will
determine point a.. Thus the distance H-a. represents the certainty equivalent of the
manager's payoff in the zero-effort case. Conversely, if the manager exerts effort I,
his payoff will be further reduced by this cost. Therefore in this instance the manager
will lose an amount equal to I in the good times and to H+ I in the bad times. This
implies that the space in the diagram in Figure 1 is further reduced to [(H+J), b, Op,
(Xb -H-J)], and the new full insurance (45 degree) line to the manager will have origin
in point 0*. However, when the manager exerts effort (e=J), his set of indifference
curves, originating from the new origin 0*, is v: The tangency between the highest
indifference curve corresponding to the 'effort' case, and the zero-profit line to the
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principal corresponding to the contract for the low-types (Ol=o})detennines contract 8.
However, contract 8 cannot be an equilibrium according to point (i) above. That is, it
is not incentive compatible. If the manager were to be offered a full insurance contract
like 8 he would not exert effort as the certainty equivalent to his payoff in case he
shirked (H-8) would be higher than the certainty equivalent corresponding to the
payoff coming from exerting effort 1(0 *-8).
Therefore, in order to avoid the moral hazard problem, the principal will not be able to
offer a full insurance contract to the managers. Hence, competition among principals
and incentive compatibility will drive the contract choice to contract M, which
rewards the manager with a payoff equal to (w-l) in the good state of the world and
(w-I-H) in case the bad state of the world occurs. This contract is equivalent to full-
insurance contract ~ as it lies on the same indifference curve v: Therefore, the
certainty equivalent to contract M will be given by the distance O*-~. It follows that
contract M will be an equilibrium as long as O*-~ >Hex. In fact, contract M in Figure
1 is an equilibrium as: (i) it satisfies both the participation and the incentive
compatibility constraints. The latter is non binding as this contract is such that H-a <
O*-~. Let us check this equilibrium against point (ii) above. If a deviant firm intends
to increase its profits, it could deviate from contract M and offer a contract in the
south-west region of M-~. However, any such contract would give lower utility to the
agents, therefore, as long as contract M is offered, no other contract will be accepted
by the agents. Hence, contract M is an equilibrium. Moreover, consistent with our
results above, contract M is only feasible as long as the cost of the punishment H is
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large enough with respect to the cost of effort 1.Hence it follows that
Lemma 2. When the punishment H is sufficiently small with respect to the cost of
effort I no equilibrium can be attained.
In fact, unless there is enough unemployment to work as a disciplinary device the
principal will not offer any management contract.
Proof This is illustrated in Figure 2 where H is smaller than in the previous case
represented in Figure 1. In this instance, the agent will be better-off by not exerting
any effort, in fact it is clear that the certainty equivalent corresponding to the case of
shirking H-a is larger than the certainty equivalent to the payoff of the 'effort-case',
O*-~ . Hence, in this setting a contract that rewards the agent with a payoff equal to
(w-I) in the good state of the world and with (w-I-H) in the bad state, that is, contract
M in Figure 2, does not satisfy condition (i) above, i.e., is not incentive compatible.
To sum up, the principal will not be able to offer any incentive compatible contract
without incurring losses given the new value of H, as shown by Figure 2 below.
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Following the description of the franchise contract outlined above (sub proposition
lA), we can now introduce the high types into this framework. This case is illustrated
in Figure 3, where the set of indifference curves for these types is labelled Vh. These
curves are steeper than those of the low types, labelled VIC, as these agents attach a
larger probability to the occurrence of the good state of demand. We do not have the
no-effort set of preferences for the franchisees, due to the fact that this contract,
bringing about an alignment of the principal's and agent's interests, as illustrated
above, always implements e=I. Hence, the origin for the indifference curve set Vh is
point I-I in the diagram. The zero-profit line related to these types is labelled TIh =0.
Lemma 3. In the presence of heterogeneous agents two contracts may be offered,
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Proof Figure 3 shows that also in this case the results obtained above are confirmed.
In other words, by adding the high types to the analysis we obtain a separating
equilibrium given by the principal offering (and the agents accepting) two different
contracts, i.e., M, the management contract for the low types, labelled WI in the
analysis above, and F, the franchise contract for the high types, labelled Wh above.
This contract pays the franchisees a payoff equal to (Wg -1) in the good state of demand
Xg and (Wb-1) in the bad state of demand As.
The conditions set above for the determination of the market equilibrium all hold for
the contract pair {M - F} in Figure 3. First, these two contracts lie on the zero
isoprofit lines for the principal with respect to each category of agents. Second, and in
addition to the criteria set above, each contract is chosen by the type of agents it is
designed for. That is, contract M is the best for the low type and contract F is the best
for the high type agents. This is reflected in the Self Selection constraints (SS})
designed in the problem above. Inorder to satisfy SS, contract M must lie on or above
the low type indifference curve passing through point F, i.e., the contract designed for
the other type. In this instance, since contract M and F lie both on VIe this implies that
the self selection constraint on the low types is binding. Analogous discussion holds
for SSh, but this constraint on the high type agents does not bind, that is, these agents
obtain a higher utility from choosing contract F rather then M. It is easy to see that
contract M lies on a much lower indifference curve for the high types, Vh, than
contract F. The explanation for this was presented above. Third, condition (i) set
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above holds for both contracts M and F. These contracts satisfy both the participation
constraints and the low type incentive compatibility constraint (see Lemma I above
for a proof of the latter). Finally, condition (ii) is satisfied, that is, no other contract
can be offered in addition to those in the menu, that would make strictly positive
profits for the firm offering it if the agents choice rule obeys the maximisation of the























If a deviant firm were to offer a contract lying in the shaded area (which would earn
positive profits on the high types), since such contract would yield a higher utility than
contract M to the low type agents, they will take it. But this contract would generate
losses for the principal if the low types take it. Conversely, it will not be preferred to
contract F by the high types, as it would give to them a lower level of utility, therefore
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such a contract cannot be an equilibrium. Note that it would be possible that a pooling
equilibrium exists only in the case when there is a very small number of 'low-types',
in this instance the principal might offer a pooling contract lying in the shaded area.
However, such a case seems extremely unrealistic. In fact one would expect the
number of 'unskilled' agents to be a lot larger than the number of 'high-skilled'
agents.
Therefore, contracts M and F represent a set of contracts that implement the PVI
solution to the problem set out in propositionl, QED.
To sum up, our results, as illustrated by the analysis presented above, are of particular
interest as they show that, in a specific framework like the one described here, PVI
can be an equilibrium driven by reasons other than competition restricting (monopoly
power enhancing) targets.
2.4. The Case of Monopolistic Competition
Having made sure that the initial model was feasible, we then extended it by relaxing
the perfect competition assumption in order to consider a case of monopolistic
competition, (Chamberlinian competition). This market structure, in fact, seems to be
the most appropriate to represent industries characterised by the presence of PVI, i.e.,
retailing and distribution, services, hotels, restaurants, and fast-food chains (see Kreps,
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1990, p.346). Such industries are the object of the empirical investigation carried out
in order to test the hypotheses formulated in this chapter (see below, part II).
The framework presented in the previous section is extended as follows. We now
assume that the total population of agents is a fixed number, given by the sum of low
and high types N =NI* + N; , and that N, is the number of low types in employment.
Hence NI* - NI is the level of unemployment on the market for low productivity
agents, which will work as a regulatory device, now endogenous to the model (the
labour market is represented in figure A below). The high types are assumed to be
fully employed given their entrepreneurial characteristics described above.
Let us look at the product and labour markets in turn.
Product market: According to the definition of Chamberlinian competition, we
consider now the case of several firms competing in the product market but still
earning zero profits. Hence we have now a downward sloping demand function for the
product facing each producer.
The inverse demand equation for the product is:
(1)
This is of the simple linear form E[P] = A - E[Q], where E[P] is the Expected Price; A
is a positive constant which varies over the cycle, and E[Q] is the Expected Quantity,
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expressed as the sum of the expected outputs of the two types of workers". Qg and Qh
are the levels of output in the good and bad state of demand respectively.
Therefore Expected Revenues are
X; = E[P]' Qj i=g.b (2) and (3) respectively.
Let us assume that the set of feasible contracts is again as outlined in the previous
section (w., w).
Proposition 2: Proposition 1 (see above) still holds true in a monopolistically
competitive framework
This is illustrated in detail below.
Labour market. Let us look at the demand and supply side by distinguishing between
the market for low and high types.
45 As the simulation analysis performed in the following section shows, the only endogenous variables
to the model in the E[Q] equation are the numbers of agents Nh and NI, therefore, maximising our
objectiv~ction (total employment) will imply maximising total output.
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Proposition 2A (agents' side). The Supply side. See proposition lA above.
1. w -low types- management contract
Competition among the low types will make them all willing to accept a labour
contract which provides them with their reservation utility level (UI in Figure A).
However, the principal will pay these agents an efficiency wage (w in Figure A), in
order to avoid the moral hazard problem.
In this second version of the model the parameter I differs from that in the first version.
While in the previous case it represented the effort required by the agent, it now indicates
the value of the principal's investment. Therefore, the moral hazard problem in this
model is represented by the agent taking this investment I, that is, it might involve
perquisite taking or the agent's shirking involving the waste of the principal's investment
or tarnishing the brand name. T then represents the punishment. It is a linear function of
the unemployment rate of the low types, H, which is now endogenous to the model,
H (NI)= [(NI * - N~ / NI *]
T (H(NI)) = C' H
(13)
(12)
Hence, the expected utility coming to the low type agents from the contract is
E[Ulj = PI' (w) r + (1 - Pi): (w - T) r
In this framework, the participation constraint on the low types, equation (6) below, can
be designed in such a way that the utility level coming to this type of agents from
accepting the contract must be greater than the utility which would come from accepting
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the contract and shirking, equation (9).
Uri = (w + I - T) r (9)
(6)E[Ud ~ Uri
Hence, we no longer have the incentive compatibility constraint we had in the previous
version of the model. That is, this constraint tells us that the utility offered by the
contract, which provides the agent with an efficiency wage, must be greater than or equal
to the utility this agent would get from accepting the contract and shirking, in other
words, this participation constraint works as a moral hazard, or incentive compatibility,
constraint.
2. Wi -high types- franchise contract
We now assume that the highly skilled workers have an upward sloping supply
schedule (Sh in Figure A),
the expected utility coming from the contract is
Proposition 2B (principal's side). Demand side. w*= (w;, w) is a vector of payment
rules which maximises the principal's payoff
The manufacturer will demand a certain number of workers which, in tum, depends
on the demand for the product. Therefore, he will have to decide how many agents to
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hire from each group, that is, how many contracts of each type.
In spite of the fact that all the low types would be willing to be employed at the
market-clearing wage, the principal will prefer to offer them an efficiency wage (w in
Figure A), which will induce him to hire the highest number of agents (NI in Figure
A) compatible with the solution of the moral hazard problem.
Nh NI NI.IC N
Figure A: The labour Market
where w, represents the conditions of the share contract, w is the fixed wage at the efficiency
level, Sh is the Supply schedule of high types, and VI is the Supply schedule of low types, uh
is the demand for high types, and ul is the demand for low types.
By looking at this diagram we can see how the principal will make his decision about
how many agents of each type to hire, in other words, about how many share,
franchise, contracts (Nh), and how many fixed-wage, management contracts (NI) to
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offer.
The value of the share contract Wi will be higher than the fixed wage w not only
because of the higher productivity of the agents to whom it has been tailored, but also
because the principal must provide them with a kind of risk premium. This comes
from the fact that the agents are risk averse, and so must be rewarded for the risk that
they are bearing.
Hence
E[l1i]= PI' (Xg - W - J) + (1- PJ' (Xb - W - J) (4)
(5)




W*= (w., w), where W[= wand Wh= Wi, is a vector of payment rules, which satisfy the
above constraints. This vector implements the PVI solution. Can this be an
equilibrium?
Within this formulation of the model, following the rationale outlined in the previous
case of perfect competition, we now look for the existence of an optimal solution by
maximising total surplus. This time, however, in order to endogenise the level of
unemployment, our objective function is the total level of employment.
(14)
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This implies the maximisation of the finn's profits via the maximisation of the
quantity produced, as this depends on the number of agents (see equation (1)), and, at
the same time, it corresponds to minimising the level of unemployment of the low
types that must be preserved to guarantee the functioning of the incentive mechanism
designed". Namely, we look for the maximum level of employment, and thereby of
production, which can be attained as a consistent solution of a general equilibrium
model".
The complete set up of the model is:
maxN (14)
S.t.





PI (w) r + (J - PJ (w - T) r > (w + 1- T) r
Ph (Wg) r + (1 - P,J (Wb)r > Ur"
u; = b: Nh
Uri = (W + I - T) r
Pdw)' + (l-PJ(W-T)r >pt{WrJr + (l-PJ(wtJr
Ph (WrJr + (1- P,J (WbY > Ph (WY + (1- PrJ (w - T)"
T (H(NI)) = C' H













46 In this second version of the model, unlike the previous case, the level of unemployment is
endogenous. The solution to the following problem will provide a vector of values for the variables
which are endogenous to the system, which will generate equilibrium both on the product and on the
labour market.
47 The program formulated with GAMS for the solution of this model is reported in Appendix.
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Equations (4) and (5) are the zero profit conditions deriving from the monopolistic
competition. Equations (6) and (7) are the Participation Constraints, and equations (10)
and (11), finally, are the Self Selection constraints, for the low and high types
respectively.
Proof: The solution to the benchmark case
We run this extended model with the Gams software by giving certain values to the
exogenous variables. In this first experiment, to which we will refer as the benchmark
case, we started our simulation exercise by setting the constant of the demand
equation A, which simulates the cycle, equal to 100.














Also in this case GAMS results were consistent with the hypotheses of our model.
They showed that the optimal (local) solution, which maximises total surplus by
maximising the level of employment consistent with the creation of the right incentive
and selection mechanism, is given by the contemporaneous adoption of a menu of two
contracts (PVI), thus giving rise to a separating equilibrium. These results are reported
in Table 2-7 and Table 2-8.
Table 2-7
VARIABLES Lower Level Upper Marginal
HI 0.460 3.279 +00 0
H 0 0.121 +00 0
T 0 0.303 +00 0
Uri 0 2.031 +00 0
o; 0 2.238 +00 0
",-, 0 4.976 +00 0
Hlb 0 1.618 +00 0
X, 0 5.144 +00 0
x, 0 1.715 +00 0
N, 0 35.156 +00 0
Nh 0 11.190 +00 0
E(P) 0 1.715 +00 0
N 0 46.345 +00 0
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Table 2-8
EQUATIONS Lower Level Upper Marginal
(1) 0 0 0 0.350
(2) 0 0 0 0.101
(3) 0 0 0 0.046
(4) 0 0 0 -0.037
(5) 0 0 0 -0.110
(6) 0 0 0 -39.99
(7) 0 0 +00 -0.630
(8) 0 0 0 -0.630
(9) 0 0 0 0
(10) 0 0 +00 -0.137
(11) 0 0.188 +00 0
(12) 0 0 0 4.813
(13) 0 0 0 12.033
(14) 0 0 0 1
The characteristics of this solution are such that the participation constraints on the
two types of agents (equations 6 and 7) will both be binding. That is, the contracts
offered by the companies will then give to each type of agent exactly his reservation
utility in order to ensure his participation".
Empirical support for our assumption that the reservation utility level of the people
who choose the management contract, the low productivity types, is lower than that of
the agents who choose the franchising contract, the highly productive types (i.e.,
Url<Urh), is provided by a recent work by Kaufmann and Lafontaine (1994).
48Recall that the reservation utility is endogenous to the model, therefore the optimal value provided by
the solution to the problem will include the rents earned to the agents.
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These authors report that from a survey conducted by the fast-food company
McDonald's it transpired that the salary earned by potential franchisees prior to
becoming franchisees was about $48K (1982 dollars), while average store managers'
compensation was about $31K. Analogous results were obtained by our empirical
analysis. These are illustrated in part II of this study.
The Self-Selection constraint for the low types (equation J 0) is binding, while it is
slack for the high types ClJ). This implies that the agents of the low skilled type will
get an efficiency wage which, given their preferences, will leave them as well off as
they would be by accepting the franchising contract. At the same time, the highly
skilled agents will choose the contract designed for their type, and this will earn them
rents. In other words, they will get a higher utility from the franchising contract than
that which they would get from accepting the fixed wage contract. This comes from
the fact that while making them the last claimants of the profits, the conditions of the
contract will partly insure these agents against the risk, not at a high enough level,
though, to appeal to the low types. Given the fact that they attach a higher probability
to the occurrence of the good state than the low types do, this contract will leave them
with a higher utility level than that which they would get from the management
contract, and, at the same time, would not give a higher utility to the low types who
will not therefore be attracted by this contract.
This result is further supported by Kaufmann and Lafontaine's (1994) findings, which
lead them to state that McDonald's desire for a particular type of individual to operate
its franchises leads the company to leave rents downstream thereby attracting a larger
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number of high quality individuals who are people with high potential earnings.
Moreover, they argue, these rents represent an incentive mechanism that complements
the use of profit-sharing rights.
The optimal choice of the firms within this framework will then induce them to hire a
certain number of low type agents, and offer them an efficiency wage, which implies
keeping a certain number of company owned outlets (NF 35.156) that brings about an
equilibrium unemployment rate equal to 0.121, as a proportion of the number of the
low productivity types in employment, working as a disciplinary device for this kind
of agent. At the same time, there will be a certain number of the outlets which will be
franchised to the high types (Nh= 11.190).
As we remarked in commenting the results presented in the previous section, the
solution obtained constitutes a local optimum given the values of the parameters.
These mostly vary with the agents' attitude towards risk, and with the principal's
input /. We performed some simulations assuming the agents to be risk neutral, the
model proved unfeasible in this instance, thus showing that agents' risk aversion is a
necessary condition for contract mixing. This was not the case when we adopted
different coefficients of risk aversion for the two types of agents, i.e., the model still
proved feasible, and provided an optimal contract mix solution. The principal input I
is another key parameter. In fact, outside a certain range of values of I the model
became unfeasible. This is especially so when the value of this input which is
appropriated by the agent acting opportunistically, is higher than the punishment he is
inflicted for his behaviour (T in this model). Evidence on this was obtained by our
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survey. In the qualitative analysis presented below we furnish evidence of companies
that reverted from PVI to one of the two extremes of the organisational structures
spectrum, i.e., either complete vertical separation or complete vertical integration with
a change in this variable.
2.5. Changes in Organisational Forms over the Cycle: a Comparative
Statics Analysis
Since most of the empirical literature on franchise contracts reports a tendency over
time towards a greater adoption of the franchise contract, we try to broaden the
analysis in order to capture this essential feature with respect to the optimal form of
organisation the firms will choose to adopt over time.
Hence, we perform this study by simulating the cycle within the demand equation of
our model and focus our analysis on the response effects to changes in demand over
the cycle. In other words, we simulate both a boom and a slump in order to analyse the
effects on the set of feasible contracts and see what is the response of the firms in
terms of organisational structure.
We perform this task by means of comparative static analysis. That is, we look at what
happens in the labour market by looking at how the supply of contracts, i.e., demand
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for agents, varies over the cycle (i.e., how many agents are hired within each group).
Then, we look at the implications of this labour structure on the organisational
(contractual) choice, namely, whether the firms tend to adopt a vertically separated
structure as a consequence of supplying more share contracts, or, instead, move
towards vertical integration by hiring more low types, i.e., by supplying more fixed
wage contracts.
2.5.1. The Boom
According to what was said above, we would expect that when demand goes up and
the economy/firm is expanding, the company will resort to the adoption of franchise
contracts to achieve higher growth. Therefore, we expect the variable Nh (namely the
number of high types who accept the contract, i.e., franchisees) to rise more than the
variable NI (namely, the number of managers of the company retained outlets).
In order to simulate an increasing cycle with a higher demand for the product, we raise
the level of the constant in the demand equation A, from 100, as in the benchmark




VARIABLES Lower Level Upper Marginal
W 0.460 23.365 +00 0
H 0 0.120 +00 0
T 0 0.300 +00 0
Uri 0 4.921 +00 0
c: 0 5.429 +00 0
w~ 0 34.241 +00 0
Wb 0 14.250 +00 0
Xi 0 35.272 +00 0
x, 0 11.757 +00 0
NI 0 35.193 +00 0
Nh 0 27.143 +00 0
E(P) 0 11.715 +co 0
N 0 62.336 +00 0
Table 2-10
EQUATIONS Lower Level Upper Marginal
(1) 0 0 0 0.295
(2) 0 0 0 0.086
(3) 0 0 0 0.038
(4) 0 0 0 0.029
(5) 0 0 0 0.094
(6) 0 0 +00 129.865
(7) 0 0 +00 1.314
(8) 0 0 0 1.314
(9) 0 0 0 0
(10) 0 0 +00 0.288
(11) 0 0.500 +co 0
(12) 0 0 0 6.563
(13) 0 0 0 16.406
(14) 0 0 0 1.000
Consistent with the results we obtained in our benchmark simulation, also in this case
the participation constraints on both types and the self selection constraint on the low
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types are binding, while the self selection constraint on the high types is slack.
A boom in the cycle induces a higher level of the reservation utility level of both
types. This induces an increase in the prices paid to the agents by both contracts. The
equilibrium unemployment rate goes down very slightly from 0.121 to 0.120. This
result comes from the fact that in order to keep an incentive device on the managers of
the company-owned outlets, unemployment rate within this group cannot decrease
much.
Therefore, the number of the managers hired goes up very slightly from 35.156 to
35.193. On the contrary, the expansion of the firm is attained via an increased
adoption of franchise contracts. In fact the variable Nh goes up from 11.190 to 27.143.
Hence, the results of the model provided by the GAMS solution show that the
response of the firm to an increase in demand consists of a larger adoption of
incentive contracts, i.e., of expanding by means of franchising instead of vertical
integration.
This, first of all, enables the company to expand more rapidly especially into new
markets which will benefit from the dynamism of efficient independent agents, and at
the same time encourages 'potential entrepreneurs' to enter franchising.
More arguments can explain these findings. We saw that an expansionary phase of the
cycle brings unemployment down, thus inducing an increase in the reservation utility
level of the low-types. Therefore, as Leibenstein (1966) remarks, company-ownership
becomes too costly for ensuring an efficient managerial performance (X-efficiency),
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namely, in our case, the efficiency wage becomes too high with respect to franchising.
Other evidence in the literature on this point is provided by Shelton (1967), and
Krueger (1991).
2.5.2. The Slump
We then simulated a slump in the cycle by lowering the value of A from 100 to 90.
The results are illustrated in Table 2-11 and Table 2-12.
Table 2-11
VARIABLES Lower Level Upper Marginal
W 0.460 1.098 +00 0
H 0 0.122 +00 0
T 0 0.306 +00 0
U,I 0 1.394 +00 0
U,,, 0 1.534 +00 0
Wx 0 1.800 +00 0
Wb 0 0.241 +00 0
x, 0 1.872 +00 0
x, 0 0.624 +00 0
NI 0 35.104 +00 0
Nit 0 7.668 +00 0
E(P) 0 0.624 +00 0
N 0 42.771 +00 0
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Table 2-12
EQUATIONS Lower Level Upper Marginal
(1) 0 0 0 0.366
(2) 0 0 0 0.105
(3) 0 0 0 0.051
(4) 0 0 0 -0.047
(5) 0 0 0 -0.109
(6) 0 0 +00 -25.033
(7) 0 0 +00 -0.426
(8) 0 0 0 -0.426
(9) 0 0 0 0
(10) 0 0 +00 -0.091
(11) 0 0.112 +00 0
(12) 0 0 0 4.289
(13) 0 0 0 10.723
(14) 0 0 0 1.000
The results obtained from the solution of the model in this experiment still provide an
optimal solution given by a separating equilibrium, i.e., by the adoption of both
contracts.
Also in this case, the two participation constraints are binding, therefore, the agents
will accept the contract at their reservation utility levels, which have now reduced
consistently as a consequence of the slump. Again, the self-selection constraint on the
high types is slack, while the one on the low types is binding, which implies that the
high skilled agents still get rents out of the franchise contract with respect to the
management contract, even if their value has now decreased. The level of the fixed
wage w paid to the low type goes down by a large amount because of the recession
that increases the competition and therefore reduces the reservation wage.
Hence, this lower cost of the managers induces the firm to employ ajust slightly lower
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number of low-type agents, (NI goes from 35.156 to 35.104). Conversely, the number
of franchising contracts offered by the company shrinks dramatically. This is
demonstrated by the change in the value of N, which drops to 7.668 from our
benchmark case where it is 11.190. This implies that over a slump the company will
not supply more franchise contracts as it would be too costly for it to insure the
franchisees against the risk. The efficiency wage will therefore be less costly to the
firm, who will therefore resort to the adoption of a more vertically integrated
structure 49.
As Stigler (1951) pointed out in his interpretation of Adam Smith's theorem "The
division of labour is limited by the extent of the market", firms tend to start out
vertically integrated, then, as demand increases, they vertically disintegrate.
This is so, mainly because of managerial diseconomies, such as the cost arising from a
greater need for co-ordination due to the management of dissimilar activities.
However, he argues, this process reverses itself as demand declines, hence, he
concludes, vertical separation is the typical nature of development in growing
49 One of the main results of dynamic extensions of the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984) is that it can generate hysteresis (Saint-Paul, 1993). Even though this model is of a different
type, and is just limited to comparative statics analysis, it shares one of the conclusions reached by
Saint-Paul (1993), who shows that even when changes in the employment level are expected, it will
have an incentive to stay where it is, Le. there will be persistent unemployment, "...because deviations
from the current value are costly in tenus of incentives," (Saint-Paul, 1993, p.2). Analogously to this
argument, the results of the simulation analysis performed in this study show that the employment level
of the low type workers will tend to be constant presenting a very small variance around the benchmark
value 35.156. In contrast with the countercyclality of the wage level obtained by Saint-Paul, however,
and more consistently with empirical evidence, the results of our model show that the wage is
procyclical.
III
industries, while vertical integration will be an outcome in declining industries.
Moreover, he reports evidence in this study regarding the decline of vertical
integration over time in expanding industries within the manufacturing sector.
If instead of assuming that our constant A varies with the business cycle, we view it as
specifically related to the demand for a particular good, and therefore varying with the
different stages of the product life-cycle, our results are perfectly consistent with
Stigler's. In such a case we would actually expect the franchisees to switch from
declining industries to other industries where demand is increasing.
All the above leads us to conclude that PVI will allow a company to face fluctuations
in the level of the demand more flexibly. When the market is expanding and demand
is increasing, contracting out/growing via a franchise network gives access to extra
production (i.e., extra workers) without obliging the firm to pay for underemployed
workers and idle capacity over a slump'",
saThe results obtained by this analysis are also consistent with what reported by Stanworth and
Dandridge (1994) in their overview of business franchising and economic change. In that work it is
reported that, consistent with Lafontaine (1993) findings about US data, franchising is growing at a
pace which is consistent with the growth of the economy as a whole. Similar conclusion is reached by
research commissioned by the Franchise Association (see Stanworth and Dandridge, 1994, p.12).
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2.6. Conclusion
Vertical restraints "between manufacturers and retailers continue to be a source of
policy debate," (Dobson and Waterson, 1996, p.I). Although the considerable recent
development of literature on vertical ties has increased the understanding of these
contractual arrangements, it does not lead to "straightforward conclusions for public
policy," (ibid.). The general conclusion rejects the 'Chicago school' view, according
to which vertical restraints should be legal, and argues for the need of more detailed
investigation of the relevant issues related to each specific case. This was the
approach followed in the analysis presented in this chapter, where we investigated the
case ofPVI.
More specifically, in this chapter we looked at the design of industrial organisational
forms, and, in particular, at the adoption of mixed organisational forms consisting of
the contemporaneous adoption of vertical integration and franchising patterns, which,
despite being an empirically relevant phenomenon, has not received a coherent
explanation from economics research.
We built up a principal-agent model based on uncertainty and information
asymmetries capable of providing an explanation for this phenomenon. Moreover, we
performed a comparative statics analysis by means of simulations which enabled us to
predict how this organisational structure is likely to change in response to
expansionary and recessionary phases of the cycle. The results provided by this
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exercise enjoy support by empirical studies on the topic. Further evidence favouring
these results is provided by the next part of this study.
The standard result of principal-agent problems in the presence of uncertainty, when
the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse, provide a first best solution
with the principal bearing all the risk and no delegation to the agent. This comes from
the fact that when the agent is risk averse, it would be too costly to the principal to
insure him against risk.
If brought into our analysis, this would lead us to expect a fully vertically integrated
structure being adopted by the firm. The presence of moral hazard and adverse
selection in our model, however, causes this to be no longer an optimal organisational
form for the company. This is due to the additional costs the firm would incur arising
from the lower level of efficiency of the agents, given by their low productivity level,
and by their cheating.
Therefore, the optimal solution of this model is given by a separating equilibrium
resulting in a PVI organisational form, consisting of the contemporaneous adoption of
vertical integration and delegation to independent agents via franchising contracts.
That is, the gains in terms of efficiency coming from delegating part of the operations
to these independent agents will outweigh the costs coming from having to, partially,
risk-insure these agents.
It has actually been reported from many case studies, (see Dnes, 1992a), that
franchising is an economical alternative to full forward integration and to dealing with
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completely independent retailers. This economy comes not only from this contract
removing the moral hazard problem, but also from the alignment of the interests of the
company and the retailer, who is now an independent entrepreneur whose wealth is
tied up to the brand performance".
It might be argued that making a performance related payment to the managers of the
company-owned outlets could be an appropriate alternative to franchising. But, as we
remarked in this work, this is not the case as this contractual form is a less powerful
incentive scheme than delegation via franchise.
Moreover, the solution of our model shows the existence of rents earned by the
franchisees. That is, the principal will have to leave these rents downstream in order to
ensure the functioning of the self-selection mechanism+ This result differs from that
showed by Rey and Tirole (1986), in their research on the logic of vertical restraints.
These authors argue that in the presence of uncertainty and asymmetric information,
vertical (competition reducing) restraints have some drawbacks, e.g., they may give
the retailers an inadequate amount of insurance. The existence of contract
heterogeneity involving contracts with different degrees of insurance for the retailer,
as described by our model, could solve this drawback identified by Rey and Tirole.
51 The shirking of the managers can also be regarded, instead of paying a low effort, as pursuing
personal agendas. As Klein (1991) remarked, "Shareholders' franchise right under the property rights
view of the corporation, ensures at least a degree of corporate accountability. The alternative prospect
of managers unaccountable to shareholders could result in a corporate oligarchy coupled with the
probability of an era of corporate plundering," (Stanford Law Review, p.I77).
52 See Krueger (1991) for evidence on the existence of efficiency wages within company-owned
outlets, and Kaufmann and Lafontaine (1994) for the existence of rents at franchised outlet level.
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The adoption of a contract mix in the presence of labour market heterogeneity induces
the agents to self-select by maximising their expected utility. This resulted in a 'truth-
telling' separating equilibrium.
Finally, this model proves that not only is such organisational structure optimal from
the company's point of view, in that it is the most efficient attainable given the
existing constraints, but it is optimal also from the point of the agents. In other words,
PVI maximises total surplus.
Both EU and US policies make a distinction between agreements on and imposition of
vertical restraints. However, while EU policy sees the agreements as essentially
"facilitatory and benign," (Dobson and Waterson, 1996), US policy has a negative
approach and regards them as a "sign of concentration", hence potentially harmful.
In our model PVI results from an agreement in that it is the best choice from the
manufacturer's point of view as well as from the retailer's. Which leads us to protend
towards the European approach.
This leads us to stress, in unison with a recent report by the OECD (1994), that
vertical restraints are not always against consumers' interests and therefore,
necessarily "obvious targets for 'trust-busters"'. (The Economist, 24.09.94, p.102). On
the contrary, they can benefit consumers as well as firms. Even if the franchise
agreements guarantee an exclusive territory to the dealer, this does not imply that the
retailer is guaranteed monopoly power in the area. While the exclusivity eliminates
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intra-brand competition, it does not keep the retailer from inter-brand competition+',
and instead, as this model showed, brings about a long run Chamberlinian solution
with the firms earning zero profits".
"Contracts with vertical restraints, are often the most efficient way for producers to get
their wares to the market. When that is so, consumers stand to gain, through a
combination of lower prices, better information and better service" (ibid.). The
fundamental problem regarding the industrial antitrust policy to be adopted with
respect to franchising derives from the complete absence, or the limited extent of,
competition both among producers and among retailers, rather than from the vertical
restraints themselves. "Vertical restraints employed by transactors with no market
power cannot be anticompetitive," (Klein and Saft, 1988, p.295).
S3 Isn't it the case we find a 'Burger King' right across the road from a McDonald's even in remote
areas?
S4 The above concluding remarks derived from the solution of our model, hold true in the case where
franchising is the only form of vertical restraint adopted by the principal. The same conclusion does not
necessarily apply where additional forms of vertical ties (e.g., Resale Price Maintenance) are imposed
by the manufacturer on the retalier. In such instance the principal-agent relationship would be
complicated by additional frictions not analysed in our framework. This point was in fact raised by
some franchisees who participated to our survey (see next chapter), who lamented the imposition of
additional obligations. The investigation of such case is beyond the scope of this research, and remains
an interesting path to pursue in future research.
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2.7. Appendices
2.7.1. Appendix 2.7-1 GAMS Solution Technique to Non Linear
Programming Problems
When GAMS solves non linear programming problems, the solution techniques are
particularly complex.
It employs a projected Lagrangean algorithm based on a method due to Robinson
(I9nis which involves a sequence of major iterations each of which requires the
solution of a linearly constrained subproblem, where each subproblem contains a
linearised version of the non linear constraints.
At the start of the k-th major iteration, let xk be an estimate of the non linear
variables, and let Ak be an estimate of the Lagrangean multipliers associated with the
non linear constraints.
Let the problem be of the form:
55 See Murtagh and Saunders (1987). "Minos 5.1 User's Guide". Stanford University.
118
min F (x) + ct x +dt Y (1)
x,y
subject to:
f (x) + Al y < or>!:n (2)
A2 x + A3 y < or > 122 (3)
I«:) <u (4)
The constraints are linearised by changing f(x) In equation (2) to its linear
approximation
where J(x0 is the Jacobian matrix evaluated at xk- The i-th row of the Jacobian is the
gradient vector for the i-th non linear constraint function. As for the objective
gradient, GAMS calculates the Jacobian using symbolic differentiation.
The subproblem to be solved during the k-th major iteration is:
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The objective function (5) is called an augmented Lagrangean.
Then, GAMSIMINOS uses the reduced-gradient algorithm to minimise (5) subject to
(6) (7) and (8).
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2.7.2. Appendix 2.7-2





PL probability of occurrence of good state for type I
PH probability of occurrence of bad state for type h
W fixed wage
I investment or effort
R coefficient of risk aversion in the crra utility function
H cost derived from losing the job
URL level of reservation utility to type I
URH level of reservation utility to type h
WG piece rate payment to the agent in the good state
WB piece rate payment to the agent in the bad state
XG output level in the good state
XB output level in the bad state;
OBJECTIVE VARIABLE: WELF Expected Social Welfare;
EQUATIONS
PESL Expected profits on low types
PESH Expected profits on high types
MH Incentive constraint on the investment/effort
PCL Participation Constraint for type I
PCH Participation Constraint for type h
ICL Self selection Constraint for type I
ICH Self selection Constraint for type h
WS Average of expected Welfare
OBJ Social Welfare objective function;
PESL Z =E= PL*(XG- W)+(l-PL)*(XB- W) = 0;
PESH Z =E= PH*(XG-WG)+(I-PH)*(XB-WB) = 0;
MH PL *«W-I)**R)+(1-PL)*«W-I-H)**R) =G=«W-H)**R);
PCL PL*«W-I)**R)+(I-PL)*«W-I-H)**R) =E= URL;
ICL PL *«W -I)**R)+( l-PL)*«W -I-H)* *R) =G= PL *«WG-I)**R)+( I-PL)*«WB- I)**R);
PCH PH*«WG-I)**R)+(I-PH)*«WB-I)**R) =E= URH;
ICH PH*«WG-I)**R)+(I-PH)*«WB-I)**R) =G= PH*«W-I)**R)+(l-PH)*«W-I- H)**R);
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WS V =E= (URL+URH)/2;





General Algebraic Modeling System
Compilation
PL probability of occurrence of good state for type I
PH probability of occurrence of bad state for type h
W fixed wage
I investment or effort
R coefficient of risk aversion in the crra utility function
H unemployment rate of the low types
T punishment derived from losing the job
UL level of reservation utility of type I
URH level of reservation utility of type h
WG piece rate payment to the agent in the good state
WB piece rate payment to the agent in the bad state
XG expected revenues in the good state




QG output in good state




K coefficient of the punishment func.




PESL Expected profits form low types
PESH Expected profits from high types
PCL moral hazard and Participation Constraint of low types
PCH Participation Constraint to type h
ICL Incentive Compatibility constraint of type I
ICH Incentive Compatibility constraint of type h
OB] objective
UTL util ofL
XGREV revenues in good state
XBREV revenues in bad state
ELEVEL unemployment cost
HSUPPL Y supply of high types
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PRICE inverse demand of the good
PUN punishment
TON tot employment;
XGREV .. XG =E= EP*QG;
XBREV .. XB =E= EP*QB;
ELEVEL.. H =E= (NLBAR - NL) / NLBAR;
HSUPPL Y.. URH =E= B*NH;
PRICE .. EP =E= A - NL*(PL*QG + (l-PL)*QB) - NH* (PH*QG + (l-PH)*QB);
TON .. N =E= (NL + NH);
PESL.. PL*(XG-W-I)+(l-PL)*(XB-W-I) =E= 0;
PESH.. PH*(XG-WG-I)+(l-PH)*(XB-WB-I) =E= 0;
PCL.. PL *«W+ l)**R)+(1-PL)*«W-T+ l)**R) =G=«W-T+ 1+I)**R);
ICH.. PH*«WG+l)**R)+(l-PH)*«WB+l)**R) =G= URH;
ICLPL *«W+ l)**R)+(l-PL)*«W-T+ l)**R)=G=PL*«WG+ l)**R)+( I-PL)*«WB+ l)**R);
ICH.. PH*«WG+l)**R)+(l-PH)*«WB+ l)**R) =G= PH*«W+ l)**R)+(l-PH)*«W-
T+l)**R);
EX .. H=L=W;








The biggest limit to empirical research on mixed organisational forms is the type of
data adopted by most scholars. Since outlet level data are not available, they make use
of firm level or even industry level data. These types of data, however, are not very
likely to shed light on the organisational decision as they lack information at outlet
level which, as we discussed above, is a crucial element to understand the principal-
agent contractual choices that result in a particular organisational structure.
The main target of the empirical investigation we are going to present in the
following chapters, is to check whether the evidence gathered can serve to verify and
enrich the theoretical presumptions deriving from the previous chapter about
'contractual choice'. Such information will help us to perform a comprehensive
exploration and evaluation of the different motivations that lead the two parties of the
contractual relationship to their particular choice. Therefore, in order to test the main
ideas proposed by the model presented in chapter 2, (e.g., the existence of a self
selection mechanism which implements a 'truth-telling' separating equilibrium), and
to investigate the individuals' contractual choice within a firm, we needed outlet level
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data providing information on the contract, the outlet, and the personal characteristics
of the agents, i.e., both the managers of company-owned outlets and the franchisees of
the franchised outlets. Since these data are not readily available, we conducted a
survey of British firrns adopting this mixed organisational structure. The survey was
carried out in 1995, by means of postal questionnaires.
The analysis that follows has been realised in three different parts. The first part
consists of a qualitative analysis of the responses obtained by the survey. The second
part is an econometric study based on the outlet-level data gathered by our
questionnaires. Finally, the third part, presents some econometric results from the
investigation of company-level data derived from the 'Franchise World Directory,
1994'. We then try to draw the main conclusions deriving from the results of our
theoretical study and those obtained by these three analyses into a unitary and coherent
framework.
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3. Survey: A Qualitative Analysis on Contract
Heterogeneity within the Firm
3.1. Introduction
The analysis we are going to present in this section has been carried out in the form of
a case study, the reason for that being an attempt to study qualitative data on
franchising contractual arrangements. More specifically, we intend to describe some
relevant characteristics of the franchise systems investigated by means of the survey
we conducted, that cannot be captured by econometrics. In fact, even though this type
of data cannot be used for econometric estimations, it provides interesting insights to
test for suggested explanations of observed contractual practices'", As Ones (1992a)
put it "opportunism, bounded rationality, trust, flexibility and contractual
incompleteness are all examples of qualitative aspects of contractual situations,"
(p.28).
The aim of this qualitative study is not a purely descriptive one. In fact, the survey was
conducted by means of questionnaires designed in such a way as to provide
information to investigate the explanatory power of the suggested and established
S6Case study methodology to examine franchising has already been adopted by various authors (inter
alia,Oant, 1995; Ones, 1992a).
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theories. This is by no means the first survey in the area. Dnes (1992a), performed a
'fieldwork-based' study of franchising where he investigated 19 franchise systems in a
broad range of industries. However, our study differs from Dnes' in many,
fundamental, points. First, Dnes focuses his analysis only on franchising, without
investigating any other contractual/organisational alternative available to the firm.
Second, his study, although including some investigation on franchisees, concentrates
mainly on franchisors; our study, in contrast, does the exact opposite. Third, the
analysis performed by Dnes consists exclusively of single chains case studies. Our
study starts with a case study including, and comparing, several firms, and then
proceeds to a more sophisticated econometric analysis.
Analogously to Ones, Dant (1995) only performs a case study analysis. His study
provides interesting insights into the franchisors' choice but lacks any analysis of the
franchisees' side. This study was carried out by means of questionnaires distributed to
franchisors at a Franchise meeting. It mainly addresses the fundamental question:
'why do firms choose to expand through franchising as opposed to other competing
alternatives?'. This question, although being closely related to the issues addressed by
our study, has a different focus, that is, it looks at the possibilities for growth deriving
from the franchising choice. Dant finds that operational control and efficiency, market
entry, capital access and profits are the most compelling reasons for this contractual
choice. More specifically, he finds support for Norton's (1988) hypothesis of bundling
of financial and human capital as determining the franchise choice, while he rejects
Rubin (1978) thesis that discards the capital provision option as being an explanatory
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factor of this contractual choice. Both these propositions, together with other relevant
hypotheses, will be investigated both in the qualitative and in the econometric
analyses that follow.
The main target of this survey consisted, as we explained above, in collecting data at
outlet levef". However, in order to analyse the decisions/choices of both the two
actors at play in this agency relationship, our survey covered both the agents
(franchisees and managers of the company-owned outlets), and the principals (the
franchisor/company).
Inwhat follows we start by describing sampling issues (selection and characteristics).
We then report on the methodology adopted to formulate the questionnaire. After this
general introductory description of the survey, we then proceed to present the results
of the qualitative analysis of the responses in two steps:
1. The Franchisors,
2. The Outlets: 2.a Franchisees 2.b Managers.
S7To the extent of our knowledge, only one survey has been conducted, before ours, on the 'agents
side'. It was performed during the 'seventies by Stanworth on three UK franchise chains. As reported
by Mendelsohn (1979), this survey showed the importance of 'self-employment' characteristics for the
franchisees of the study, in their decision to take up the business. It also concluded that, in addition to
other motives like rapid growth with limited capital, one relevant reason for a company to adopt
franchising is that this has a lot to offer in having to serve geographically dispersed markets with the
problems this involves, like communication, motivation and labour selection.
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3.2. The Sample
The firms who were sent the questionnaire were randomly drawn from all the
companies listed in the Franchise World Directory 1994, which is an annual directory
published by the British Franchise Association listing all the members in that
particular year, the number of franchised and company-owned outlets, the year when
the company was established and the year when it started franchising, the franchise fee
and the royalty rate, the total investment cost and working capital requirement,
typical outlet projected turnover and projected profits, period of initial contract,
renewal period and the areas of availability''', Among these companies we decided to
mail the questionnaire to several chains operating in different business categories, so
as to have a sample representing all the main sectoral characteristics. However, in
order to avoid a possible bias in the representativeness of our sample, the proportions
of chains investigated per each sector was made approximately correspondent to the
population distribution derived from the Franchise Directory. Roughly speaking these
sectors can be grouped into three large categories according to their typology:
1. Services (building, cleaning, business, vehicle);
2. Restaurants, Catering and Hotels;
3. Retailing, Distribution and Wholesale Vending.
S8 These information, however, are not always complete. Furthermore, they are not provided for all the
companies listed.
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The Franchise Directory actually reports a more detailed separation of categories of
sectors. Nevertheless, we decided to proceed to the above grouping on the basis of the
sectoral characteristics represented by the type of activity performed by the principal
upstream and by the agent downstream, which would, therefore, present analogous
characteristics in terms of moral hazard and adverse selection issues.
In fact, the importance of value added downstream is stronger in the services sector, it
is then quite strong in the second group, restaurants, catering and hotels, while it is of
relative minor importance in the distribution, retailing and wholesale vending sector.
Since, according to the theory presented above, the more labour intensive the process
downstream, the stronger will be the case for moral hazard and adverse selection in
those sectors, we intended to investigate how this would reflect in the organisational
forms adopted by the firms pertaining to these three main sectoral groups.
Moreover, one additional factor to be taken into account is the degree of 'sunkness' of
the initial investment made by the franchisee downstream. Actually, as noted by some
researchers (inter alia, Klein, 1980, Williamson, 1985, Dnes, 1992a and b), this can
play the role of a hostage-bond that the agent posts on his performance. This
commitment (investment) would be an additional disciplinary device on the
franchisee. However, where the initial commitment on the franchisees' side is quite
low, and/or it is sunk only to a very limited extent, a stronger importance of labour
input downstream might not be necessarily associated with more franchising. It is of
extreme importance to disentangle, and evaluate the magnitude of these two factors in
that in some cases/sectors, one might offset the other, thus reverting the first best
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organisational structure to one or the other extreme of the range of the
contractual/organisational options (i.e., vertical integration or complete delegation).
Since our main scope was to obtain information at outlet level, we intended to mail
the questionnaire to all the outlets (i.e., to all the franchised and company-owned
outlets) of the investigated chain. The total number of questionnaires sent to the
outlets was 376, this was determined by research funds constraints. The number of
companies/franchisors investigated, was therefore determined endogenously, that is,
these 376 outlets pertained to 23 different chains. Hence, we sent the questionnaire to





Business Sample Responses Sample" Responses
Category
Total Number Total Number Number of Num.
of outlets of outlets C/O outlets Franchised
outlets
I. Services









Distribution, 8 2 185 19 7 12
Wholesale
vending
TOTAL 23 7 376 46 12 34
Legend: C/O=company-owned.
* Since the Franchise Directory did not report for all companies the distribution of the
outlets, between company-owned and franchised, we did not have this information a priori.
The presence, however, of some bias in our selection of the sample could not,
initially, be ruled out since the companies included in the sample all adopted either a
mix of contracts or only franchise contracts. In other words, we did not have in our
sample any companies that had opted for the other extreme of the contractual range,
i.e., that only adopted company ownership. This is clearly due to the fact that the
'Franchise Directory' does not list any such companies.
The risk of sample selection however, was greatly reduced by the fact that (as we will
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discuss in deeper details in the section on the franchisor's survey) among the
respondents there were some companies that had decided to give up on the franchise
option, and had reverted their chains into wholly integrated companies. Actually, to
the best of our knowledge, this is the only survey in this field of research that includes
the other end of the spectrum of organisational options, i.e., completely vertically
integrated companies. This is of extreme importance in that it allows us to test the
hypotheses set out by the previous part of this work. In other words, it allows us to
check whether, given certain conditions, as derived from the analysis performed
above, the PVI will turn out to be the 'optimal' choice.
3.3. The Questionnaire
The questionnaire was carefully constructed by making use of the questionnaire
design methodology developed throughout the social sciences (inter alia Hague, 1993,
Oppenheim and Naftali, 1992, Denscombe, 1992, and Converse and McDonnel,
1987). In order to make data gathering as complete as possible, these authors suggest
to simplify the questions as much as possible so as to maximise the response rate. We
adopted the funnelling technique, which suggests starting off by asking very broad and
generic questions, and slowly getting into deeper details, trying to leave to the end
more specific and confidential questions.
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Another technique adopted was the closed questions one. That is, we provided several
alternative potential answers and asked the respondents to t~ick the one which would
be appropriate in their case, but always left the possibility of providing unprompted,
open-ended responses.
Several questions were provided with scaled potential answers. Such scale consisted
of a five points Likert-type scale, which is commonplace and generally accepted in
social sciences investigations. These questions were formulated in such a way as to
investigate the relative importance of different factors affecting the contractual choice
and the available alternatives. They were scaled from 1. extremely important/relevant,
to 5. non important/relevant. Getting an insight on the ordering of the different reasons
for the individual to choose such type of contract is of extreme importance to verify
the hypotheses suggested by this work (this will then be further tested in a hierarchical
discrete choice econometric model, see following chapter).
The general problem due to the adoption of scaled questions is that they only allow for
a restricted range of responses. We overcame this problem leaving to the respondent,
also in this case, the possibility to provide a different answer from those suggested by
the question. Great care was taken in the formulation of the questions so as not to bias
the answers in any way.
Three different questionnaires were designed (the specimen of the questionnaires are
reported in the appendix to the chapter). One for the franchisor/company (see
Appendix 3.6-1), one for the franchisees (see Appendix 3.6-2), and one for the
managers of the company-owned outlets (see Appendix 3.6-3). These last two
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questionnaires also included a questionnaire on the outlet (see Appendix 3.6-4) in
order to explore the physical characteristics of the outlets, and obtain data to test the
main hypothesis suggested by the literature of a correspondence between outlets and
contractual heterogeneity .
The literature on surveys suggests, before sending out all the questionnaires, to make a
test of the questionnaire designed by means of a pilot survey, in order to check that the
questions are easily and correctly understood by the respondents, and that there are no
questions which are bound to be left unanswered.
We chose a subsample of 10 companies and 80 outlets on which to test our
questionnaire. The replies suggested that our questionnaires did not need major
changes but just minor refinements.
We then proceeded to a slight revision of the questionnaire as suggested by the results
of the pilot survey. The total final number of outlets that were sent the questionnaire
was therefore 37659• Most part of the completed questionnaires were received back in
approximately one week- ten days. About two weeks after having sent the
questionnaire, we followed up with 'reminder phone-calls'. We contacted by
telephone the firms that had not responded by that date enquiring whether they had
received the questionnaire, and, in case they had, if there were any special reasons that
kept them from replying. In few cases it actually turned out that the firm had gone out
59This figure includes also the number of pilot questionnaires sent, since, due to the fact that we did not
need to make any changes apart from some minor refinements, they were extremely similar and enabled
us to use their responses together with those of the main survey.
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of business, or that it had changed address. Some claimed not having received the
questionnaire, in these cases, as in the cases of change of address where a new address
had been provided, we sent another copy of the questionnaire. The response rate in
this second round was extremely low, thus showing that actually those firms that had
not responded in first place were not intending to take part to the study anyway.
3.4. The Franchisors Survey
Each of the 23 companies/franchisors was contacted by a personal letter explaining
the type of research being conducted and requesting hislher cooperation by completing
the questionnaire. A sample of the letter together with the questionnaire specimen is
reported in Appendix 3.6-1.
The small number of companies investigated in this part of the survey is mainly due to
the fact that we intended to obtain some precise and limited information from the
upstream companies, since the main object of our data-gathering exercise are the
outlets. Hence, with this first part of the survey, as we show in the analysis of the
responses, we mainly tried to investigate the type of organisational form adopted by
the firm, and the motivations for its particular choice; its advantages with respect to




Of the 23 questionnaires sent to the headquarters of the companies included in the
sample, we received the following responses:
• 7 fully completed questionnaires. The sectoral characteristics of these firms are
reported in Table 3-1 above. Since we guaranteed confidentiality, we cannot
disclose the names of the firms that responded. Hence, we attach a code to each of




2 'restaurants, hotels and catering'
3 'retailing and distribution'
the letter following the number, then, identifies the company.
• 2 (from category 2) sent an information brochure;
• 1 was no longer trading (from category 1, more specifically cleaning services);
• 2 (from category 3) had been bought by different companies and had not
restarted operating yet;
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• 1 company sent back the questionnaire not entirely completed, and
unfortunately could not be included among the respondents;
• 10 did not reply even after our reminder phone-calls. Most of them said they
could not reply for confidentiality reasons.
Being based only on seven cases, the conclusions deriving from the analysis that
follows cannot be generalised, i.e., they certainly cannot be regarded as being
representative of the entire population. Nevertheless, they can shed light on some of
the issues we are investigating here.
As we said above, the fact that these seven respondent companies who are split quite
evenly among the three possible organisational forms: 2 only franchise, 3 mixed and 2
(1 already, 1 about to) only company-owned, makes this analysis rather interesting
since, as said above, this is the first survey on this topic that includes also companies
that adopt only company-ownership, (see Dant, 1995, who states the presence of
sample-selection bias in his as in other surveys, because no other cases but franchise
companies are included in the sample).
However, cleaning services are over-represented among the respondents in the
services sector. This is due to the fact that these firms, as we are going to illustrate
below, experienced strong problems in their relationship with the franchisees, which
provided them with a stronger motivation to respond than other firms which probably
did not have analogous experiences.
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3.4.2. The Questionnaire and the Responses
The questions included in the questionnaire referenced all the arguments identified by
the literature and by our propositions, as presented in the first part of this work. They
were grouped into two main sections of the questionnaire: the first section, seeking
information on the company, and the second investigating the contractual
arrangements.
According to Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969), along with the capital shortage hypothesis,
(see chapter one), franchising is advantageous for a franchisor in the infancy and
adolescence of the enterprise because it is a way to obtain capital to expand, and
knowledge of local market conditions. Then, once the system is fully launched (and
the franchisor gets known on the capital markets), he buys back the franchisee
operated units in order to own and operate them directly. Martin, 1988, showed that
the above argument might be valid in the short run, but that in the long run credit
market conditions do not influence the organisational choice. Analogously, many
other works found the above theory not consistent. Nevertheless, In some cases
(Lafontaine, 1992), this argument was still found significant.
According to a life-cycle study of franchising conducted by Martin, 1988, instead,
franchising does not represent a temporary phase on the path to complete ownership
integration. On the contrary, it can be regarded as a long-run market solution to risk-
sharing and monitoring problems. The findings of this study, in fact, reveal that the
proportion of company-owned outlets declines in the long-run. This study, however,
as all other studies on the topic, is based on a sample which does not include firms
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that in the meantime had decided to abandon the franchise option and to revert to
complete vertical integration.
Conversely, according to the hypothesis formulated in the previous chapter, we expect
that, unlike the prediction of the life-cycle hypothesis, the 'age' of the company will
not directly affect its organisational choice. In that chapter we found that (consistent
with what found by Stigler, 1951) the organisational structure adopted by a firm
changes in response to changes in the state of demand. Unfortunately, the information
we obtained from our survey did not provide us with time series data to test this
theoretical result.
Nevertheless, an indirect effect of the age variable on the contractual can be
envisaged. A more established company can be assumed to have a stronger, and more
valuable, 'brand name', and therefore to be able to attract more potential franchisees.
First, because it will involve higher expected returns to the franchising, and second
because of a reputation effect, that is, it will be less likely to indulge in opportunistic
behaviour.
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The first four questions of the questionnaire were meant to gather evidence on this
point.
AGE
Q.l In what year did your company start?
Q.2 In what year did your company start franchising?
Table 3-3
1.A 1.B 1.e 2.A 2.B 3.A 3.B
Year Started the 1981 1990 1987 1981 1981 1987 1980
Company
Year Started 1981 1994 1990 1987 1987 1987 1989
Franchising
The fact that some companies start franchising at a later stage provides clear evidence
against the capital constraint hypothesis. This is even more so if we consider that, as
the respondents declared, the only two cases of contemporaneous start 3.A and I.A
were companies already in operation when they were acquired by the present owners.
This suggests that before starting franchising, the company must get some
establishment on the market. This establishment, as we illustrate below, increases the




Qo3 How many franchised and company-owned outlets have you had on average since then?
Table 3-4
1.A 1.B 1.e 20A 20B 30A 30B
C/O Fr. C/O Fr. C/O Fr. C/O Fr. C/O Fr. C/O Fr. C/O Fr.
1980-1984 1 4 X 1 0 X
1985-1989 1 8 2 0 X X 1 4 1 8 X
1990-1994 1 15 2 2 1 18 2 3 1 8 1 15 0 25
1995 10 1 3 0 0 33 2 4 1 8 1 17 0 52
Legend: C/O= Company-Owned, Fr.= Franchised, X corresponds to a time interval when the
company was in operation but for which it did not provide any information about its
structure.
The time intervals included in the questionnaire included also the interval 1975-1979,
this has not been included in the table above since none of the respondents was in
operation at that time.
I.A sent us a letter in which they explained to us that they had no intention of
continuing franchising, therefore they were about to dismiss this last franchised outlet
remaining in their chain. For this reason, henceforth we regard this company as wholly
integrated. This company represents a peculiar case, in that they suffered a very strong
moral hazard problem. This was also the case for 1.B.
I.C, conversely, reversed from a mixed structure to a solely franchise system.
Although the restricted number of the respondent companies cannot be the ground for
a reliable generalisation of the results to the entire population, it gives some
information on the direction of the main dynamics underlying the phenomenon.
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The information reported in the table above shows a lot of dynamism in the
organisational structures adopted by the investigated firms, unlike in the contract
terms (see below), as found by Lafontaine and Shaw, 1996. This dynamism, apart
from the two particular cases of the cleaning companies which faced strong moral
hazard problems, and therefore reverted from a mixed to an integrated structure, is
reported on the franchised outlets, whose number is growing over time, rather than in
the number of company-owned outlets.
This compares favourably with the predictions deriving from the model presented in
the previous chapter, where we predicted, that as firms grow, they tend to make larger
use of delegation, however, as demand falls, they tend to switch back to a vertically
integrated structure. Unfortunately these data cannot enable us to test the last part of
this statement.
Q.4 What was the average turnover of these outlets (both company-owned and franchised) over
the following time periods?
Only one of the respondents provided these information. All the other companies
seemed to be very reluctant to reveal financial data, therefore it was not possible to
compare the financial performance of the two types of outlets, and make any inference
on their relative efficiency.
THE CONTRACT
The following questions, from 5 to 16 aimed at investigating the contractual choice
and at delving deeper into the motivation of such choice.
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Q.5 Do you have specific written contracts with your franchisees?
All companies report to have written contracts with their franchisees, unlike with
company managers. The clear risk of opportunistic behaviour on both sides makes the
adoption of a written contract an inevitable choice.
CONTRACT MIX
Q.6 Have you got both company-owned and franchised outlets?
Q.7 Why do you retain the ownership of some outlets'!
Table 3-5
Company Contract type Motivation
















Concentration on being a franchisor.
Commitment.
CIO outlets act as a template, as a benchmark, for
franchisees to replicate. They are also used to test new
ideas.
High sunk costs for franchisees. Not easy to franchise.
Concentration on being a franchisor.
* See above for explanation as why we regard this company as wholly 'vertically integrated':
Legend: CIO=company-owned.
The information provided by 3.A on the motivation for choosing this contractual mix
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shows that there is a binding financial constraint on the franchisees rather than on the
company, as suggested by the capital shortage hypothesis. In fact, this results also
from the econometric estimations performed on the outlet level data collected by our
survey (see following chapter).
Apparently there are not many common patterns in the choice of the organisational
form, this is especially so for companies adopting a mix of both contracts. Only in the
case of companies adopting only one contractual form did we obtain the same answer.
In the case of franchising, for example, apparently, these firms prefer to concentrate
only on one type of contract as they would probably have to face diseconomies from
the adoption of a contract mix.
If, as explained above we regard 'I.A' as a company adopting only company-owned
outlets, then a common pattern arises also at the other extreme of the contract range.
Both companies that adopt only company ownership pertain to the same sectoral
category, i.e. cleaning services, hence, they face the same sort of constraints and,
therefore, their organisational choice is determined by similar motivations'". These
two cleaning companies, I.A and I.B, both reverted from a mixed to a completely
vertically integrated structure. This was a result of a strong problem of cheating on
fees from franchisees. As it will be clear from the analysis of the responses that
60A more detailed analysis of the motivation is reported in questions 15 to 17.
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follows, the initial investment of the franchisee in this subsector is very small, and,
most important, it is sunk only to a very limited extent?'.
As we showed in the model presented in the previous part of this work, the 'contract-
mix' solution is a local equilibrium given certain values of the parameters. More
specifically, the simulation analysis revealed that the separating equilibrium arises for
certain ranges of values of the parameters, e.g., initial investment. If we interpret the
case of these two companies in the light of the above results, considering that this
operation does not require a 'high value' human capital, hence the screening motive is
not very strong, we are led to think that the incentives provided by the franchise
contract do not outweigh the gains that accrue to the franchisees from cheating. In
other words, in this sector it is not possible to design an incentive compatible
franchise contract. This is due to the fact that the sunk-cost penalties of specific
investment are very low, because of the small size of the initial investment. This in
turn implies that there is no hostage function, hence no disciplinary device, in such a
sector where the incentive to cheat on the franchisees' side is certainly very high, also
considering the difficulty of monitoring such operation.
61Cleaning equipment can certainly have a very high salvage value. Furthermore, since it is not very
strictly linked to the brand 'image', as would be for example all the assets at a McDonald's outlet, this
makes it very likely for such problems to arise in this sector. Our prediction would be that a mixed
structure is not the first best for the cleaning services sector, and we would expect all the companies
pertaining to this sector that adopting franchising to stop operations or tum to the vertical integration
solution. Indeed, among the replies we received, the one company that responded saying it had stopped
operation and could therefore not complete the questionnaire was another cleaning company.
Furthermore, as resulted from the letter I.A sent us, they said they had just acquired the company from
its previous owners, which explained why they had initially a number of franchised outlets, and, this, in
turn, most likely explains why this company was sold by the previous owners.
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2.B reports on keeping the ownership of some units to use them as a benchmark for
franchisees to conform to, and as a way to test new ideas/products. Gallini and Lutz
(1992) suggested that contract mixing, or, as they defined it, 'dual distribution',
particularly in the case of 'new products', can be explained by signalling motives, that
is, by the willingness of the principal to signal to potential franchisees the validity of
the new idea/product by investing himself into it by means of company owned outlets.
From what 2.B stated, however, it looks as if, rather than a signalling purpose, the
company-owned outlets are a testing ground controlled by the company before the
launch of a new product. However, the two motivations can be consistent. This is
more consistent, though, with the idea we presented in the previous chapter that the
franchise is a semi-independent business option for the franchisees. We argued there
that it actually saves them the costs of building a name in the market, and, from what
is reported here, it seems to save the 'potential entrepreneurs' also the costs of
experimenting with new products.
CONTRACT FORM
Q.8 Is there one standard contractual form for all the franchisees?
All companies reported to have standard, written, contractual agreement with their
franchisees. The adoption of standard contracts supports very recent findings by
Lafontaine and Shaw (1996), who also highlight the stability of these contract terms
over time. At the same time the fact that there are no exceptions to the adoption of
written documents shows that the potential for opportunistic behaviour on both sides,
leads the two parties to make use of written agreements.
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Q.9 Do you have formal contracts with the general managers of the outlets owned by the
company?
Unlike the contracts with franchisees, which are always written documents, the
relationship with the managers does not always take the form of a written agreement.
This might actually suggest that the moral hazard problem in this relationship is less
stringent than it is in the relationship with a semi-independent agent, the franchisee.
However, this conclusion has to be revised in the light of the answers that were given
to question 17 below, where all the companies declared that managers are easier to lay
off. In other words, this might suggest, as we assumed in our model, that the principal
holds the bargaining power in this relationship, hence, the absence of a written
contract makes it easier for the principal to layoff the manager. This clearly suggests
that in this type of relationship the principal retains more bargaining power than he
does in the franchise relationship. Consistent with our theoretical model, this might
also imply that the lay-off is a disciplinary device on the managers at company-owned
outlets. Among the seven firms of our sample, only two of the five companies that
have company-owned outlets have written contracts with their managers (3.A and
I.A), while the remaining three (2.A, 1.B and 2.B) do not adopt written agreements.
CONTRACT (ORGANISATIONAL) DYNAMICS
The questions that follow aimed at testing the presence of franchisor's opportunistic
behaviour, which would consist in the franchisor buying back the franchise outlets
once the sunk investment is made by the franchisee. In our analysis above, we ruled
out this case because of reputation motives for the franchisor. Klein (1980)
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has already pointed out this would not be a rational behaviour. In fact, from the
answers provided we could not infer any opportunistic behaviour from the principal.
However, this point will be more widely investigated in the analysis of the franchisees
responses.
Q.I0 How many contracts did you renew on average at the expiry date?
Q.ll How many outlets did you terminate on average at the expiry of the contract?
Q.12 Were they:
• Discontinued, • Bought back from the franchisee to be operated by the company, • Transferred from
company-ownership to franchising, .Sold to a different franchisee, •The manager was changed.
Since most companies are quite young, and the duration of the franchise contract is
generally between ten and fifteen years, for some of them, namely 3.B, 2A, I.B and
l.C, the contracts had not expired yet. 3.A and 2.B, whose contract is for ten years,
had renewed all the franchise contracts expired.
I.A terminated eleven franchised outlets which were bought back to be company
operated. Company-owned outlets, obviously, do not have a contractual expiry date.
Q.13 How many contracts did you terminate before their expiry date?
Q.14 Were they:
• Discontinued, • Bought back from the franchisee to be operated by the company, • Transferred from
company-ownership to franchising, .Sold to a different franchisee, •The manager was changed.
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Table 3-6
LA 1.B I.e 2.A 2.B 3.A 3.B
Contracts
terminated 3 2 2 2 0 0
before ex~iry
I Bought Bought
They were Discont.ed back to c/o Discont.ed back to Discont.ed
I I Sold to a c/o
Discont.ed new
fran.see
Legend. Discont.ed= Discontinued. c/o= company-ownership. fran.see= franchisee.
The cases of contract termination before the expiry date do not seem to provide any
support to the hypothesis of franchisor opportunistic behaviour since only two outlets
were bought back by the franchisor. One outlet was bought back by 1.B, however, this
is explained by the company's decision of terminating all franchise operations because
of a strong franchisee moral hazard problem. The case of 2.A cannot be assessed in
any conclusive way.
Moreover, the pattern followed by the acquisition to company ownership of franchised
units as reported from the responses to questions 10-14, does not seem to provide any
evidence in favour of the life-cycle hypothesis as proposed by Oxenfeldt and Kelly,
(1969).
MOTIVATION FOR THE SPECIFIC ORGANISATIONAL/CONTRACTUAL
FORM
The following questions were designed in such a way to explore the validity of the
literature hypotheses, and of the new hypotheses proposed in this study about the
advantages associated with this contractual choice.
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On a 5 point Lykert-type scale, from extremely important to not important, the firms
investigated were asked to rate the importance of several possible reasons for their
particular contractual choice.
In some of the questions that follow, I.A is not included among the respondents as
they did not answer them since they inherited, hence did not choose, a mixed
structure.
Q.15 Please rate the reasons why you decided to adopt franchising
62Table 3-7
Mean Median Standard Dev.n Min Max
Q.15
* Higher 3 3 0 3 3
profitability
* To raise 4 5 1.414214 2 5
capital
* Faster 2.8 2 2.04939 5
expansion
* Sharing 3.8 5 1.788854 5
the financial
risk
Legend: Range goes from 1=extremely important, to 5= not important.
Other reasons reported by the companies in the last (open end) part of the question:
the 'Other' option, were:
62 Since we are dealing with ordinal scale data, the appropriate measure of central tendency is the
median.
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• Was already a franchise system when acquired by the present owners. (I.A). This
actually explains the fact that the company did not find appropriate the organisational
structure it inherited, and therefore, after experiencing serious problems, decided to
revert to complete company-ownership.
• Easier to manage, (2.A).
• Motivated owners, secure commitment to the business, (2.B).
The answers provided to the question above seem to reveal that there are not many
common opinions, apart for the first option where all agreed that profitability is
higher, but is not of extreme relevance to the franchise choice. The capital shortage
hypothesis did not receive support. Some support is provided to the argument
proposed by Norton (1988), according to which franchising enables a finn to grow
faster. Norton explained this because of the bundling of human and financial capital
involved in the franchise option. We will show here that while this is true for the case
of human capital, it is not true for the latter. The standard deviation related to this
. h ., hi h63option, owever, IS quite Ig .
63The variance range generally accepted in social sciences from five point scales is up to 2.0 (see
Churchill, 1991)
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Q.16 What are the relative strengths of franchisees as compared to general managers in case of
company-ownership?
Table 3-8





* Care more about




...Provision of 1.833333 1.602082
capital
...Easier to terminate 4 4 1.095445















Legend: Range goes from 1=extremely important, to 5= not important.
Since the answers provided by 1.B, one of the two cleaning compames that
experienced problems were completely different from the others, hence changing all
the results reported in the table above, we decided to report in a second table the
answers provided by all the other companies but 1.B.
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Table 3-9 bis
Mean Median Standard Min Max
Dev.n
Q.16 without I.B
* Better skills 3.25 3 0.5 3 4
* More committed than 0
managers
'" Care more about the 0
quality of the product!
service delivered to the
customers
* Provision of capital 1.25 0.5 2
'" Easier to terminate the 4 4 1.154701 3 5
contract in case of bad
performance
Legend: Range goes from 1=extremely important, to 5= not important.
Once excluded the case of 1.B, there were considerable similarities in the opinion of
the respondents in terms of advantages of franchisees as opposed to managers to run
the outlets of their chains. By far the mostly agreed points, as we suggested above,
were both the importance of commitment and effort expended by the franchisees.
Most of the respondents agreed that it is advantageous that franchisees provide
finance, with respect to managers, however, recall that, as they declared above, this
was not amongst the most important reasons for which they decided to adopt
franchising.




Mean Median Standard Min Max
Dev.n
Q.17
* Better skills 4 4 1.095701 3 5
* More committed than 3.333333 3 0.57735 3 4
franchisees
* Care more about the quality of 3.333333 3 0.57735 3 4
the product! service delivered to
the customers
* Higher reliability as they are 2 2 3
part of the company
* Easier to layoff in case of bad 1.666667 1.154701 3
performance
Lesend: Ranse soes from I=extremel~ ime0rtant, to 5= not ime0rtant.
The most relevant point in this table, as we discussed already above, seems the general
idea that managers are easier to layoff in case of bad performance.
FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
Initial Investment
Q.18 Is the initial investment for the franchised outlets made by Franchisor [J Franchisee [ ]
Q.19 Is it the same for all the franchised outlets?
[ ] Yes: What is the amount? *Franchisor: [] *Franchisee: [ ]
[ ] No: What is the range? *Franchisor: [] *Franchisee: [ ]
What makes it differ?
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Table 3-11 Initial Investment in UK pounds.
l.A l.B 1.C 2.A 2.B 30A 30B
Franchisor 0 0 0 0 5.000 0 0
Franchisee 9.500 7.500 20.000- 80.000 15.000 30.000 20.000
40.000
I.e is the only company that allows a range of different investment levels depending
on the size of the outlet. It is interesting to note that only in one case does the principal
take part in the investment of the agent downstream. In all other cases but one, the
investment is a fixed sum provided by the franchisee.
As we remarked above because of the implications in terms of 'bond-posting', the size
of the initial investment in the two cleaning companies is quite low.
Qo20 Is the franchise fee required the same for all the franchised outlets?
Yes: How much is it?
No: What is the range?
What makes it differ?
Table 3-12





6.000 10.000 13.000 11.930
l.C is the only company that allows a range of franchise fees depending on the size
and location of the outlet.
1.A, as well as 1.B, have an extremely low franchise fee, this, coupled with the fact
that the initial investment is quite low as well, and not sunk (cleaning equipment has a
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salvage value extremely close to its real value), and with the fact that it is an operation
extremely difficult to monitor, implies that the commitment on the franchisee's side is
very low, thereby inducing a strong franchisee moral hazard problem. These sectoral
characteristics make the mixed system not optimal any longer. Eventually, we would
expect companies pertaining to this category to revert to a vertically integrated
organisational structure.
Q.21 Does the royalty rate differ among the outlets?
No: How much is it?
Yes: What is the range? What makes it differ?
Table 3-13
I.A I.B Le 2.A 2.B 3.A 3.B
Royalty Rate 7% Sliding 6%-12% 5% 15% 7.5% 0
scale
Advertising 0 0 0 0 0 2.5% 0
fee
Perhaps the existence of a sliding scale for 1.B is an additional incentive for its
franchisees to under-report the turnover in order to cheat on royalties. Again, in the
case of I.e the size and location of the outlets make the contract tenus vary. For all
the other firms the royalty rate does not vary across outlets.
Q.22 What has been the average annual pay of the general managers in charge of a company-
retained outlet since you started?
On average it varies between 7.500 and 17.500. Unfortunately, these data are too
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limited to allow us to test any efficiency wages implications.
INFORMATION ON THE CONTRACT
The second part of the franchisor's questionnaire asked more direct information on the
contractual arrangements.
Q.l Monitoring Frequency.
I. How often do you inspect the outlets of your company (e.g., daily, weekly, every month, etc.)?
Table 3-14
Monitoring l.A l.B l.e 2.A 2.B 3.A 3.B
Frequency
Twice Daily N/A Daily Daily Daily N/A
CIO outlets per
week
Franchised Monthly Weekly Monthly Weekly Twice per Monthly No
outlets month inspection
It is interesting to remark that despite the strong moral hazard problem reported at
franchised outlet level, by the two cleaning-services companies of our sample, there is
still a considerable difference in the monitoring frequency between clo and franchised
outlets.
The information reported in the table above can be rearranged in a 'contingency table'
in order to perform a non-parametric test for structural differences between the two
sub-samples. In other words, we are going to adopt a Chi-square test to study the
following hypotheses:
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Ho :Monitoring Frequency is independent of the type of outlet, versus




Daily 4 o 4
Twice per week 1 o
Weekly o 2
Twice per month o 1
Monthly o 2






Total 5 7 12
We obtain the observed and expected frequencies from the data reported in the table
above (see Yeomans, 1968, p.286, for an explanation of the calculations techniques)
"'
which enable us to obtain a calculated Chi-square =12. The value deriving from the
tables for the Chi-square with five degrees of freedom at the 0.05 confidence level is
11.07. Therefore, we can reject our null hypothesis and conclude that the monitoring
frequency is structurally different between the two types of outlets.
Monitoring frequency is clearly lower at franchised outlets, as one would expect. This
implies that the delegation of the downstream operation enables the principal to save
on monitoring costs. Furthermore, we would expect that monitoring frequency is
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increasing with the value added by the downstream operation, and that it is negatively
related to the royalty rate at franchised outlets. Unfortunately this sample is too small
to test such hypothesis, however, the case of 'no inspection' reported by 3.B, where
the value added downstream is quite low and the royalty rate is zero, represents a case
in point.
Q.2 Is advertising paid for by
[IThe franchisor [ IThe franchisee[ IBoth: In what proportion? (Franchisor: ) (Franchisee: )
Table 3-15 Advertising Expenditures
I.A I.B Le 2.A 2.B 3.A 3.B
Franchisor o 1% 25% 50% 50% Part o
Franchisee 100% 99% 75% 50% 50% Part 100%
Mathewson and Winter (1985) argue that franchisor's opportunistic behaviour can
arise in the franchise relationship since the franchise is an incomplete contract. More
specifically, they say that the franchisor might free ride on the franchisees in that once
he delegates the outlets to independent agents downstream, he might have an incentive
not to keep investing in the 'brand name' value. Such a case, they report, is generally
related to advertising expenditures that are, they claim, not specified in this
incomplete contract. From our findings, however, it seems that all franchise
agreements but one specify the exact share of these expenses each party has to make.
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All the above findings show that the franchise contract is a very detailed document
(see Hadfield, 1990) which covers most aspects of the contractual relationship so as to
minimise any room for opportunistic behaviour from both parties, and protect, at the
same time, the brand name of the franchisor, and the initial investment of the
franchisee (Klein et aI, 1978, Klein, 1980, Williamson, 1985, Ones, 1992 a and b).
Q.3 What do you use as a measureof the performance of an outlet?
[INumber of customers, [ ] Level of sales, [ ILevel of net Profits, [ ILevel of costs, [ ] Other:
All companies look at the sales level as an index of performance. Most of them,
however, look at all the other factors indicated in the questionnaire. 2.A added that
they also look at 'happiness' of staff.
Problems with franchisees
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Q.4 Did you ever encounter any problems with the franchisees?
( J No ( J Yes What type?
Table 3-16
Company Problems with franchisees
1.A Cheating on royalties. Attempt to bankrupt the franchisor In
order to be free from contractual obligations.
1.B Problems with payments.
1.e Not communicating problems early enough.




Apart from the two cleaning companies, the other companies did not seem to have
experienced any strong problem of franchisees opportunistic behaviour.
Q.5 In what case could you terminate a franchise before the expiry date?
The answers provided to this question are as follows:
• Breach of contract (3 .A, 2.B, I.C);
• False report of royalties, and other type of payments (I.A);
• Insolvency (3.B);
• Any gross deviation from the procedures (2.A, I.B).
The reasons provided above for an early termination of the contract from the
franchisor, did not seem to be too vague so as to enable the principal to take
advantage of the franchisees' investment and terminate without a strong motivation.
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However, we are not aware, obviously, of the possible presence of some particular
contractual clauses that would allow the franchisor to act opportunistically. This
argument will be investigated further in the franchisees survey.
Problems with managers
Q.6 Did you ever encounter any problems with the managers of the outlets in your ownership?
[INo [ IYes What type?
Table 3-17
Company Problems with managers
l.A None
l.B Problems of reliability.
l.e N/A




Q.7 In what case could you fire a manager before the expiry date?
The answers provided to this question are as follows:
• Usual employment law conditions (3.A);
• Consistent under-performance (I.A);
• Any gross deviation from the contract (2.A, I.B).
Also in this case it is not clear that the company could fire a manager without a good
motivation. Nevertheless, as we pointed out above, all companies said to find it easier
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to lay-off managers. This can certainly be regarded as a disciplinary device on the
managers of the company-owned outlets, as we argued in the previous chapter.
PRICE SETTING
Q.8 Who sets the price of the product/service in the franchised outlets?
Q.9 Who sets the price of the product/service in the company-owned outlets?
Table 3-18 Price Setting
1.A 1.B 1.e 2.A 2.B 3.A 3.B
C/O outlets The The N/A The Confidential Joint N/A
ComEan~ ComEan~ ComEani:
Franchised The Joint Joint Joint Confidential Joint Confidential
outlets Franchisee
It is interesting to note that, unlike what is reported by the franchisees as we will
report below, no franchisor said to have the exclusive decision right on the price
downstream. This has important implications in tenus of franchise regulation as we
will discuss below in deeper details. Since the European regulation allows block
exemption for franchise agreements provided that they are not associated with other
[onus of vertical restraints (such as resale price maintenance in this case), we would
expect the franchisors who set the price for the final product not to reveal this
information,
FINANCIAL INFORMATION ON THE COMPANY
Q.I0 What has been the company's approximate average level of total turnover per annum since
the first year of operation?
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Q.ll What has been the approximate level of net profits per annum since then?
With these questions we intended to gather data which would enable us to compare
the financial performance of the company over time, with the organisational structure
adopted during the same period. Unfortunately, the respondents were extremely
reluctant to provide us with information on Turnover and Profits of the Company.
Only in one case (namely, 3.A) were these data provided, in the other cases the
respondents stated that confidentiality issues prevented them to release this
information.
3.5. The Outlet Survey
In order to gather information at outlet level we decided to design a different
questionnaire to be mailed directly to each outlet of the above companies. In order to
obtain the entire list of the outlets of each company of the sample and their addresses
in UK, we made use of the electronic 'Business Directory' of British Telecom. In this
way we managed to obtain the list of all the outlets of the chains, and to send the
questionnaire to all of them. Since from this list we could not distinguish franchised
from company-owned outlets, we sent the entire questionnaire to all the outlets asking
the respondents to fill in the parts which were appropriate to their case. In order to
facilitate the choice of the right questionnaire, we adopted different colours, and asked
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the respondents to fill in the blue one if franchisees, the yellow one if managers, and
the white one, which was the same for both as it was designed to obtain data on the
outlet characteristics.
Of the 376 questionnaires we sent, 46 were returned fully cornpleted'".
Both the questionnaire for the franchised outlets and the one for the company-owned
outlets were divided into three main sections:
a) Information on the FranchiseelManager;
b) Information on the Contract;
c) Information on the Outlet.
The first part, a), on the agent, aimed at testing whether the different characteristics of
these agents were regularly reflected in a particular contractual choice (i.e., whether a
franchise or a management contract). These regularities, if observed would provide
evidence to 1. the existence of a separating equilibrium, and 2. the presence of a self
selection process on the agents' side, according to which the agents would choose a
particular contract to best suit their typology.
The second part, b), was meant to gather information on the contract in order to
investigate the presence of single/double sided moral hazard, and/or, of contractual
64 No incentives were offered for completing the questionnaire except that an offer to share the output
of the study was extended to respondents willing to receive the results of the survey. Strict
confidentiality of individual responses was guaranteed.
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provision to correct for such problems. Furthermore, some questions were designed in
order to investigate if any cases of franchisor's opportunistic behaviour had arisen
during the contractual relationship, analogously to what was asked in the franchisor's
questionnaire to explore the experience of franchisees/managers opportunism. This
section also asked for information on the contractual terms, that is, the franchise fee
and the royalty rate, to check for the stability of these terms, and the way the relative
magnitude would affect the individuals' contractual choice and behaviour. For
example, a higher initial investment/franchise fee, would represent a bond on the
performance on the agent, and would therefore represent a hostage, guaranteeing the
franchisor from the franchisee's misbehaviour, which would be less likely to arise in
cases where a higher financial commitment is requested from the agent. This would
be even more so the larger the degree of sunkness of this investment.
We also asked who sets the price of the final product to test: (i) whether there is a
higher likelihood of observing a franchise contract when the franchisee has the power
to choose the price of the final product, and, (ii) whether the franchisors dictate the
final price thus imposing an additional vertical restraint, i.e., Resale Price
Maintenance (RPM), on the franchisee (note however, that such imposition 1S
generally disguised because of legal reasons as we explained above).
Finally, part c) was specifically designed to obtain information on the physical (and
financial) characteristics of the outlet, in order to gather data that would enable us to
testing the validity of the main hypotheses set by the literature, according to which
contractual heterogeneity is mainly dictated by outlets heterogeneity. In order to
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investigate the presence of inter and intra brand competition, we asked about the
distance from outlets of the same chain and of competing chains.
3.5.1. The Outlet Responses
Unfortunately the response rate for such surveys is not very high, especially in the
case of small outlets. The final number of fully completed questionnaires which could
be used for our estimations amounts to 46. The characteristics of the sample
represented by the final respondents are reported in the following Table.
Table 3-19
Business Category Total Number of Number of C/O Num. Franchised
outlets outlets outlets
Services (building,
cleaning, business, II 0 11
vehicle)
Restaurants, Catering,
Hotels 16 5 II
Retailing, Distribution,
Wholesale vending 19 7 12
TOTAL 46 12 34
The attributes of the respondents, reported in the table above, seem to reflect quite
closely the relative proportions of each sector; in other words, the sectoral distribution
of the respondents approximates the sample quite well, see the table above, therefore
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the population, distribution. Hence, the final sample, does not seem to present a type
of bias due to any sectoral over or under-representation. A different type of bias
which could have arisen in the sample is related to the characteristics of the
respondents. Actually, our major concern was to design the questionnaire in such a
way as to ensure a wide representation of the respondents. More particularly, in order
to make sure that our data were reliable enough to test hypotheses like one-sided and
double-sided moral hazard, we had to make sure that the franchisees who experienced
any problems within their contractual relationship would respond. Arguably our final
sample might be biased in the opposite direction, that is, it might over-represent
managers and franchisees who encountered some type of problems in their
relationship with the company-franchisor'". However, this fact is not worrying in that
it would actually strengthen our possibilities of testing for the arguments pro and
against this contractual choice, allowing us to assume, without too much loss of
generality, that the non-respondents fall in the standard case, i.e., not facing abnormal
situations.
6SThis was the case with the cleaning services companies among the respondents of the franchisors'
survey.
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3.5.2. The Survey: Analysis of the Answers: The Franchisees
The first part of the questionnaire on the outlets was meant to gather information on
the agents' characteristics in order to test our claim that this contractual relationship
can be affected by adverse selection. Therefore, it started by investigating school
qualification, prior occupation (as the forgone-'irrelevant' - alternative), previous
income (as a proxy for reservation utility), age of the individual (as a proxy for
experience'"), previous experience and training. These questions are then followed by
a series of scaled questions on the motivations for the particular contractual choice
and the weight of different factors on this choice. And, finally, the last part
concentrates on more specific information on the contract. These are both financial
and qualitative information, aimed at testing our second main argument, consistent
with the existing literature, on the presence of double-sided moral hazard problems.
In this part of the analysis we are going to concentrate our attention on the qualitative
information provided by the respondents. The following chapter will then concentrate
on the quantitative aspects.
66See the following chapter for a deeper discussion on this point.
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Q. 6. Please rate the reasons why you decided to take up the franchise
Table 3-20
Mean Median Standard Min Max
Dev.n
o.e
* Opportunity to 2.171429 2 1.150082 5
have own business
* Higher expected 2.8 3 1.278786 5
income that in a
fixed-salary job
* Less risky than 1.628571 0.910259 4
starting a business
on your own because
* Greater job 2.085714 2 1.067472 5
satisfaction
* Had appropriate 3.470588 4.5 1.709781 5
experience
Legend: Range goes from 1=extremely important, to 5= not important.
Other:
• Availability of training and support
• More Professional
• Less interference than management
• Could generate high sales
The 'entrepreneurship' motive seems to dominate this contractual choice of the
agents. By far the stronger motive for choosing franchising is, consistent with our









Don't know 10 9%
Total 34 100 %
Table 3-22





Total 34 100 %
Lafontaine (1992) adopts a dummy variable in her empirical investigation to indicate
whether previous experience in the business was required by the franchisor. She
considers this variable as an indicator of franchisees' input importance, which,
together with other variables, she regards as an indicator of franchisee's moral hazard.
However, she argues, this could be seen as a rationing (screening) device, in which
case this requirement would have a negative impact on the extent of adoption of
franchising by a firm. The results she obtains, though, show that the effect of this
variable on franchising does not differ significantly from zero. As we show later in
this study, 'general' rather than 'specific' experience seems to be of more relevance to
the franchisors. Most companies, actually, prefer to provide their own training to the
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'right' human capital force.
Table 3-23






'Weeks of training' is a variable that Lafontaine (1992) adopts to measure franchisor's
input as a proxy for franchisor's moral hazard. She finds this variable to have a
negative effect on the percentage of franchised outlets in a company. This result,
however, seems at odds both with the argument presented above on human capital,
and with our argument (consistent with Klein, 1980) about the adverse consequences
such opportunistic behaviour of the franchisor would have on his company.
Table 3-24
Q. 9. Who paid for the training course?





















* Independence / an opportunity to
run your own business
* Benefit of a well-known, protected 2.636364
brand name
* Less capital risk than an
independent business












2.5 2 1.191367 5
Legend: Range goes from 1=big advantage to 5= not relevant.
Other:
• Access to suppliers
• More brand exposure






* Tight control of the franchisor
via the contract
* High royalties
* Lack of direction by the
franchisor
* National brand name might be
tarnished by other (bad)
franchisees










Legend: Range goes from 1=big disadvantage to 5= not relevant.
Other:
• Lower mark up than if independent
• High cost of franchise fee
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I:
Lack of national marketing
None




There is room for horizontal free-riding (Brickley and Dark, 1987) as quite a number
of franchisees (51%) believe that their performance is affected by the behaviour of
other franchisees of the same company.
Table 3-27





Satisfied about the present franchise
Not satisfied with the present franchise
Would rather be just the manager
Would rather have an independent
business













Information on the contract
1. Is your contract: [J A written document you signed
How many years does it last for?
[ ] An informal agreement
As one would expect, all have a written contract but one. Its duration is generally five
years, (23 cases). In two cases only is it seven years. Nine outlets, then, have a 10
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years agreement. These outlets pertain to the services sector. This might be interpreted
as a way, when higher initial investment is required, to provide stronger incentives to
the agents downstream to participate to the contract by guaranteeing them a longer
flow of expected returns from this investment (Lyons, 1996).
Table 3-28





Is weighted in favor of the franchisor













3. According to your contract
The franchisee does not have the right to sell hislher
franchise
The franchisee may sell the franchise only to the franchisor
The franchisee may sell the franchise only to a person
proposed by the franchisor
The franchisee may sell the franchise to anybody but needs
the franchisor's approval
The franchisee may sell the franchise to anybody without
the franchisor's approval




















Low quality of the product/service provided to
customers











• Any persistent breach of the agreement
• Buying 'off contract supplies
• For necessary refurbishment of the premises -2 cases-
• Failure to observe all conditions of agreement
• Purchase of from other sources -2 cases-
• Breach of contract -2 cases-
• Franchisee's insolvency
Table 3-31
5. Did the franchisor ever propose to buy back the franchise?






For what the reason?
• Because they intend to transform the chain into a wholly owned company
• Dissatisfied with rewards from some franchisees
• As a result of a dispute
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Table 3-32
6. Did you ever threaten to terminate the relationship?











• Poor support from franchisor
• No help from franchisor
• Dissatisfied
Table 3-33
7. Do you plan to renew the contract when it comes to an end?










• To set up an independent business
Table 3-34
8. Has your franchise been renewed?









In two cases twice, just once in the other four cases.
9. Price recommendation, (RPM).
In 12 out of 34 cases the respondents declared that the franchisor sets the price of the
final product. This suggests that there are a large number of cases where other vertical
restraints like RPM are coupled with franchising. This information was not disclosed
by the franchisors' responses in that, as we explained above, this practice is not




















franchisee 90% - franchisor 10%
franchisee 80% - franchisor 20%
3% of turnover each
1
2 12 %
Both -they did not provide the exact shares- 4 12%
Total 34 100%
11. and 12. Initial Investment
Lafontaine (1992) finds that the more finance provided by the franchisor, the higher
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the percentage of franchised outlets in the chain. Here this is not the case as only in
one of the 34 franchise investigated outlets, did the franchisor provide any finance,
this was however, an extremely small share- only 1.000 pounds, that is, the 10%, of
the initial investment of 10.000 pounds-. Nevertheless, it's worth anticipating that
according to the econometric results obtained in the following chapter, we find that
there is a binding financial constraint on the franchisees. Interpreting Lafontaine's
results along these lines, we can look at the provision of capital by the principal
relaxes this constraint on the agents, and makes it possible for a larger number to
participate, thereby resulting in a larger number of franchised outlets. The explanation
we provide in our econometric study to explain our findings on lack of participation of
the franchisor to this initial investment rests on the 'human capital selection'
consequences of credit rationing (Cressy, 1996), and on the commitment of the agent
this investment generates.
15. Have the franchise fee and/or the royalty rate changed since the first year of your franchise?
[INo [)YesHow?
20 no
10 franchise fee increased for new franchisees
1 franchise fee increased royalty rate decreased
1both franchise fee and royalty rate increased
2 set up an advertising fee
These answers suggest that the contract terms are In most cases held constant.
Analogous finding were obtained by Lafontaine and Shaw (1996), who, consistent
with our hypotheses, explain this with reputation motives for the franchisors.
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16. In your view has the contract been adequate?
IIYes IINoWhy?
Twenty-three franchisees (67%), thought that the contract was adequate. Of the
remaining eleven, seven stated that in their view the contract was biased in favour of
the franchisor (20%). The other four (13%) provided the following motivations:
Franchisor's inexperience in franchising has resulted in many contractual complications
changes in supply arranged
no help from Franchisor
In one case no motivation was provided.
17. Did you ever encounter any problems in your relationship with the franchisor?
I I No I I Yes What type?
• Poor service, inefficient, low quality of supplies
• poor communication (7 cases)
• problems with supplies
• other f.sees operating in the area
• f.sors provisions too costly make product uncompetitive
• franchise has been stopped and there is no further possible development for me in this
brand"
• they were not honest about cost and expected profits
• incompetent promotion arrangements
• no development for more franchise in this company*
• changes of the contract when it suited the franchisor
• changes in the contract
• As Hadfield (1990) noted already, it is sometimes the case that one franchisee
operates more than one outlet as he would find scope for entrepreneurship under the
shield of a brand name. This reinforces our 'human capital' hypothesis for the
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explanation of the contractual choice.
18. Has the contract ever been changed?
[ INo [I Yes How?
In the 82% of cases (28 franchisees) the contract had not been changed
The remaining 18% of contracts were changed as follows
1. Change in royalty rate
1. To reflect changed operating constraints
1. To incorporate bonding changes (?)
1. Franchisor now retains 50% property of the stock
19. Do you think there is any section in the contract that should be changed?
[INo [ IYes Which?
Twenty-two (65%) believe there is no need for the contract to be changed. The 30%,
i.e. 10 franchisees, stated that it should be changed as follows:
• 2 Many parts should be changed, but they did not give any details.
• 1 franchisee should be given the right to terminate and receive compensation in case of
poor performance of the franchisor
• 2 Said that one year restriction to go independent in the same area should be abolished
• 1 Opt out condition
• 1 Royalty rate too high (10%) should be changed
• 3 franchisees were not happy with the supply arrangements. One of them suggested they
should be given the possibility of buying supplies also from companies other than the
franchisor.
• 2 Did not answer this question.
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20. Would you like to add any comments about your franchise relationship?
• very good training and back up
• they do not want any more franchise
• Franchisor is jealous because they earn more than he does
• Started with 20 franchised outlets, but, as franchisor was incompetent, many contractual
problems arose, lost 5 outlets in 18 months and stopped franchise further
• good after problems at start
• bad Franchisor
• would like more help and input on supply
• Very good and helpful Franchisor
• I wish it was over
• Franchisor does not give enough confidence to franchisee
• dissatisfied with quality of training and support from Franchisor
• Franchisor now has improved his assistance. Success only due to franchisee effort
3.5.3. The Survey: Analysis of the answers: The Managers
The last part of our survey concentrates on the responses provided by the managers of
company-owned outlets (the questionnaire on the outlets characteristics was meant to
gather data to test our hypothesis by means of econometric estimations, hence it will
not be included in this analysis of the survey).
Also in this section, as in the one above on franchisees, we are going to concentrate on
the information provided by the respondents that are not included in the econometric
analysis presented in the following chapter. In other words, in this section we are
going to investigate the presence of common patterns in the motivations for this
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contractual choice of the agents. In the conclusion to this chapter we comment the
findings of both sections.






* Provides safer earnings than 2.22222
franchising
* Provides higher earnings than 3.22222
franchising





* Greater job satisfaction than 3.4 3.5 1.429841 5
being a franchisee
* Less problems than being a 2.4 2 1.173788 5
franchisee
* Had appropriate experience 2.4 2 1.505545 5
Legend: Range goes from 1=big advantage to 5= not relevant.
From the answers presented in the table above, by far the strongest motivation for
choosing a management instead of a franchise contract seems to be the fact that this
option does not involve any financial investment, in turn followed by the
consideration that it provides safer earnings. These two responses provide support to
the hypothesis set out in the theoretical part of this study (see previous chapter), where
we argued that the presence of uncertainty downstream involves the need to address
risk sharing issues related to the contractual choices. Since we assumed the agents to
be risk averse and the principal to be risk neutral, we argued that only the agents who
are better skilled, hence more confident about their abilities, will choose the franchise
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option, which involves risk sharing, as opposed to the management contract, which
involves full insurance of the agent. In other words, we assumed the existence of a
self-selection process on the agents' side. Our hypothesis seems well supported by
these responses, especially when coupled with the variables representing the agents'
characteristics, see following chapter.
9. Do you get any form of financial incentives apart from the salary?
[ J No [ IYes- Is it: [ I% of revenues [ IFixed bonus ( IOther:
In all but one case, that is, in eleven cases, the managers receive an incentive payment
in the form of a commission or of a performance bonus.
10. Was prior experience required when you started this job?
[INo [] Yes How many years?
11. Did you attend a training course to become a manager for this outlet?
(INo [ IYes Who paid for it? ( IYou ( IThe company
Only in three cases was prior experience required, while in six cases out of twelve the
company provided a training course.
12. What do you feel are the main advantages of your job to you?
13. What do you feel are the main disadvantages of this job to you?
All report to feel satisfied with their job. Some say that they feel the main advantage is
that it is less stressful than being a franchisee. However, almost all lament having to
work very long hours.
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14. How do you feel about your job?
[ ) Satisfied about it
[ ) Would rather be a franchisee
[ ) Would rather have an independent business
[ ) Would rather have a different job Why?
All say they are satisfied with their job apart from two who say that they would rather
have a different job because their pay is not correlated with the number of hours they
work.
Information on the contract
1. Is your contract:
[ ) A written document specifying precise duties and responsibilities
[ ) An informal agreement
In three of the twelve cases the parties do not have a formal agreement, in the
remaining nine they adopt written contractual arrangements.
2. What are your contractual obligations?
[ ) To reach a certain target ofsales
[ ) To work for a certain number of hours
[ ) To provide a minimum level of quality of the product/service
[) Other:
All the three above obligations hold in all cases. In one case there is an additional
obligation of covering all variable costs. They seem rather tight obligations for being
an employment relationship. Apparently in this relationship the bargaining power is
on the principal's side, who can set strict contractual conditions to make sure to avoid
any agents' shirking, in which case, it would be quite easy to lay-off the agent,
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consistent with what stated by the franchisors as reported in the first part of the survey
above.
Table 3-37
4. In what case could the company lay you off before the expiry of the contract?
Low turnover 4
Low quality of the product/service provided to 4
customers




Other: Misconduct (2 cases)
6. Do you encounter any problems in your relationship with the company?
(J No (J Yes What type?
7. Is there any section in your contract you would like to be cbanged?
[] No [] Yes What type?
None of the respondents reported of having problems with the company, however,
three respondents said they would like to have a lighter number of hours. In one case
the respondent lamented about a contractual clause that allows the company to move
the manager to any other outlets of the chain in a different location.
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3.5.4. Conclusion
The results obtained by the survey presented above seem to provide large support to
the hypotheses proposed and the results obtained by the model presented in the first
part of this study.
Contractual mix of franchising and vertical integration can be regarded as an effective
governance arrangement which delivers human capital, entrepreneurial discretion and
flexibility by providing the right incentives to heterogeneous agents downstream, and
simultaneously reducing costs of monitoring and coordination.
From the results of the survey illustrated here, the transaction costs hypothesis,
according to which organisational forms evolve in a way that minimises the sum of
production and transaction costs, did not find supporting evidence. In a case like the
one analysed here, where production costs do not vary, or vary to a very limited
extent, over different organisational structures, this theory would conclude that
transaction costs drive this choice. However, no evidence on this point was provided
by the responses of the franchisors. When asked about the motivations for their
specific contractual choice, agency problems were reported as being the driving force.
Two of our respondents, however, only adopted franchise because by concentrating
only on this option they minimise coordination costs.
Martin's (1988) contention, along with other authors supporting the 'capital-shortage',
and risk sharing (on the principal's side) hypotheses, that the contract mix is
determined by the need of the principal to spread the financial risk, or to obtain capital
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from external sources (i.e., the franchisees), was refuted by our results. In fact, the
opposite view, which we suggested above, prevailed. More specifically, our model
assumed that in this relationship the principal is risk neutral while the agents are risk
averse. This assumption was positively supported by the franchisors' responses that
stated the sharing of financial risk not to be a motivation for their contractual choice'",
The managers of the company-owned outlets stated that their decision to become
managers instead of applying for a franchise contract was due to the fact that this
option does not involve any financial investment. The second most important motive
was that it provides safer earnings than a franchise. These answers provide strong
support to our theoretical predictions according to which the agents' risk aversion,
coupled with the need of full insurance sought by these agents, leads them to this
tual hoi 68contrac c oice .
Analogously, the franchisees reported that by far the main reason for their contractual
choice was that this was a less risky option than setting up a business on their own.
This reveals strong 'entrepreneurial features' in the franchisee's figure, along with our
hypotheses. Actually, our findings along this route suggested that this motive is even
stronger than what we expected. In fact, among the responses on the main advantages
and disadvantages of their franchise, some franchisees reported to be happy with
67However, they regarded this as an advantage of employing franchisees rather than managers. This
advantage, though, can be explained by the commitment features attached to the franchisee's
investment, rather than by the shift of the risk on the agent. We discuss this point in more details in
what follows.
68ln the following chapter we test the correspondence of agents' and contracts characteristics.
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having possibilities of development within their company, some others lamented that,
since their company had stopped franchising, there was no space for them to develop
any further in that business. Some franchisees, in fact, albeit only a small share of
them, are also owners and investors, more specifically, "they are master franchisees,
with the rights to sub-franchise within their (normally larger) territory. Other
franchisees own several outlets directly and hire managers to operate their outlets,
some others may own multiple franchises, each with different partners and other
investors," (Hadfield, 1990, p.934). This proves that the 'entrepreneurial' motive in
this choice is very strong and that the partial insurance offered by a franchise contract
is a very appealing feature to risk-averse 'would-be' entrepreneurs.
Although this entrepreneurial dynamism is certainly the most appealing characteristic
of this contractual option for the upstream company, it is constrained by the size and
the extent of specificity of the initial investment. One of the investigated franchisors,
in fact, said that the contemporaneous adoption of company-owned outlets is due to
the difficulty of finding potential franchisees because this involves a large initial sunk
investment. This suggests, again, the existence of a binding financial constraint on
the franchisees, which is also confirmed by the econometric results presented in the
following chapter69•
69 Recent research on entrepreneurship (Cressy, 1996) suggests 'human capital' selection motives to be
the main reason for debt rationing (i.e., binding fmancial constraint) on potential entrepreneurs, see
following chapter.
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Most important, we found strong evidence on franchisees' binding financial
constraint. One would then ask why don't franchisors, who are assumed to be risk
neutral, provide finance by taking part to this initial investment in order to relax this
constraint?" The rationale for this behaviour lies, in our opinion, in two main
arguments. First, the financial constraint can be regarded as an additional incentive-
device adopted by the franchisor for its bonding characteristics, in order to guarantee
downstream performance. This was showed by the results of this survey, from which
it emerged that where this characteristic lacks, this contract is no longer optimal and
firms tend to abandon it. Second, and perhaps more important, this initial investment
serves as an additional self-selection instrument on the market for potential agents.
According to what we argued in the theoretical part of this study, this contract mix is
optimal because of its human capital implications, in the sense that it overcomes
adverse selection problems. These results, together with those obtained by our
econometric analysis below, seem to provide evidence on this point. Only 'better-
skilled' agents will decide to take on this financial risk, a 'success dependent '
compensation package involving a financial investment would not be accepted by a
'low-skilled' (worker) agent, (see Cressy, 1996).
At the same time, though, this initial investment can be seen as a bond posted by the
agent on his performance (inter alia, Klein, 1980, Williamson, 1983). Hence, the
larger the size and the specificity of this bond, the stronger the commitment of the
70 Lafontaine (1992) shows that franchisors who provide finance have a higher percentage of franchised
outlets.
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agent who posts it. This point was also positively supported by our survey's
responses. In fact, in some instances where this investment is small in size, and can
have a quite high salvage value, it does not offset the gains to the franchisee f64n
cheating, i.e., it loses its commitment scope. This was the case for two companies of
our sample, that decided to revert to a fully integrated structure.
At the same time, however, this specific investment could have 'hostage'
characteristics (Williamson, 1983). In other words, the principal could take advantage
of the specific investment and act opportunistically by holding-up the outlet once the
irreversible investment is done. In the first part of this study we criticised this
argument, in that we would expect such type of behaviour to turn against the
franchisor (see chapter one). Even though our franchisors sample is quite small, hence
we cannot claim generality for our results, in no case did it provide any evidence of
this type of franchisor's moral hazard. Also from our (larger) sample of franchisees,
no evidence of hold-up attempts could be gathered. The pattern followed by the
franchisors in their acquisition and dismissal of outlets presented by our data did not
show evidence of such a behaviour. On the contrary, the results of the survey showed
that franchisees were more likely to have threatened the principal of an earlier
termination of the contract (14.7%), this was explained by the respondent as due to the
unsatisfactory support provided by the company.
The need to curb potential moral hazard on both sides brings the parties of the
franchise relationship to the adoption of written contracts (all franchisees reported
their adoption). These documents actually specify in great details all the cases in
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which the contract can be terminated by the franchisor, and the franchisee's sale
rights. As already noted by Klein (1980), franchisors use restrictive covenants (often
lamented by franchisees in our survey), which prevent the franchisee from competing
in the same area for some period after he has left the franchise system. This is also
generally true for advertising expenditures. These are generally sustained by the
franchisees (35%), in some cases they are shared (39%) -in different proportions, see
above results- with the franchisee participating with a larger share in most cases.
Some cases remain, though, where no precise agreements are arranged.
While the financial commitment of the franchisee, and the fact that his own earnings
are linked to the outlet performance, control for this agent's potential moral hazard, as
we stated above, this incentive is lacking when the agent is a manager of a company-
owned outlet. Our main theoretical prediction in such a case was that the threat of
being fired works as an incentive device for these agents. Also in this case we found
positive support from the survey's results to our theoretical presumptions. All
franchisors said that a strong advantage of managers with respect to franchisees is that
they are easier to layoff. Furthermore, many cases were reported by the managers in
response to the question asking them about circumstances in which they might be laid
off. While the franchise agreement always takes the form of a written contract, this is
not always the case for the employment relationship with a manager. This fact,
coupled with the above statement, clearly shows that the bargaining power in this
relationship is held by the principal. From what declared by the managers in their
responses, it looks as if, despite being an employment relationship, the obligations
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deriving from the management contract are quite many, working a certain number of
hours, achieving a certain target in terms of quality, turnover, etc., and much closer to
the franchisee's targets than to those of a simple employee. Although many of them
actually lament having to work too many hours, the lay-off threat seems to induce
these people to accept tight working conditions. An additional incentive to perform,
however, is offered in the form of commissions, and performance related bonuses.
Furthermore, the different power of these two different incentive schemes, i.e., the
stronger incentive power provided by the franchise contract with respect to the
management contract, is reflected in the different monitoring frequency associated to
franchised and company-owned outlets, this is clearly much higher in the latter case.
Unlike the 'location hypothesis' as presented by Martin, who stated that the type of
location of an outlet affects the monitoring frequency in franchised outlets, our
findings show that this is not the case. All franchised outlets pertaining to the same
company presented the same monitoring frequency, which is considerably lower than
the monitoring frequency at company-owned outlets. This provides favourable
evidence to the hypothesis of our theoretical model that described the moral hazard
problem to be more stringent at company-owned outlets, in that the franchise contract,
by making the franchisee the last claimant of the operation, minimises this incentive
to indulge in opportunistic behaviour.
A large majority of franchisees (69.7%) believes the contract is weighted in favour of
the franchisor. As Dnes (1992a) pointed out, "an obvious question is why franchisees
freely agree to such arrangements," (p.21). Nevertheless, the majority of the
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franchisees thought the contract had been adequate, the most1'#'lamented problem was
'communication failures'. An interesting suggestion made by a franchisee in response
to what contractual changes would they suggest, was to include a right for the
franchisee to terminate the contract in case of franchisor's bad performance,
analogous to the franchisor's right to terminate the franchisel This would certainly be
a fair task to pursue for Franchise law. The fact that some franchisees were unhappy
with the support provided by the franchisor has to be balanced though, against the fact
that there were a fair number who were happy about their relationship, and against the
fact that franchisees who had not experienced problems were less likely to have
responded to our survey Moreover, the level of approval seemed to increase over time,
and more franchisees reported to be satisfied after initial problems. Some franchisees
lamented their contractual obligation not to buy supplies from other firms than the
franchisor. It would be interesting to explore how, in the presence of downstream
competition, the principals are able to establish a monopoly position upstream by
creating a network of franchised outlets. However, this is beyond the scope of this
study.
Prior experience is not generally required, neither for franchisees nor for managers.
Most of the companies prefer to provide their own training course. Analogously to
empirical results obtained by studies on entrepreneurship, see following chapter, these
results suggest that the better abilities of a worker do not identify with specific
experience. Many franchisees conclude that their success in only due to their own
effort.
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One last important remark concerns the lack of contract tenns customisation. In other
words, we found that contract terms are generally standard across all the outlets of a
chain, and that these tend to be stable over time. Although this might be explained by
transaction costs hypotheses namely by the costs of customising and implementing a
large number of heterogeneous contracts, we rather tend to believe, consistent with
what we argumented above, and with Lafontaine and Shaw (1996), that this is driven
by the need for reputation of the franchisors.
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3.6. APPENDICES71
71 The cover letters to the questionnaires that follow are also in the name of Dr. M. Kwon from the
Warwick Business School. The research performed on the basis of the survey was supposed to be joint
work with Dr. Kwon but his appointment as Associate Professor in Korea made this unfeasible.
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Coventry, 3rd July, 1995
Dear Sir/Madam,
We are a group of researchers from the Business School and from the Department of
Economics of the University of Warwick. As we are conducting a study on the adoption of
franchising contracts and company ownership by firms in the U'K; we are contacting all the
companies affiliated to the British Franchise Association. The purpose of this survey is to
analyse differing forms of industrial organisations in order to draw policy conclusions both at a
national and at a European level.
Although we realise the completion of the questionnaire will demand some of your
time, we do hope for your kind cooperation. We will provide a short summary of the research
to all the participants who return the questionnaire. We hope this will prove interesting to you.
We would like to stress that all the survey data are absolutely confidential, and that no
information will be published about identifiable persons or companies without their permission
under any circumstances. If any questions arise, please do not hesitate to contact us, either by
post or by phone.
I THE UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK C.OVENTRY CV4 7Al UNITED KINGDOM.' TELEPHONE +44(0)1203523523 EXT 2089 FAX +44(0)1203 524963(\~"""'''''": ,,:zr;
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE FRANCmSOR
1. In what year did your company start? ..
2. In what year did your company start franchising? ..
3. How many franchised and compay-ewned outlets have you had on average since then?
75 - 79 80-84 85- 89 90-94
Company-owned [] [ ] [ ] [ ]




4.What was the average turnover of these outlets ever the following time periods?
75 • 79 80·84 85· 89 90-94





s. Do you ha\'e specific written contracts with your franchisees?
[] No (] Yes
6. Bave you got both companY-Gwnedand franchised outlets?
[ ] No [ ] Yes Why7 : .
...................................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................................
7. Why do you retain the ownership of some outlets? ..
....................................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................... , .
8. Is there one standard contractual form for all the franchisees?
[ ) Yes [ ) No, several different contracts are in use:
What makes them vary? .
9. Do you have formal contracts with the general managers of the outlets owned by the company?
[] No [) Yes
10. How many contracts did you renew on average at the expiry date?
7S ·79 80·84 8S- 89 90·94
Company-owned [) [) [] []
Franchised [) [] [] [)
11. How many outlets did you terminate on average at the expiry of the contract?
7S ·79 80·84 8S· 89 90-94
Company-owned [] [] [] [)
Franchised [] [] [] []
12. Were they
• Discontinued
-Bought back from the franchisee
to be operated by the company
• Transferred from company-
ownership to franchising
.Sold to a different franchisee









13. How many contracts did you terminate before their exptr)· date?
75 ·79 80-84 8S· 89 90-94
Company-owned [] [] [) []
Franchised [] [] [] []
14. Were they
• Discontinued
-Bought back from the franchisee
to be operated by the company
• Transferred from company-
ownership to franchising
-Sold to a different franchisee









15. Please rate the reasons why you decided to adopt franchising
extremely important 1 2 3 4
123 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
.. Higher profitability
.. To raise capital
.. Faster expansion
.. Sharing the financial risk
.. Other: ······.. ········· ..








16. What are the relative strengths of franchisees as compared to general managers in case of
company-ownership? - extremely important 1
.. Better skills 1
.. More committed than managers 1
.. Care more about the quality of the productJ
service delivered to the customers
.. Provision of capital
.. Easier to terminate the contract in case of bad performance
• Other: · ········· .
2 3 4 5 not important
2-' 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
17. What are the relati ve strengths of general managers in case of company-ownership as compared
to franchisees? extremely important 1 2 3 4 5 not important
.. Better skills 1 2 3 4 5
.. More committed than franchisees 1 2 3 4 5
.. Care more about the quality of the productJ
service delivered to the customers
• Higher reliability as they are part of the company
• Easier to layoff in case of bad performance
.. Other: ·..·..·········.. ···.. ··········· ..
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
18. Is the initial in vestment for the franchised outlets made by
[ 1The franchisor [ ] The franchisee [ ] Both
19. Is it the same ror all the franchised outlets?
[ 1 Yes What is the amount? Franchisor ..
{ 1No What is the range? Franchisor .
What makes it differ?
[ J Location of the outlet
[ ] Size of the outlet
[ ] Age of the outlet
[ ] Other: ·..··.. · ··.. ····..·.. ·..· .
Franchisee ·····
Franchisee · ··
20. Is the franchise fee required the same for all the franchised outlets?
l J Yes How much is is it? ·.. · ·..· · · · ..
[ 1No What is the range? ..
What makes it differ?
[ 1Location of the outlet J
[ ] Size of the outlet
{ 1Age of the outlet
[ ] Other: ··.. ··..·····..·········..······· ..
c:
21. Does the royalty differ among the outlets?
[ ] No How much is is it? ..
[ ] Yes What is the range? .
What makes it differ?
[ ] Location of the outlet
[ ] Size of the outlet
[ ] Turnover of the outlet
[] Other: .
22. What has been the average annual pay of the general managers in charge of a company-retained
outlet since you started?
75 -79 80-84 85- 89 90-94
Less than L. 5,000 p.a. [] [] [ ] []
5,000 - 9,999 [] [ ] [ ] [ ]
10,000 - 14,999 [] [ ] [ ] []
15,000·19,999 [] [] [ ] []
20,000 - 24,999 [] [] [] []
25,000 - 29,999 [] [ ] [] [ ]
30,000 - 34,999 [] [] [ ] []
35.000 - 39,999 [) [] [ ] ( ]
40,000 or more: How much?
INFORMATION ON THE CONTRACT
1.How often do you inspect the outlets of your company (e.g., daily, weekly, every month, etc.)?
Company-owned .
Franchised .
2. Is advcrtising paid for by
[ ] The franchisor [ ] The franchisee
[ ] Both In what proportion? Franchisor.......................... Franchisee .
3. What do you use as a measure of the performance of an outlet?
[ ] Number of customers
[ ] Level of sales
[ ] Level of net Profits
[ ] Level of costs
[] Other: .
4. Did you ever encounter any problems with the franchisees?
[ ] No [ ] Yes \Vhat type? ..
........................................................................ , .
5. In what case could you terminate a franchise before the expiry date?
......................................................................................................................................................................
6. Did you ever encounter any problems with the managers of the outlets in your ownership?
[ ] No ( 1Yes \Vhat type? .
...................................................................................................................................................................
7. In what case could you fire a manager before the expiry date?
'0' .0 ~.o •• o0 ••• 0 0 0 , 0" 0" 0 .. " •••••• 0 o. 0 .. 0 '-t" ••o,., o , 0 0 , , ..
8. Who sets the price of the product/service in the franchised outlets?
[ ] The company [ 1The franchisee [ 1Jointly
c\
9. Who sets the price of the product/service in the company-owned outlets?
[IThe company [ IThe general manager [ IJointly
10. What has been the company's approximate average level of total turnover per annum since the
first year of operation? 75 - 79 80-84 85- 89 90-94
Less than £. 10.000 p.a. [ I [ I [ I [ I
10,000 - 29,999 [ I [ I [ I [ I
30,000 - 49,999 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
50,000 - 69,999 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
70,000 - 99,999 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
100,000 - 119,999 [ I [ ] [] [ ]
120,000 - 149,999 [ ] [ ] [ I []
150,000 - 179,999 [ I [ I [ I [ ]
180,000 - 199,999 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
200,000 - 249,999 [ ] [ ] [] [ ]
250,000 - 299,999 [ ] [] [ ] [ ]
300,000 - 349,999 [ I [] [ ] []
350,000 - 399,999 [ ] [ ] [ ] []
400,000 - 449,999 [ I [ I [ I []
450,000 - 499,999 [ I [ I [] [ ]
500,000 - 549,999 [ ] [ I [ ] [ ]
550,000 - 599,999 [ ) [ ) [ ) [ )
600,000 - 649,999 [ ) [ ) [) [)
650,000 - 699,999 [ ) [ ) [ ) [)
700,000 - 749,999 [ ) [ ) [ ) [ I
750,000 - 799,999 [ ) [ ) [ ) [ ]
800,000 or more: How much?
11. What has been the approximate level of net profits per annum since then?
75 - 79 80-84 85- 89 90-94
Negative [ ) [ ] [ ) [ ]
° -£. 9,999 p.a. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]10,000 - 29,999 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
30,000 - 49,999 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
50,000 - 69,999 [ ] [ ) [ ) [ )
70,000 - 99,999 [ ) [ ) [ ) [)
100,000 - 119,999 [ ) [ ) [ ) [ )
120,000 - 149,999 [ ] [ ] [ ) [ ]
150,000 - 179,999 [ ) [) [ ] [ ]
180,000 - 199,999 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
200,000 - 249,999 [ ) [ ] [ ] [ ]
250,000 - 299,999 ( ] [ ] [ ] []
300,000 - 349,999 ( ] ( ] [ ] [ ]
350,000 - 399,999 [ ] [ ] [ ] [)
400,000 - 449,999 ( ) [] [ ] [ J
450,000 - 499,999 ( ) [ ) [ ] [ J
500,000 - 549,999 [ J [ J [ ] []
550,000 - 599,999 [ ] ( J [ ] [ ]
600,000 - 649,999 [ ] ( ] [ ] []
650,000 - 699,999 [ ] [ ] [] [ ]
700,000 or more: How much?




11. Would you wish to receive any feedback on the overall results of this study? [1 Yes [ ] No
e
./












Coventry, 22nd May, 1995
Dear Sir/Madam,
1
We are a group of researchers from the Business School and from the Department of
Economics of the University of Warwick .. As we are conducting a study on the adoption of
franchising contracts by firms in the U'K, we are contacting all the outlets pertaining to
companies affiliated to the British Franchise Association. The purpose of this survey is to
analyse differing forms of industrial organisations in order to draw policy conclusions both at a
national and at a European level.
Although we realise the completion of the questionnaire will demand some of your
time, we do hope for your kind cooperation. We will to provide a short summary of the
conclusion of the research to all the participants who return the questionnaire. We hope this
will prove interesting to you.
We would like to stress that all the survey data are absolutely confidential, and that no
information will be published about identifiable persons or companies without their permission
under any circumstances. If any questions arise, please do not hesitate to contact us, either by
post or by phone.
We would ask you, if your outlet is a franchise, to fill in the blue and the white forms;
if it is retained in the company's ownership, to fill in the yellow and the white forms. We look






ti~·,,' :iII':, ....,~~.;;, .-;-;i:-'" THE UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK COVENTRY CV4 7Al UNITED KINGDOMTELEPHONE +44(0)1203523523 EXT 2089 FAX +44(0)1203 524963
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE FRANCHISEE
1. What is your school qualification?
[ ] No qualification [ ] CSE [ ] 0 leveVGCSE
[ ] Other: .
[] A level [ ] University degree
2. What was your occupation prior to entering franchising?
[ ] Manual [ ] Lower level wl"dtecollar [ ] Middle management/semi professional
[ ] Higher management/professional [ ] Self-employed [ ] Other: .
3. What was your annual income in the last paid employment before taking the current franchise?
[] Less than £.9,999 [] 10,000-14,999 [] 15,000-19,999 [) 20,000-24,999
[ ) 25,000-29,999 [ J 30,000-34,999 [ 135,000 or over: how much? £ .
4. In what year did you enter the current franchise? .
5. What was your age when you took up the franchise?
[ ] Less than 25 [ ] 25-29 [ ] 30-34 [ ] 35-39 [ ] 40-44 [ ]45 or over
6. Please rate the reasons why you decided to take up the franchise
extremely important 1 2 3 4 5 not important
• Opportunity to have 0\\11business
but still be part of a big organisation 2 3 4 5
• Higher expected income that in a fixed-salary job 2 3 4 5
• Less risky than starting a business on your own because
of proven product/service and ready-made market 2 3 ..$ 5
• Greater job satisfaction 2 3 4 5
• Had appropriate experience 2 3 4 5
• Other: ........................ ·························............................ 2 3 4 5
• Other: ................................. ·················........................... 2 3 4 5
7. Would you be otherwise self-employed if you had not taken up the franchise?
[INo [IYes [lDon'tknow
8. Was prior experience required when you took up the franchise?
[ ] No [ ] Yes How many years? .
9. Did you attend a training course to become franchisee?
[] No [] Yes Who paid for it? [] You [ ] The franchisor
10. What do you feel arc the main advantages of franchising to you?
big advantage 2 3 4 5 not relevant
• Higher earning 2 3 4 5
• Independence / an opportunity to run your 0\\1\ business 2 3 4 5
• Benefit of a well-knO\\11, protected brandname 2 3 4 5
• Less capital risk than an independent business 2 3 4 5
• Backing of a large organisation (advice, training, etc.) 2 3 4 5
• Other .......................... ·······················......................... 2 3 4 5
11. What do you feel arc the main disadvantages of franchising to you?
big disadvantage 1 2 3 4 5 not relevant
• Tight control of the franchisor via the contract 1 2 3 4 5
• High royalties 1 2 3 4 5
• Lack of direction by the franchisor 1 2 3 4 5
• National brand name might be tarnished by other (bad) franch1sees 2 3 4 5
• Other: ............................... ·················............................................. 2 3 4 5
• None []
12. Do you think the quality of the product/service provided by other franchisees affects your sales?
[] Yes [] No
13. How do you feel about your business?
[ ] Satisfied about the present franchise
[ ] Would rather be just the manager
[ ] Would rather have an independent business
[ 1 Would rather have a franchise in a different business. Why? ..
l·t How many hours do you work per week? ..
QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE CONTRACT
1. Is your contract: [ 1A written document you signed [ 1An informal agreement
How many years does it last for? ..
2. Do you think that your contract
[ ] Is weighted in favour of the franchisor
[ 1 Is weighted in favour of the franchisee
[ 1 Is about right
[ ] Other: .
3. According to your contract
[ ] The franchisee does not have the right to sell hislher franchise
r J The franchisee may sell the franchise only to the franchisor
[ ] The franchisee may sell the franchise only to a person proposed by the franchisor
[ ] The franchisee may sell the franchise to anybody but needs the franchisor's approval
[ 1 The franchisee may sell the franchise to anybody without the franchisor's approval
[ ] Sale rights are not specified
[ ] Other: .
4. In what case could the franchisor terminate the franchise before the expiry of the contract?
[ ] Low turnover
[ 1 Low quality of the product/service provided to the customers
[ ] Too high costs of operation
[ ] Other: ..
[ 1Other: .
5. Did the franchisor ever propose to buy back the franchise?
[ 1 No [] Yes For what the reason? ..
6. Did you ever threaten to terminate the relationship?
[ 1No [1 Yes For what reason? ..
7. Do you plan to renew the contract when it comes to an end?
[ J No [ J Yes For what reason? ..
8. Has Jour franchise been renewed?
r] No [J Yes How many times? .
9. Who sets the price for the final product/service
[ ] You [ 1 The franchisor
10. Is there in the contract an explicit agreement on promotional/advertising expenditures?
[ ] No [] Yes: Do they have to be carried out by:
[ ] The franchisor
[ ] The franchisee
[ ] Both. In what proportion? Franchisor...................... Franchisee .
11. How much was the starting capitaV initial investment required? ..
12. Who provided it?
[ ] The franchisor [ ] The franchisee
[ ] Both In what proportion? Franchisor Franchisee ..
13. Is the franchise fee?
[ ] A one- off payment. How much is it? £. .. ..
[ ] An annual payment. How much is it? £. .. ..
[ ] Other: What is it? How much is it? £. .. ..
14. What is the royalty rate you pay? % .
What is it related to (e.g., level of sales, level of profits, etc.)? .
15. Have the franchise fee and/or the royalty rate changed since the first year of your franchise?
[ ] No [] Yes How? ..
16. In your view has the contract been adequate?
[] Yes [] No Why? " ..
17. Did you ever encounter any problems in your relationship with the franchisor?
[ I No [1 Yes What type? .
18. Has the contract ever been changed?
[ ] No [J Yes How? ..
19. Do you think there is any section in the contract that should be changed?
[ I No [1 Yes Which? .
20. Would you like to add any comments about your franchise relationship?
21. Would you wish to receive any feedback on the overall results of this study? [] Yes [ ] No
3.6.3. Appendix 3.6-3 The Manager's Questionnaire
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE MANAGER
1.What is your school qualification?
[ ] No qualification .[ ] CSE [ ] 0 leveVGCSE
[] Other: .
[] A level [ ] University degree
2. What was your occupation prior to starting this job?
1[ ] Manual [ ] Lower level white collar
[ ] Higher management/professional [ ] Self-employed
[ ] Middle management/semi professional
[] Other: .
3. In what year did you start this job? .
4. What was your annual income in the last paid employment before taking the current post?
[] Less than £.9,999 [] 10,000-14,999 [] 15,000-19,999 [] 20,000-24,999
[ ] 25,000-29,999 [ ] 30,000-34,999 [ ] 35,000 or over
5. What was your age when you started?
[ ] Less than 25 [ ] 25-29 [ ] 30-34 [ ] 35-39 [ ] 40-44 [] 45 or over
6. What has been the approximate average level of your annual pay since then?
75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94
Less than £. 5,000 p.a. ( ] [ J [ J [ I
5,000 - 9,999 [ ] [ ] [ J [ ]
10,000 - 14,999 [ ] [ ] [ I [ I
15,000 - 19,999 ( ] [ ] [ I [ I
20,000 - 24,999 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ I
25,000 - 29,999 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ I
30,000 - 34,999 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
35.000 - 39,999 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
40,000 or more: How much?
7. Is your pay related to your experience?
[] Yes [J No
• Provides safer earnings than franchising
• Provides higher earnings than franchising
• Does not involve any financial investment
• Greater job satisfaction than being a franchisee
• Less problems than being a franchisee
• Had appropriate experience
• Other: .
8. Why did you decide to take this job instead of applying for a franchise?
















9. Do you get any form of financial incentives apart from the salary?
[J No [] Yes Is it: [] % of revenues [J Fixed bonus [J Other: ..
10. Was prior experience required when you started this job?
[ ] No [ ] Yes How many years? ..
11. Did you attend a training course to become a manager for this outlet?
[ ] No [ ] Yes Who paid for it? [ ] You [ ] The company
12. What do you feel are the main advantages of your job to you?





13. What do you feel are the main disadvantages of this job to you?
14. Bow do you feel about your job?
[ 1 Satisfied about it
[ 1 Would rather be a franchisee
[ ] Would rather have an independent business
[ ] Would rather have a different job Why? .
1
15. Bow many hours do you work per week? .
QUESTIONNAIRE ON TBE CONTRACT
1. Is your contract: [ ] A written document specifying precise duties and responsibilities
[ ] An informal agreement
2. What are your contractual obligations?
[ 1 To reach a certain target of sales
[ ) To work for a certain number of hours
[ ] To provide a minimum level of quality of the product/service
[ ] Other: , , .
[ ] Other:.. , , .
3. Is your job
[ ] Permanent [ ] Temporary How long is it for? .
4. In what case could the company lay you off before the expiry of the contract?
[ ) Low turnover
[ ] Low quality of the product/service provided to the customers
[ ] Too high costs of operation
[ ] Other: .
[ ] Other: , , , .
5. If for some reason you were to leave your current job (because you decided to quit or were laid
off), how quickly do you think you could find a job at about the same pay?
[] Very quickly [] In about 3-5 months time [] In about 6-12 months [] More [] Don't know
6. Do you encounter any problems in your relationship with the company?
[ ] No [ ] Yes \\'hat type? ..
...................................................................................................................................................................
7. Is there any section in your contract you would like to be changed?
[ ] No [ 1Yes What is it? .
8. Would you like to add any comments about your job?
9. Would you wish to receive any feedback on the overall results of this study? [ ] Yes [ 1 No
3.6.4. Appendix 3.6-4 The Outlet Questionnaire
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE OUTLET
1. What product/scnice do you sul)ply? .
2. What is the approxlmate size in square feet of your outlet? .
J. What is the distance In miles from the closest office of the COml)nny? .
4. Where is the outlet located?
[ ] In the town centre
[ ] Out oCthe centre What is the closest town?............................... How far is it? (miles)
[ ] In a shopping centre
[ ] Close tolAlong a motorway or a major out ot town road
5. Who owns the premises?
[ ] The company/franchisor [ ] The franchisee [ ) A third party: Who? .
6. In what year was the outlet first established? .
7. What has been the approximate average le\'el of turnover I)cr annum since then?
75·79 80·84 85· 89 90·9-'
Less than £. 10,000 p.a. [ ] [ ] [ ) [ )
10,000 • 29,999 [ ) [ ] [ I [ )
30,000 .49,999 [ ] [ ] [ I [ ]
50,000 ·69,999 [ ) [ ] [ ] [ )
70,000 • 99,999 [ ] [ ] [ ) [ )
100,000·119,999 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
120,000 • 149,999 [ ] [ I [ ) [ ]
150,000·179,999 [ ] [ ] [ ) [ ]
180,000· 199,999 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
200,000 or more: How much?
8. What has been the approximate level or net profits per annum since then?
75 • 79 80·8-' 85· 89 90·94
Negative [ ] [ ] [ ) [ ]
o . £. 9,999 p.a, [ ] [ ] [ ) [ ]
10,000·29,999 [ ) [ ) [ ] [ ]
30,000 ·49,999 [ ) [ ) [ I [ )
50,000 .69,999 [ ) [ ] [ ] [ )
70,000 • 99,999 [ ] [ ] [ ) [ )
100,000·119,999 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
120,000 • 149,999 [ ] [ ) [ ) [ ]
150,000 • 179.999 [ ] [ ] [ ) [ ]
180,000 • 199,999 [ ) [ ) [ ) [ )
200,000 or more: How much?
9. What has been the approximate level or costs per annum since then?
75 ·79 80-84 85· 89 90·94
Less than t: 10,000 p.a, [ ) [ ) [ ] [ I
10,000 • 29,999 [ ) [ ) [ ) [ 1
30,000 .49,999 [ ) [ ) [ I [ I
50,000 ·69,999 [ ) [ ) [ 1 [ 1
70,000 • 99,999 [ I [ ] [ 1 [ 1
100,000 - 119.999 [ ) [ ] [ ] [ 1
120,000 - 149,999 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 1
150,000 - 179,999 [ ] [ ] [ 1 [ I
180,000 - 199,999 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
200,000 or more: How much?
A
cs
10. How much did you invest in your own outlet per year over the period given below?
75 - 79 80-84 85- 89 90-94 average
11. How much did the company invest in your outlet per year over the period given below?
75 - 79 80-84 85- 89 90-94 average
12. How many employees work in the outlet? .
13. Does the company inspect the outlet?
[ ] No [ ] Yes How often? .
Do you think this is [ ] Too much [ ] Too little [ ] About right
14. Do you think the companylfranchisor does enough to promote the product/servlce?
[ ] Yes [ ] No \Vhy? .
15. Are there any other outlets of the same chain in your area?
[ ] No [ ] Yes Within [ ] walking distance
[] 10-15 minutes reach (by carl bus/train)
[ ] 20-30 minutes reach (by carl bus/train)
[ ] 40-60 minutes reach (by carl bus/train)
[ ] more than one hour reach (by carl bus/train)
16. How far from yours is the closest outlet of the same chain?
[ ] Walking distance [ ] 1/2 mile [] 1 mile [] 2 miles [ ] 5 miles [ ] more than 5 miles
17. Are there any other outlets of a competing chain in your area?
[ ] No [ ] Yes Within [ ] walking distance
[ ] 10-15 minutes reach (by carl bus/train)
[ 1 20-30 minutes reach (by carl bus/train)
[ ) 40-60 minutes reach (by carl bus/train)
[ ] more than one hour reach (by carl bus/train)
18. How far from yours is the closest outlet of a competing chain?
[ 1 Walking distance [] 1/2 mile [ ] 1 mile [] 2 miles [ ] 5 miles [ ] more than 5 miles
19. How far from your outlet is the closest head-office of your company/franchisor?
........................................................................ miles
20. What is the address of the head-office of your company/franchisor?
10. How much did you invest in your own outlet per year over the period given below?
75 - 79 80-84 85- 89 90-94 average
11. How much did the company invest in your outlet per year over the period glven below?
75 - 79 80-84 85- 89 90-94 average
12. How many employees work in the outlet? .
13. Does the company inspect the outlet?
[ ] No [ ] Yes How often? ..
Do you think this is [ ] Too much [ ] Too little [ ] About right
14. Do you think the company/franchisor does enough to promote the productlsen'ic:e?
[ ] Yes [ ] No Why? ..
15. Are there any other outlets of the same chain in your area?
[ ] No [ J Yes' Within [ J walking distanc~
[] 10-15 minutes reach (by carl bus/train)
[ ] 20-30 minutes reach (by carl bus/train)
[ J 40-60 minutes reach (by carl bus/train)
[ ] more than one hour reach (by carl bus/train)
16. How far from yours is the closest outlet of the same chain?
[ ] Walking distance [J 112 mile [] 1 mile [J 2 miles [ ] 5 miles [ ] more than 5 miles
17. Are there any other outlets of a competing chain in your area?
[ J No [ J Yes Within [ ] walking distance
[ ) 10-15 minutes reach (by carl bus/train)
[ ) 20-30 minutes reach (by carl bus/train)
[ ) 40-60 minutes reach (by carl bus/train)
[ ) more than one hour reach (by carl bus/train)
18. How far from yours is the closest outlet of a competing chain?
[ ) Walking distance [ ) 1/2 mile [] 1 mile [J 2 miles [ J 5 miles [ ) more than 5 miles
19. How far from your outlet is the closest head-office of your company/franchisor?
........................................................................ miles
20. What is the address of the head-office of your company/franchisor?
...................................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................................
4. An Empirical Study on Contractual Heterogeneity
within the Firm: The "Vertical Integration-Incentive
Contracts" Mix
4.1. Introduction
Referring to the empirical literature on contractual heterogeneity within firms,
Shepard (1993) remarks: "In the absence of outlet specific data, studies test for a
relationship between the proportion of outlets operated under some contractual form
and some aggregate characteristics. The theory invoked by these studies, however,
makes no predictions about proportions. Indeed, in the absence of important
heterogeneity across outlets, the theory predicts that only one contract type would be
observed," (p.59). Even relying on outlet-specific data, however, Shepard's work, like
most literature, predicts that outlet heterogeneity leads to heterogeneity in contracts.
Tackling the same problem Lafontaine (1992) argues that existing empirical work on
franchising examining the way in which franchisors mix company-owned and
franchised outlets cannot explain contract mixing, "with homogeneous outlets the
models all lead to chains that are fully franchised or fully-company owned, not to a
mixture of contracts," (p.268). Moreover, she argues, "theoretical models themselves
do not really address the issue of contract mixing but rather concentrate on the
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determinants of the share parameter," (p.264). Lafontaine's findings go beyond the
restrictive analysis of the terms of the contract by showing that risk, moral hazard and
franchisor's need for capital are better able to explain the extent of adoption of
franchising than the share parameter. However, like all the other contributors to this
literature within an agency framework, she does not look at all at the agent's choice 72.
In what follows we intend to extend the analysis to the behaviour of this party of the
agency relationship, little addressed by the existing literature. The aim of the analysis
presented in this chapter is to test some hypotheses explaining the adoption of
different contractual arrangements between the principal and the agent deriving from
the theoretical work presented in the first part of this study, in which it was concluded
that the adoption of franchise contracts and vertical integration within the same finn
(namely, Partial Vertical Integration, PVI) could be explained by two main factors:
asymmetric information and uncertainty.
The information asymmetry affecting the agency relationship between the upstream
finn and the downstream unit was assumed to be twofold. The agency relationship is
characterised by the presence of hidden action due to the fact that the principal
upstream cannot observe the action of the agent downstream, i.e., there is a potential
moral hazard problem. This moral hazard problem becomes even more stringent when
72This shortcoming of existing research on franchising has been stressed also by the business literature.
Dant (1995) remarked that despite the frenetic growth pattern registered by franchising, many essential
questions about this contract still remain virtually unexplored from an empirical perspective. "For
instance, the motivational incentives that prompt individuals into becoming franchisees is still a poorly
understood phenomenon since much of the theoretical development within franchising literature has
adopted the viewpoint of franchisors," (p.l 0).
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there is uncertainty over the state of demand for the final product, so that in the case of
a bad performance, the principal cannot tell whether the bad outcome was due to lack
of effort on the agent's side or to poor demand.
This vertical relationship is also affected by hidden information due to the
heterogeneity of potential agents on the market. If the labour market is characterised
by the presence of agents who differ in their ability/productivity levels, and this
information is hidden from the upstream principal, the contract mixing, i.e., the
contemporaneous adoption of franchise contracts and company-ownership represents
a 'truth-telling' separating equilibrium solution which enables the principal to
overcome the potential adverse selection problem by generating a self selection
process of the potential agents.
There has recently been a growing interest in franchising, which has led to a number
of empirical papers investigating the firm's organisational forms within an agency
framework. However, curiously, these empirical papers look only at the principal's
choice, omitting the study of agents' behaviour, thus implicitly assuming that such
behaviour will be dictated by, and therefore will perfectly conform to, the principal's
decision. The work we are about to present intends to fill this gap in the literature. We
pursue this avenue by seeking verification of some new hypotheses we suggested
above by comparing and econometrically testing them against the established theories.
We intend to show that the contract mixing (PYI) outcome is the result of the choice
of both decision makers, i.e., both the principal offering the contract and the agent
accepting it. Therefore the final outcome of this game, represented by a separating
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equilibrium, is determined by the design of two different contracts, which will
generate a correct self-revelation mechanism of the agent and enable the principal to
overcome both moral hazard and adverse selection, while allowing the agent to
maximise expected utility.
The main novelty of this study rests on both the explanation proposed of contractual
mixing as being determined, among other factors, by agents' characteristics ", and on
the data used. The data, collected by survey, combines information on both outlets,
agents, and contractual characteristics at outlet level.
The analysis proceeds as follows: section 4.2 sets out the main hypotheses to be
tested, comparing and contrasting them to the existing literature. Section 4.3 then
presents two alternative models which will be used to test these different hypotheses.
Finally, section 4.4 reports the results of the estimations.
73 As a matter of clarification, it is worth remarking that the explanation we propose to contract mixing,
namely, among other reasons, labour market heterogeneity, does not imply that the contracts offered by
the principal will be tailored to the individual characteristics of each single agent. We expect. instead,
that heterogeneity on the agents' market will induce the principal to offer heterogeneous contracts (two
in our case), each of them standard in its characterisation, i.e., for all the agents that choose that
typology. More specifically, we hypothesise inter-contract uniformity (see Bhattacharyya and
Lafontaine, 1995, for a wide discussion of lack of contract terms customisation. See also Ones, 1992a,
Lafontaine, 1992, and Sen, 1993). Our hypotheses predict that a self selection process on the agents will
bring about a separating equilibrium characterised by each agent choosing one of the standard types of
contracts offered to him, exactly the one the principal designed for that type.
206
4.2. TheMain Hypotheses
In what follows we are going to summarise the main hypotheses deriving from the
existing theory on the franchise-vertical integration mix" and compare them with the
hypotheses proposed here.
As illustrated in the first chapter of this study, the standard answers provided by the
literature, and tested by most empirical work, point at several factors as explaining
contractual heterogeneity within the firm: risk sharing, information asymmetry,
location and monitoring costs, and capital market imperfections. These explanations
are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, some of them hold true only if combined.
However, contrary to what is generally observed (see chapter 2 above for a discussion
of this point), they explain contractual heterogeneity as deriving from outlets
heterogeneity .
Below we summarise the predictions of these hypotheses and briefly review the
hypotheses proposed by this study.
Risk sharing. The delegation of downstream operation via a franchise contract
involves the shift of the risk of the operation from the principal to the agent.
Therefore, it involves a trade-off between risk-insurance and incentives (Martin,
1988, Norton, 1988, Brickley, Dark and Weisbach, 1991, Lafontaine, 1992). This
74 Note, however, that some of the hypotheses formulated in the literature derive more explicitly from
the literature on franchise contract rather than contract mixing.
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hypothesis predicts that the higher the risk involved in the operation, the lower will be
the percentage of the company-owned outlets. In other words, it is assumed that the
principal will try to shift the risk of the operation to an independent agent. However,
as already noted in the literature, if the principal and the agent share the same
information (or lack of it) on the potential market, such argument would be persuasive
only if the principal were more risk averse than the agent, which seems to be
counterfactual. Indeed, if we assume that the principal is risk neutral and the agent is
risk averse, as seems to be the more plausible case, this hypothesis leads to the
prediction of complete vertical integration of the chain. Conversely, according to our
hypothesis, since the integration/delegation choice is a trade off between insurance
and incentives, we believe that in the case of a risk neutral principal and a risk averse
agent, the higher the risk the more expensive, in terms of forgone profits, will it be for
the principal to provide incentives to the agent, i.e., make use of franchising.
Therefore, we expect that higher risk will lead to a higher probability of company
ownership.
Information asymmetry (double sided hidden action).
First consider The agent's hidden action. This is due to the fact that the agent's
behaviour cannot be freely observed by the principal. Moreover, this behaviour cannot
be inferred by the outlet's performance because of the presence of a random element
in the demand (Mathewson and Winter, 1985), thus creating an incentive to shirk on
the agent's side. Hence, the importance of the agent's effort in the downstream
operation is a key variable in the contractual decision. Most empirical works
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concentrate on the franchisee's moral hazard problem. As Brickley and Dark, 1987,
and Brickley, Dark and Weisbach, 1991, point out, since the managers of the
company-owned outlets do not bear the full cost of shirking and perquisite taking,
they will have a stronger incentive to engage in this behaviour than franchisees.
Accordingly, we hypothesise that the moral hazard problem will be more stringent in
the case of company operated outlets than in the franchised outlets because of the
incentives created by the franchise contract. The franchisee, being the last claimant of
the profits, will bear a large part of the consequences of his behaviour. Moreover, the
franchisee has a stronger commitment to the business, due to the fact that he makes a
(sunk) financial investment's. Opportunistic behaviour may lead to its loss if the
franchise is withdrawn. Williamson (1985) considers ex-post bonding aspects of
hostages but also urges for more attention to be given to their ex-ante screening
properties. The latter is the target of this work. According to our model, the contract
can be designed in such a way as to control for the franchisee's misbehaviour, while
this is not the case for the manager of a company operated outlet.
Now consider the principal's hidden action. Some researchers found evidence of the
existence of franchisor's moral hazard (Rubin, 1978, Lal, 1990, Lafontaine, 1992).
These works note that trademark expenditures are among the most important
contributions of the franchisor and, the more important the trademark is to the success
of the chain, the more vulnerable are the franchisees to a potential franchisor's
7S For a theoretical model where franchisees' sunk costs are shown to be used as an incentive-
compatibility device, and rule out agents' opportunistic behaviour see Ones (1992b).
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misbehaviour. However, as we discussed above, it is reasonable to suppose that since
opportunistic behaviour of the franchisor would certainly affect his reputation, and
therefore the probability of finding agents willing to take up a franchise in his chain,
this would not be rational in a repeated game. This is especially so in a chain with a
good brand name. In fact, even if this problem does exist, from the results of our
survey we observed that it is present in only a very small number of cases. Such cases
are represented by new/small chains, i.e., where the brand name is not very valuable,
and therefore, as stated by the literature, would not be such a stringent problem for the
franchisees". This argument would hold true also in the case when the franchisor's
opportunistic behaviour is represented by the attempt to dismiss and buy back the
most profitable outlets from the franchisees, taking advantage of the sunk investment
realised by the franchisee. However, an investigation conducted by Dnes (1992b)
discovered that in UK formal termination is unusual. The franchisors investigated by
this study had terminated less than 0.003 of their agreements over 10 years, (p.488)77.
From our survey we obtained analogous findings (see previous chapter).
76 The importance of the reputation for a franchisor is also proved by the fact that many franchisors
have formed associations (e.g. The British Franchise Association) guaranteeing that their members
respect certain standards and follow certain rules. The main aim of these associations is for the
members to tell themselves apart from unethical companies, thereby signalling their type, and providing
a kind of guarantee against misbehaviour, to potential franchisees. In this respect, we believe, implicit
contracts can substitute for the voids left by explicit contracts. A market sanction can make an implicit
contract self-enforcing.
77 A possible explanation for the relative lower degree of the principal moral hazard problem in UK
with respect to US could be the relatively stronger impact of reputation effects in a smaller market such
as UK with respect to US. Alternatively, it could be ascribed to some structural differences which
would be of extreme interest to investigate in further research.
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Location and monitoring costs. According to the discussion above concerning the
incentive to shirk on the agent's side, most empirical literature (inter alia Brickley and
Dark, 1987, Norton, 1988, Lafontaine, 1992, Scott, 1995), explains the heterogeneity
of contracts by the heterogeneity of the outlets characteristics. The results obtained by
these papers show that the larger the distance between the outlet and the branch
headquarters, the higher will be the costs of monitoring the behaviour of the agents;
therefore this will induce the principal to resort to a larger adoption of franchise
contracts in order to provide more incentives downstream. However, following this
argument, in the case of homogeneous" outlets we should observe homogeneous
contracts, which is not what appears to happen in reality. As mentioned above, we
intend to propose a new set of hypotheses according to which the location and
distance variables do not bear a large explanatory role of contractual heterogeneity.
Capital market imperfections. A final, and traditional explanation for franchising,
mostly invalidated by empirical studies, but still found significant in some cases
(Lafontaine, 1992), looks at franchising as a way for the principal to face a binding
financial constraint. According to this hypothesis, franchisees are seen as an
inexpensive source of capital. This idea, though, seems at odds with the risk sharing
argument as described above (see Rubin, 1978).
7SByhomogeneity in this context we mean standardisation. Very frequently these outlets present the
same characteristics in terms of size, type of location, refurbishment and lay-out of the products. As
Michael, 1996, remarked, "...adaptations to the local market are prohibited by the requirements of
standardisation," (p.S7).
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Information asymmetry {hidden information}. As we illustrated above, a different
hypothesis we propose in this paper relates to agents heterogeneity. That is, we
hypothesised that in the presence of heterogeneity on the managerial labour market the
principal wants to assign the downstream operation to the best skilled workers but he
cannot observe the agents' type. Therefore, we argue that a firm can offer different
contracts to compel heterogeneous potential agents to self-select according to their
abilities, which resulted from the solution of the model in part I. Following this
argument we intend to test this hypothesis according to which the higher skilled
workers will prefer a franchise contract which makes them the last claimants of the
profits. However, at the same time these types (who know they are more productive
and therefore have a higher reservation utility) will be more costly to the principal,
who will have to pay them also a risk premium 79. On the other hand, the low skilled
workers will prefer a full insurance (management) contract. In other words, according
to our prediction, PVI will be a first best choice for the principal (with respect to the
trade off between forgone profits and better performance'" given by the solution of the
moral hazard and adverse selection problems), and for the agents, who will thereby
maximise their expected utility", This first best organisational choice will therefore
79 As mentioned above we are assuming that the principal is risk neutral and the agents are risk averse.
80 A smaller share of a larger cake might be better than an entire, smaller, cake.
81 The idea of franchising contracts being adopted as a managerial screening device was already
considered by Norton (1988). However, his empirical estimates do not properly explore this hypothesis.
That is, Norton argues that as a firm tries to expand rapidly, it is costly for it to find talented, non-
shirking, managers (p.213), hence, franchise is a contractual form that economises on managerial and
selection costs. Therefore, he states that the positive relationship he found between the growth (in
sales) of the establishment and the adoption of franchise proves that the latter is an efficient form of
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be mainly due to the alignment of the principal's and the agent's objective functions.
Indeed, as Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b) remarked, in order for delegation to
promote organisational efficiency, the right to make decisions must be properly
aligned with the profits that result from those decisions, i.e., residual claims. In the
framework of this analysis, the franchisee makes decisions regarding the downstream
operation, and bears the residual claims from these decisions". At the same time,
since these decisions depend on the franchisee's human capital, it is necessary, for the
franchisor, to select the people with the right skills. It is our prediction that the
contract design will accomplish at the same time two main tasks: 1. generate incentive
compatibility, and 2. work as a screening device by implementing a self-revelation
mechanism of the potential agents. Therefore, when incentives are aligned in a
principal-agent game, a Nash equilibrium can be reached with the players choosing
their first best action, which will now coincide.
To sum up we are going to test whether the contractual heterogeneity is a result of
outlets' heterogeneity, or if, conversely, as we hypothesised, it is driven by the agent's
managers selection. Unlike Norton, in this paper we investigate the existence in itself of such a
screening process, rather than its (supposed) consequences.
82Franchisees can actually be regarded as 'semi-independent' entrepreneurs because of the many
analogies between the activities of the two. Consistent with our hypotheses, the human capital
embedded in potential entrepreneurs has been found significant on the entrepreneurial choice by a very
recent empirical study (Cressy, 1996), analysing debt rationing on business start-ups. In this paper,
which studies debt rationing on entrepreneurship by means of a large dataset of UK business start-ups,
Cressy shows that firms self-select for funds on the basis of human capital endowments of proprietors.
Furthermore, he finds that "the influence of fmance on performance is nil and the correlation between
finance and survival vanishes once human capital is controlled for," (p.1254). Human capital, therefore,
appears to be the 'true' determinant of survival. lfwe consider the fact that the franchisee has to make a
financial investment to start up his business, the analogy between Cressy's findings and our hypotheses
becomes quite clear.
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heterogeneity, and by the need to provide these agents with the right incentives and
risk insurance.
4.3. TheModel Specification
4.3.1. Modell: The Contractual Choice
The last hypothesis described in section 2, and represented in the first model we are
going to test, describes the probability of the contract offered by the principal, and
accepted by the agent, being a franchising contract as depending on the agent's and
the contract characteristics, as reported in equation (4.1):
P(F). =a.+J3 (Ur). +J32(Age). +~3(Rr). +~4(Ff). +~5(Mh). +8. (4.1)I 1 I I I I I I
where ;=1,2, ...46 refers to the outlet, P(F) is the probability of the outlet being a
franchise, Si represents the error term. The explanatory variables and their expected
relation with the dependent variable are described in what follows.
Ur represents the reservation utility of the agent. We assume that the higher the
productivity level of the agent, the higher his reservation utility. To attach a value to
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this variable we use the wage earned by the agent in the previous job as a proxy. We
expect that the higher the reservation utility of the agent, the higher is the probability
that this agent will prefer a franchise contract. Since the agent knows he is skilled, he
is confident he can achieve a good performance, which will induce him to prefer a
contract that entitles him to the final profits of the operation". Hence we expect that:
The variable Age refers to the age of the agent. Our hypothesis is that the older the
agent, the more experienced, or simply self confident, he is". Accordingly, we expect
the probability of franchising to be positively related to the age of the agent, i.e., ~2>O.
Rr represents the royalty rate set within the franchise contract. That is, the percentage
of the revenues that should be transferred to the principal by the agent, according to
the franchise agreement. Therefore (1- Rr) represents the percentage of the revenues
that will be retained by the agent. Our hypothesis is that the higher the royalty rate, the
lower is the probability of an agent taking up a franchise contract, as this implies
transferring a larger share of the downstream profits to the principal; therefore, we
expect that: ~3<O. If this is the case, this result would provide support to our argument
that the agent's decision is one of the determinants of the contractual choice. In fact,
13 This contract cannot be mimicked by a performance related pay management contract in that while a
franchisee will care for the log-term value of his business, a manager might be just interested in the
short-term performance, to which the pay is linked. Anecdotal evidence on this point is reported by
Ones (1992b).
14Age is used as a proxy for experience also throughout the literature on entrepreneurship (see Cressy,
1996, where a concave relationship is hypothesised between human capital and age).
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other works (see for example Combs and Castrogiovanni, 1994) assume that
franchisors who require large royalties have a higher proportion of franchised units.
FI is the franchise fee i.e., the one-off payment that the agent makes to the principal
at the set up of the franchise contract. This variable has the same interpretation as the
initial investment required to the franchisee. Hence, we omit the latter as not to reduce
excessively the degrees of freedom of our estimates.
The higher the franchise fee (initial investment) required by the franchisee, the more
risky it will be for this agent to accept such a contract". Hence we expect that the
probability of franchising decreases with the increasing size of this fee. This variable
can be seen as representing the risk aversion of the franchisee. In other words we are
predicting that the larger the size of this financial commitment, the higher will be the
fmancial risk involved for the agent, who will therefore be less willing to accept a
franchise contract. Unfortunately, this is the only way we have to test the risk
argument. The literature has adopted many other measures, which, we believe, cannot
be seen as reliable proxies of the risk in that most of them are a-posteriori, hence
endogenous, measures. Such is, for example, the case of Martin, 1988, and Norton,
1988, who make use of the variation in detrended sales per outlet. Moreover, we
cannot tell whether this variance is due to stochastic elements of the demand or to the
agent's behaviour.
85The franchisees generally borrow the funds necessary to make this initial payment from banks.
Therefore, following the point made by Cressy, 1996, we might envisage that behind the provision of
fmancial capital, which was found in the past to be an explanatory variable for franchising, there could
actually be an even stronger explanatory power attached to the human capital than we assumed so far.
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Lafontaine, 1992, adopts a measure of risk represented by the average proportion of
discontinued outlets in the sector. However, a sectoral measure might not be
representative for each franchise in that sector". As Lafontaine and Slade (1995) put
it: "unfortunately data that measure outlet risk are virtually non existent," (p. 9).
Analogously to the royalty rate, the franchise fee is expected to have a negative
influence on the probability of franchising.
Similar to our argument, Brickley, Dark and Weisbach, 1991, consider the initial
investment as a proxy for risk. They assume that if the coefficient has a negative sign,
this would provide support to the risk sharing hypothesis. If, conversely, this
coefficient is positive, this would favour the capital constraint hypothesis (Martin,
1988). In that study the former hypothesis is preferred to the latter.
According to our hypothesis we expect the probability of franchising to decrease with
the increasing size of the franchise fee in that, if this capital requirement is very high,
it might be a disincentive for the agents to take up a franchise, since these agents are
risk averse.
Conversely, according to the capital shortage hypothesis the principal is more likely to
franchise a higher proportion of its outlets when there is a high initial capital
requirement.
86 The proportion of franchised outlets discontinued by McDonald's can not be a reliable signal for
somebody considering taking up a franchise in a small and little known fast-food chain.
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Most recent work has not found evidence supporting the capital constraint hypothesis.
Nevertheless, some authors (Lafontaine, 1992), still argue for the relevance of the
fmancial motive in the choice of franchising".
According to the capital shortage hypothesis: ~4>O, while the risk aversion argument
predicts: ~4<O.
In order to investigate the moral hazard problem (represented in the model by the
variable Mh), we assume that the higher the value added downstream (at outlet level),
the stronger the moral hazard problem. This implies that when such moral hazard
problem is more stringent, the contract offered to the agent will have to provide a
higher level of wage to the manager (efficiency wage88), and a lower level of royalty
to be paid by the franchisee, in order to satisfy at the same time the participation,
incentive compatibility and self selection constraints. Unfortunately data on value
870ne way to test whether the fmancial constraint is binding on the principal or, conversely, on the
agent, could have been to test whether there is a smaller probability of observing a franchise contract
when the franchisor participates to the initial investment in the franchised outlet, as the capital shortage
hypothesis would suggest, or whether the reverse is true. However, this proved not to be viable in that
from the information gathered by our survey, no one case resulted where the franchisor participated in
the initial investment In unison with Klein (1980), we argue that the decision of the franchisor not to
participate in this initial investment is not dictated by a binding financial constraint but rather by the
disciplinary role performed on the agent by his fmancial irrevocable commitment. According to Klein,
the franchisor can impose a capital loss on the franchisee up to the amount of the initial non-salvageable
investment. "Hence, a form of collateral to deter cheating is created," (p.359). A cost penalty for
unsatisfactory performance by the franchisee is thereby created. Analogously, Ones (1992b) argues that
the initial fee, coupled with the trade-mark equipment and designs, local goodwill, and many other
unaccounted factors, represent sunk costs that act on the franchisee as an explicit hostage with bonding
characteristics. See also footnote 85 above, for an additional suggestion as to why the franchisor's
capital constraint hypothesis has given rise to contradictory findings, and thoughts.
88 On the existence of efficiency wages in company-owned outlets see Krueger, 1991.
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added at outlet level are not available, therefore, we resort to the adoption of a
measure of labour intensity, as done in the literature. Norton (1988), and Michael
(1996), adopt as a proxy the ratio employees/sales; Scott (1995), adopts the
capitalllabour ratio, since the agent is the one who must oversee the provision of
labour. In our model we resort to the same proxy used by Norton (1988), and Michael
(1996). In this model we predict that the more important the agent's effort, the higher
will be the probability of a (high incentive powered) franchise contract being offered
by the principal, i.e., the probability of observing a franchise contract increases as the
labour intensity of the downstream operation rises: ~s>O
Some additional relevant variables are then tested at a following stage. They are not
included in the main model to economise on the number of degrees of freedom of the
estimates. These variables are described below.
Brand is a variable that represents the number of years the company has been in
operation. It can be used as a proxy for brand name value. The number of years in
business is a proxy adopted by Lafontaine (1992) as one of the measures of the
franchisor's input to test for the franchisor's moral hazard hypothesis. Moreover, she
adopts this variable also to measure the franchisor's capital constraint, "The more
established a firm is, the easier its access to capital should be," (p.274). These two
interpretations, argues Lafontaine, are indistinguishable empirically since their effect
on the dependent variable is the same, i.e., negative. Our hypothesis is that the older
the company, hence, the more valuable the brand name, the higher the expected profits
for a potential franchisee; therefore we expect this variable to affect positively the
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probability of franchising, 11>0. Moreover, the older the company, i.e., the more
valuable the brand name, the smaller will be the risk shifted to the franchisee, which
reinforces our expectation of a positive effect of this variable on franchising.
RP stands for Recommended Price. This is similar to Resale Price Maintenance
(RPM). However, as mentioned above, the price recommendation cannot be
identified with the latter for legal reasons. In the previous chapter we identified some
cases where the franchisors adopt at the same time these two forms of vertical
restraints.
This is included in the estimates by means of a dummy variable taking value I in the
case of a price recommendation from the franchisor to the franchisee and zero
otherwise.
The idea is that if a potential agent has the power to fix the price for the final product,
he will have a higher incentive to take on a franchise, hence it should be: 12<0.
According to Lafontaine and Slade (1995), the delegation of price decision
downstream is generally accompanied by higher prices at franchised outlets, which
they explain with tacit collusion motives.
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4.3.2. Model Specification
The model presented above is a binary choice model where the contractual choice
depends on a set of variables which represent both the individual's and the contract's
characteristics. The aim of model 4.1 is, therefore, to investigate the (principal's and
agent's) contractual choice so as to establish an empirical link between selection
probabilities associated with each alternative and the utility associated with each
alternative. Our choice set is restricted to two contractual modes, hence, the decision
variable is of a binary type: Franchise or Company-ownership.
We assume the existence of a hierarchical relationship between the two choices, in
other words, every individual is assumed to be able to choose one of three different
alternatives:
1. becoming a franchisee, 2. becoming a manager of a company-owned outlet, 3.
accepting an outside option. Our sample includes the first two alternatives 1 and 2.
The outside option, case 3, can be represented by their reservation utility variable,
which, in this model, will be smaller or equal to the utility coming from options 1 and
2, and, therefore, foregone (because regarded as inferior) by the individual, (see
Hensher and Johnson, 1981, p.82).
Following the hierarchical structure of this model, which derives from the assumption
of the existence of a self selection process on the agents' side, based on their human
capital, we assume the decision structure to be dependent on the individual's
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characteristics'", In other words, we expect that the agents who have a lower
reservation utility, i.e., who are less productive, will decide to take on a management
contract, while those agents who are more self-confident and efficient, and who have a
higher reservation utility level, will more likely prefer a franchise contract.
Some of the explanatory variables are alternative specific, namely, the contract
characteristics refer to each contractual option. While some of these characteristics are
invariant, as for the royalty rate and the franchise fee for all franchise contracts within
the same chain, such is not the case for the wage paid to the agent by the management
contract which, apart from being alternative specific, will be endogenous to the model,
and cannot, therefore, be included in the estimated equation".
The behavioural interpretation is that the particular contractual attributes (royalty rate
and franchise fee) exert a pure shift effect on choice, hence, ceteris paribus, 'highly
89 On discrete choice modelling see Hensher and Johnson, 1981.
90 However, some evidence found by recent related empirical work seems to compare favourably with
our hypothesis concerning the wage variable. Michael (1996) finds that wages have a significant
negative effect on franchising as an organisation share within industries. The wage variable adopted in
this study is measured as the average wage per employee in each industry (given by the ratio of total
industry payroll to total number of employees). According to our hypothesis, the agent's choice about
being a manager or a franchisee is dictated by his reservation utility and the way it compares to the
wage and the franchise contract terms (royalty rate and franchise fee). Since we assume that agents who
choose a franchise contract have a higher reservation utility, we would expect them to accept a
management (fixed wage) contract if this were to offer them a high enough wage. Therefore,
analogously to Michael, we would expect a smaller adoption of franchising in those industries
(companies) where a high wage is offered. Similarly, according to our predictions, when the wage
offered to the agent is relatively low, the better skilled agents would rather be franchisees
(entrepreneurs). Indeed, the literature on entrepreneurship assumes that expected utility from
entrepreneurship exceeds the expected utility coming from a fixed wage deriving from being an
employee (see Blanchflower and Oswald, 1993). Cressy, 1996,makes analogous assumptions, however,
he regards the "exercise of skills" as yielding utility to the individual, unlike our theoretical model,
which underpins this analysis, where we regard this "exercise of skills" as an effort on the agent's side,
which, therefore, yields disutility.
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productive' agents will have a higher preference for a particular alternative'"
(franchise contracts) in the choice set. In other words, individuals with different
productivity levels and, therefore, different levels of reservation utility, value potential
incomes (the expected profits accruing from franchising and the fixed wage of the
management contract) differently. In this analysis, then, these attributes enter the
utility function of the agents in the same way, the difference stands in the way these
attributes are valued by the agent, i.e., they are weighted differently".
Estimating the effect of agents' individual characteristics and of the contract
characteristics on the agents' contractual choice requires the adoption of a procedure
that accommodates the discrete nature of the observed outcome. Since this outcome
can be either a franchise or a management contract, the dependent variable can be
defmed as the probability of the agent choosing a franchise contract, that is:
P[Y=1] if the contract observed is franchising P [F]
P[Y=O] if the contract observed is management, i.e., in the case the outlet is company-
owned.
91 This follows from the hypotheses we have been making in this study, consistent with very recent
findings on the entrepreneurial decision, (see Cressy, 1996). In the framework of our model, these
weights may be represented by the variables Ph and P, which enter the expected utility functions of the
agents.
920ne additional positive shift on the expected utility accruing from the franchise option, might be
exerted by the fact that it involves a proven productlbrand name. This might encourage 'potential
entrepreneurs' into choosing a franchise instead of the 'going alone' option.
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This model is of a 'discrete choice' type, where our dependent variable represents a
probability value, i.e., lies in the [0,1] interval, which makes the adoption of OLS
inappropriate. Therefore, we perform our empirical analysis by means of the
Maximum Likelihood estimator in a probit specification".
4.3.3. Model 2. The Standard Hypotheses
The alternative model, presented in equation (4.2), intends to test whether the
contractual heterogeneity is a result of outlets' heterogeneity, or if, conversely, as we
hypothesised, it is driven by the agent's heterogeneity, and by the need to provide
these agents with the right incentives.
P(F) ; = a + P 1(Dist) ; + P2(Size); + P3(Loc) 1+ El (4.2)
Where the dependent variable is the same as in model 4.1. In what follows we report
the description of the independent variables and the expected effect on the probability
of adopting the franchise contract as deriving from the standard literature hypotheses.
93 The question of whether to use a normal or a logistic distribution in our case is not very relevant in
that these two distribution tend to provide similar results, (see Greene, 1993, p. 638).
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The variable Dist (Distance), reports the distance between the outlet and the
company's head office. It is generally used in the literature as a proxy for monitoring
costs'". One of the main arguments of this literature is that the further away the outlet
from the headquarters, the higher the costs to monitor the outlet, therefore, the higher
the probability this outlet will be offered as a franchise. (see inter alia Brickley and
Dark, 1987; Minkler, 1990). The higher the distance between the outlet and the head
office of the company, the higher the monitoring costs, therefore the higher the
probability of franchising, hence it should be 131>0.
Size represents the size of the outlet in square feet, weighted by the average size of
the outlets of the chain they pertain to. This variable is a proxy used to take into
account the moral hazard problem, which is assumed to become more stringent the
larger the size of the outlet, according to the assumption that larger outlets are more
demanding to manage (Lafontaine, 1992, p.273). Different proxies have been used by
the literature to take into account the outlet's size, e.g., average sales (Norton, 1988,
Martin, 1988, Lafontaine, 1992); initial investment required (Brickley and Dark, 1987,
Scott, 1995). However, these proxies capture also other factors like management
efficiency in the former case and financial risk in the latter. Hence, we decided to
94 The monitoring difficulty is generally measured by means of different proxies:
1. Distance from monitoring headquarters (Brickley and Dark, 1987; Minkler, 1990);
2. Type of location: urban-rural area (Rubin 1978, Brickley and Dark, 1987, Norton, 1988);
3. The inverse of the outlet density (Minkler, 1990; Lafontaine, 1995).
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resort to a physical measure", consistent with Lafontaine, 1995, who uses the number
of seats in a fast food outlet.
However, while according to the theoretical prediction of these authors an increased
size is expected to be associated with more separation, their findings showed that
larger size is generally associated with more company-ownership.
"Establishment size may also be a relevant market parameter. Fama and Jensen
(l983a, 1983b) note that activities with substantial economies of scale generally entail
greater gains from specialisation and separation of investment from management.
Thus, larger size would seem to discourage franchising," (Norton, 1988, p.203).
According to the prediction of the theory, we would expect that the larger the outlet,
the higher the probability of franchising, i.e., ~2>O.According to the above argument
put forth by Fama and Jensen and reported by Norton though, the reverse should be
the case, i.e., ~2<O.Hence, this relationship is ambiguous a-priori.
The variable Loc reports the type of location of the outlet. As mentioned for the
distance variable, some part of the literature on contract mixing identifies franchise
contracts as a response to monitoring problems encountered in remote and dispersed
locations, thereby explaining the existence of PVI by variations in these monitoring
95 We made use of the data on square feet of each outlet, corrected as described above, and normalised
by the industry average to correct for sectoral differences.
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costs (Brickley and Dark, 1987; Martin, 1988; Brickley, Dark and Weisbach, 1991).
According to these authors the location of an outlet is extremely important in that
some outlets, like, for example, those located along a motorway, having a clientele of
non repeat customers, present a stronger moral hazard and free-riding problem.
Following this hypothesis then, we should expect that remote locations will be
franchised, while concentrated locations should be company-owned, (see Rubin,
1978).
To test this hypothesis we constructed a dummy variable of the following typology:
{
lin the case of non repeat customers
Loc= o in the case of repeat customers
The case of non repeat customers" is the case of outlets located along motorways or
in big town centres. The case of repeat customers then, refers to outlets located in
rural and small urban areas.
The sign of this relationship is not clear-cut. Actually, if there is a non-repeat type of
clientele, the moral hazard problem becomes larger, therefore the proportion of
franchised outlets should increase, i.e., P3>O.
96 This variable differs from the one adopted by Brickley and Dark, 1987, who separate out the two
types of clientele according to the type of product, e.g., hotels and fast food are considered to serve a
non-repeat type of clientele, while retailing and services companies are believed to have a repeat
customer group.
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However, if ~h<Othis could be explained by the fact that the easier the access to an
outlet or, the lower the monitoring costs, as is the case along a motorway or in big
town centres, the smaller is the probability of franchising.
This equation, again, will be estimated as a probit model. We intend to test model
(4.1) versus model (4.2) in order to test our hypotheses versus the standard literature
hypotheses. If model (4.1) fits the data better, this result would support the adverse
selection and moral hazard stories, regardless to the outlet heterogeneity. In other
words, while according to the existing literature (Brickley and Dark, 1987; Brickley,
Dark and Weisbach, 1991; etc.) the distance from the principal, the size of the outlet
and other outlet specific variables increase the probability of franchising, our model
would present a completely different explanation, that is: the adoption of
heterogeneous contracts is driven by incentive and insurance motives on the agents'
side, regardless of the distance, the size, the location, and the type of customers of
each outlet.
The data adopted to test the two models presented above derives from our survey, see
previous chapter for a detailed description. In Table below we report the summary
statistics.
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Table 5-1 Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std Deviation Minimum Maximum
y 0.7391 0.44396 0 1
Ur 18.521 10.4360 0 60
Age 34.565 7.49341 22 47
Rr 0.0691 0.06764 0 0.2
FI 15279.35 17457.76 3300 120000
Mh 0.0710 0.12851 0.00067 0.6667
Brand 13.869 5.09295 8 25
RP 0.4782 0.50504 0 1
m« 117.2 83.591 5 250
Size 1339.9 1670.3 50 8000
Loc 0.47826 0.505 0 1
4.4. TheResults
The results obtained from the estimation of the probit models 4.1 and 4.2, described
above, are reported inTable 4-2 and Table 4-3.
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The above three sets of results, which have been obtained after correcting for an
heteroscedasticity problem", are quite similar98• They confirm the hypothesis
proposed by this study that a mixed organisational form represents a separating
equilibrium by implementing a self-selection mechanism within a heterogeneous
managerial labour market. This is confirmed by the fact that the probability of an
outlet being a franchise increases with the age and the reservation utility of the agent,
that is, with his experience and productivity.
The result obtained by Lafontaine (1992), contrary to her prediction on the variable
'brand', i.e., the number of years in operation of the franchisor, indicates that older -
more established- companies make a larger use of franchise contracts than younger
ones. She comments that "this goes against one's intuition which is to expect
franchising to be especially beneficial to young start-up firms with limited resources,"
(p.279). Conversely, this result makes perfect sense in the light of the hypotheses we
proposed in this study. That is, the fact that a company is more established on the
market exerts a positive shift on the expected probability of success of the potential
franchisees, thus attracting more potential agents to participate to this contract. This
argument, coupled with the negative correlation found between the franchise fee and
the probability of franchising revealed by our results, confirms that the financial
97 For further details on probit regressions with Huber standard errors see the STATA manual.
91 They are slightly worse when we include the brand variable, suggesting there is some correlation
between the age of a company and the contractual and managerial typology, represented by the
independent variables. In the appendix we report the correlation matrix.
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constraint is binding for the agents, and not for the principal, unlike Lafontaine's
hypothesis.
Our results compare favourably with the findings of most research on
entrepreneurship, and, in particular, with those obtained by Cressy (1996). In that
paper also, it was found that age was an extremely important individual variable. That,
unlike the general definition of human capital adopted by labour economics literature
that regards the level of education of the individual as the primary factor, this variable
did not have any explanatory power. In some estimations performed in this study but
did not report here, we adopted a variable measuring the education qualification of the
individuals. We discarded it as it was non significant. Furthermore, "sector specific
experience" was not always found significant in Cressy's study. Analogously, from
the results of our survey, the respondents declared in most of the cases not to have any
specific previous experience, however, the franchisor in most cases provided a
training course. This leads us to believe that sector-specific 'capital' does not
necessarily identify with 'human capital'". Apparently the particular knowledge of a
certain operation is not regarded by franchisors as a 'human capital asset', so that they
provide it to their franchisees.
The franchise fee, as predicted, has a negative impact on the franchising choice
because of the financial risk this involves 100. Contrary to findings by Norton (1988),
99Analogous fmdings were obtained by our survey, see qualitative analysis presented in the previous
chapter.
100 Case study evidence supports these fmdings. Ones (1992a) reports that empirical results support the
idea that there is a screening role for these investments, (p.7).
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Martin (1988) and Lafontaine (1992), whose results support the notion that risk has a
positive effect on the adoption of franchising (!), our findings seem to provide
evidence to support the assumption that the agent is the more risk averse party in the
agency relationship and that the fmancial (capital) constraint is binding for the agent,
and not for the principal. These results imply, according to our hypotheses, that human
rather than financial capital is the most attractive characteristic of franchising.
The main worry about these findings concerns the fact that the royalty rate does not
present a coefficient significantly different from zero. Apparently, this would suggest
rather than the royalty rate, that the franchise fee is the major disincentive for the
agents to take up a franchise. In other words, a financial constraint on the agents' side,
or, as we assumed, the higher risk involved by a larger sunk investment has a stronger
effect on the contractual decision than the expected revenues.
The moral hazard variable, significant at 10%, confirms that there will be a higher
adoption of franchise contracts where the downstream input, i.e., the agent's effort,
has a stronger effect on performance.
The variable brand presents the wrong sign though its coefficient does not
significantly differ from zero. This can be explained by the fact that this variable does
not change among the outlets pertaining to the same chain. Actually, it would be more
appropriate to consider it with firm level rather than outlet level data.
Finally, these empirical results support the idea that an agent would be more willing to
take up a franchise when he has the freedom to set the price of the final product. This
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fmding favours the assumption that additional vertical restraints of the form of resale
price maintenance, coupled with franchising, can be used by the principal upstream to
appropriate any rentslOI that might be left downstream, and, would limit even further
the inter-brand competition. Since we did not have data on the price set at outlet level
it was not possible to test Lafontaine and Slade (1995) hypothesis of downstream tacit
collusion at franchised outlets.
We then estimated the alternative model deriving from the standard explanations
suggested by the literature, as described by equation 4.2. Two different versions of
this model were specified, i.e., we estimated it under a linear and a partially
logarithmic specification.
As can be clearly seen from the results reported in Table 5-2, this model is not able to
explain the contract mixing under any of the two specifications. Both of them actually
fail the LR test on the joint significance of the coefficients: ft=OI02.
101 On the existence of rents downstream see Kauffinan and Lafontaine, 1994.
IOOTheabove model was tested for heteroschedasticity and, unlike the previous model estimation, this
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From the results reported above it can be concluded that physical heterogeneity of the
outlet is not able to provide an explanation for contractual heterogeneity'?',
As a last step of our analysis then we carried out a non-nested test of the two models.
That is, we tested model4.l versus modeI4.2. We performed this test as suggested by
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993)104. This tests that an alternative set of variables ~ is
the appropriate one for the structural equation of the probit model. The value of the t-
ratio favoured model4.1 against 4.2 as the correct one at 0.01 significance level.
4.5. Conclusion
In this chapter we investigated heterogeneous organisational forms of the form of a
mix of vertical integration and franchising (FVI) in order to test the theoretical
propositions deriving by the model presented in the first part of this study. Most of the
existing literature has not been able to explain the existence of this contractual
103 The fact that the distance variable is not significant might also be due to the fact that the
geographical distance in UK is less relevant than it is in US, where the previous investigations have
been realised.
104 This type of non-nested test is based on artificial nesting (see Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993,
p.382), where both models are embedded in a more general one against which these two models are
tested. In the case of discrete choice models, among which is the one we are studying, this test makes
use of a binary response model regression as the general model adopted to compute the non-nested tests
(for more details see Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, p.528 and Limdep 7 manual, p.422). We
resorted to the adoption of this type of test because of the low number of observations of our sample. In
fact, trying to make use of a nested test created problems to the estimation of the general model due to
the low number of degrees of freedom.
heterogeneity in the absence of outlet heterogeneity. We attempted this task by testing
a model that explains the adoption of such organisational structure as due to a trade
off between risk-insurance and incentives in the presence of uncertainty and
asymmetric information. This information asymmetry, of the type of both hidden
action and hidden information, invests the principal-agent relationship in such a way
as to make this 'hybrid' organisational arrangement the first best for the principal by
creating the right incentives downstream and generating a self selection process of the
agents. In other words, contract mixing implements the solution of the potential moral
hazard and adverse selection problems descending from the information asymmetry in
the presence of uncertainty. At the same time it is optimal for the agents who will
choose the contract, designed for their type, which maximises their expected utility. In
other words, we hypothesised that contract mixing represents a Nash equilibrium of
the principal-agent game in that it implements the alignment of the principal's and the
agent's objective functions, thereby representing the first best action for both actors at
play.
We tested this model against a different model formulated on the basis of the standard
hypotheses derived from the literature. These two alternative explanatory models were
estimated by means of data we collected by means of the survey described in the
previous chapter, on companies in different sectors adopting 'business-format'
franchising accompanied by some degree of vertical integration (PYI) in UK.
The data collected by this survey favour the explanation proposed by this paper
against the standard answers provided by the literature. Finally, we confronted the
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explanatory power of the two models by means of non-nested hypothesis which gave




pay age fee roy mh brand rpm
pay 1.0000
age 0.3786* 1.0000
fee 0.0957* 0.0810* 1.0000
roy - 0.2627* -0.1513* -0.0368* 1.0000
mh - 0.1581* -0.1949* -0.1117* -0.2029* 1.0000
brand - 0.1884* -0.1812* -0.1633* 0.2410* 0.5782* 1.0000
rpm 0.0184* -0.0714* 0.0266* 0.2702* 0.0205* 0.0789* 1.0000
Significance levels: * =0.05,
239
5. Econometric Investigation of the Extent of
Adoption of a 'Contract-Mix' by the Firm
5.1. Introduction
As a further step to check the validity of the theoretical propositions presented by this
study to explain the existence of contractual heterogeneity within the firm, we are
going to perform some empirical analysis on company-level data.
In the two preceding chapters we studied the validity of the hypotheses deriving from
the model proposed in the first part of this study by means of data we collected by
means of a survey. These data, as described above, focused on outlet level
information. In other words, it mainly consisted of data on agents', contracts', and
outlets' characteristics. Although we also gathered information on upstream
companies, these were indeed quite limited.
The results obtained by the empirical analyses illustrated so far provided support to
the explanations proposed by this work. However, the limited investigation of the
company (franchisors') side of this agency relationship realised by the survey, led us
to decide to investigate the upstream firms further. Actually, in the qualitative analysis
of the survey we remarked that, although we obtained results that sustained our theory,
we could not claim their generality in that they were obtained from a very limited
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sample. This was sufficiently encouraging, though, to further investigate the issue. In
this chapter we are going to present the results obtained by such investigation.
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section gives a short overview of the
main explanations proposed by this study to contract heterogeneity and sets out the
main hypotheses that are going to be tested in this part of the study. Section 5.3
describes the data set adopted for this empirical analysis, and the characteristics of the
sample. The model estimated and its econometric specification are then presented in
section 5.4. Section 5.5 illustrates the results we obtained. The conclusion drawn from
these results is then presented in the last section.
5.2. The Specification of the Hypotheses
As discussed above, company level data are not appropriate to investigate contract
heterogeneity, especially when this is explained by 'within firm' heterogeneity.
Nonetheless, company level data investigation can provide useful additional evidence
when carried out in the light of outlet-level investigation results.
Hence, in this part of our empirical investigation we are going to explore the extent of
adoption of franchising and vertical integration by the firm (principal upstream).
Having proved that this contract mix is mainly determined by 'human capital'
selection, incentives, and risk sharing issues, we now intend to prove that these
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motives still hold true at aggregate level, i.e. that they can explain the propensity
towards more vertical integration or delegation at firm level.
First, let us summarise our previous findings in order to characterise the deriving
hypotheses for the model we are going to test here.
From the results obtained so far we concluded that the adoption of a contract mix is
driven by various factors. Most important, and in this stands our main contribution to
the existing research, we showed that the franchisorj' need to obtain the best skilled
labour force to perform his downstream operation leads him to offer a contract that
only appeals to 'high-skilled' type agents. Such a contract, we showed, takes the form
of a share contract in that we identified the high-types as 'potential entrepreneurs',
i.e., these agents would be willing to participate in a contract that transfers to them the
residual rights of their activity. This proved to be 'optimal' also for the principal in
that the delegation of residual rights to the downstream agent generates 'high-power'
incentives. In other words, we concluded that performance downstream is linked to
ownership to a much larger extent than it is to the reward. We argued that a
performance related pay cannot mimic this contract, i.e., is not able to attain the same
outcome.
While this contract is optimal for the principal in that he will obtain a high-skill and
highly motivated crew, and is optimal for the agents, who get the opportunity to 'have
their own' business at a discounted risk rate, this choice is expensive for both. It is
expensive for the principal in that this share contract implies providing a partial risk-
insurance to the agent, who generally makes the investment. When this solution to the
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incentives-risk sharing trade-off proves too expensive, in terms of foregone profits,
the principal will resort to it only partially, i.e., he will retain the ownership of part of
the downstream outlets. This implies hiring managers for the company-owned outlets.
On the agents' market, at the same time, while 'high-skilled' agents prefer a contract
that makes them the residual claimants of their activity, 'low-skilled' agents will not
accept such a type of contract in that they would prefer a contract that provides them
with a full insurance, i.e., a management contract (Cheung, 1969). This proves less
expensive to the principal due to the lower reservation utility of these agents, and to
the fact that he does not have to provide them with any insurance premium since these
agents are 'normal' employees and do not take any part to the financial investment in
the operation. However, the features of this contract are such that, the lack of
investment -commitment- by the agent, and the payment of a fixed wage (the same
argument holds true also in the presence of bonuses and other forms of performance
related pay), do not create strong incentives to deter cheating on the agents' side. This
task will be performed by the payment of an efficiency wage, and by the existence of
unemployment on the managers' market, which will give rise to a disciplinary device
in the form of a lay-off threat in case of shirking (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). Hence,
the contemporaneous offer of these two types of contracts by the principal will
generate a self selection mechanism on the agents' market, thereby implementing a
'truth-telling' separating equilibrium, which constitutes the (local) optimum of this
game. This equilibrium proves to be a Nash equilibrium in the principal-agent game,
and proves to be a 'Pareto-optimum' in the sense that it will maximise the expected
utility coming to both agentf types from the contracts designed for their group, while
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enabling the principal to achieve his first-best in terms of downstream performance.
To sum up, adverse selection, moral hazard and risk insurance issues were the
arguments we proposed in order to explain this contract mix choice. Therefore, the
extent of adoption of each contract type will be determined by the relative size of the
above factors in each chain. Adverse selection and moral hazard issues, widely
investigated above, cannot be explored here. This is so in that the former cannot be
tested at chain level, while the 'Franchise World Directory' does not provide any
I
information to enable us to build a proxy to investigate the latter. The favourable
evidence obtained above on these two arguments though, can allow us to focus the
following investigation on the last of the three arguments mentioned above, i.e., 'risk-
insurance'. Nonetheless, some of the hypotheses deriving from this argument will
have implications in terms of the other two arguments too, as we are going to discuss
in the following description of the hypotheses.
Risk sharing and franchisors' capital constraint.
Some part of the empirical research on franchising (inter alia, Oxenfeldt and Kelly,
1969; Martin, 1988; Lafontaine, 1992), suggested that this contract enables the
principal to face a binding financial constraint by obtaining capital from the agent -
franchisee-. Conversely, we showed here that the financial constraint is binding for the
agent. This binding financial constraint on the risk-averse agents could be relieved by
a risk-neutral principal by taking part to the initial investment. However, unlike what
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the above literature predicts, this doesn't happen. Again, we explained this with
'human capital' selection motives. The discussion is analogous for the franchise fee.
Having assumed the agents to have 'potential-entrepreneurs' characteristics, and to be
risk averse, we said that the longer the time a company has been in operation, the
more valuable will be its brand name, i.e., the smaller the risk of failure shifted on the
franchisee. In contrast, the theory would suggest that the younger the company, the
tighter its binding financial constraint (in that it does not have credit on the financial
markets), hence, the stronger the need to resort to franchisees' capital. Then, as the
company gets established (and gains financial credibility), it will buy back these
outlets and its proportion of franchised outlets will decrease over timelOS.
However, our hypothesis leads us to predict that the longer has the company been in
business, the higher its adoption of franchise.
Contract Terms
The franchise fee, i.e., the upfront fixed payment the franchisee has to make to obtain
the franchise, can be interpreted in an analogous way to the initial investment. That is,
if our hypothesis of franchisees' binding financial constraint holds true, it will induce
a lower proportion of franchised outlets.
The prediction about the royalty rate, i.e., the ongoing share of profits that has to be
transferred from the franchisees to the franchisors is less clear-cut. We would expect
105 However, this could also prove into a franchisor's opportunistic behaviour.
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that the higher this rate, the lower the expected profits to the franchisees, therefore, the
less willing they would be to participate to the contract. On the other hand, the higher
this rate, the higher the expected profits for the principal, hence, the probability that he
will offer a franchise rather than a management contract. The relationship between
this variable and the contract choice is therefore ambiguous a-priori. A positive
relationship would show that the principal has the bargaining power, a negative one
would signal that the franchisees have the bargaining power. From the econometric
analysis performed on outlet-level data above, we found the effect of this variable on
the probability of a franchise contract to be non significantly different from zero. We
concluded there that the incentive and risk-sharing motives had a stronger explanatory
power in determining the contractual choice than expected profits had for both parties.
5.3. The Data and the Sample
The data adopted to perform this last econometric analysis consist of a cross-section
of companies operating in several industries. These data were derived from the
'Franchise World Directory,I06.
I06See above for a description of this publication.
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The number of chains included in the sample was reduced to 46. This was due to the
fact that, as we remarked above, not all the firms listed in the 'Franchise World
Directory' provide information on their company. Some of them only list their name
and address. Moreover, we had to exclude from our sample those companies that did
not require teither a franchise fee,rior a royalty rate. More specifically, since this study ,-"
concentrates on 'business format franchising', we had to exclude all those companies
that adopt 'traditional franchising', that is, those companies that derive their mark-up
from the sale of the inputs to the franchisees for the downstream operation.
Furthermore, after eliminating some companies as described above, we had to further
reduce their number to make our sample proportional to the population characteristics
in terms of sectoral representation.
Most franchise systems are primarily composed of franchise units. In our sample,
whose characteristics are represented in Table 5-1, the average percentage vertically
integrated outlets [l-p(F)] in a system is only the 18.5%. Since the data for this
analysis come from a 'Franchise' publication, it does not include companies that are
on one extreme of the contractual spectrum, i.e., completely vertically integrated. That
is, while it includes companies that are fully separated (completely franchised), as
results from the maximum value that the dependent variable, 'percentage of
franchised outlets' [P(F)}, can take on, this is not the case for the minimum of this
variable. This implies that our sample is censored, as we do not observe the values of
p(F) below its minimum. In the following section we discuss the implications of this
censoring in the observations for the econometric specification of our model.
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Table 5-1 Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt. Min Max n
p(F) 81.55 22.158 -1.5 4.4 0.157 1.0 46
I 66698 109.1 2.5 8.5 5000 500000 46
Year 13.9 9.042 l.l 3.7 3.0 41 46
Fee 15279.4 17427.76 4.8 28.8 3300 120000 46
Rr 0.0691 0.0676 0.8 2.6 0.00 0.20 46
Legend:
p(F) = percentage of franchised units; 1= initial investment realised by the franchisee;
Year= number of years in business ofa company; Fee=franchise fee; Rr=royalty rate.
5.4. The Econometric Specification of The Model
The dependent variable p(F) is the percentage of franchised outlets, and the subscript i
refers to the company, unlike the previous models where it referred to the outlet.
Having discovered that contracts' heterogeneity at outlet level is determined, above
all, by the labour market heterogeneity, in the model reported by equation (5.1) below
we look more specifically at the proportion of franchised and company owned outlets.
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By means of this model we intend to check whether, overall, this proportion is
determined by incentive motives and by the need to insure the agents against risk.
Therefore, we look at the percentage of franchised outlets as the dependent variable of
our model and see whether our model can provide an explanation for it.
]i_F) ; = a +P .(1) I+P 2(Year); +P 3(Fee) I+P 4(Rr) I+e i (S.t)
Risk sharing and franchisors' capital constraint.
If, as suggested by existing empirical work on franchising, this contract enables the
principal to face a binding financial constraint by obtaining capital from the
franchisee, we would expect the percentage of franchised outlets p(F) to be increasing
in the size of the initial investment (1). If, on the contrary, as we suggested, this
financial constraint is binding for the agent, then we expect the above relationship to
be negative, i.e., ~1<O.
According to the hypothesised 'potential-entrepreneurs' features of the franchisees,
and to their risk aversion, we expect that the older the company (Year), i.e., the more
valuable its brand name, the higher the percentage of franchised outlets of a chain
(~2>O). On the contrary, according to the existing theory, illustrated above, the




Following our hypothesis of franchisees' binding financial constraint, the franchise
fee (Fee), analogous to the initial investment, is expected to be negatively related to
the proportion of franchised outlets, that is, fh<O.
From wha(concluded in our 'outlet-level' econometric investigation, we cannot
clearly predict the sign of the relationship between the royalty rate (Rr) and the
percentage of franchised outlets in a chain. If these results were to be expected to be
consistent with those obtained above, in other words, if incentive and risk-sharing
motives had a much stronger explanatorypower in determining the contractual choice
than expected profits had for both parties, we would then expect this variable not to be
significantly different from zero.
Since our dependent variable p(F) is the percentage of franchised outlets in a
company, it is bounded between zero and one. Hence, consistent with methodology
adopted by other researchers (Brickley, Dark and Weisbach, 1991; Lafontaine, 1992),
we estimate model (5.1) by means of a Maximum Likelihood estimator. Because of
the characteristics of censoring of this dependent variable, as mentioned above, a
Tobit estimator is adopted. Brickley, Dark and Weisbach (1991) explain that the
censoring on the dependent variable is due to the fact that the "true variable", i.e.,
"desirability of franchising", is unbounded, but our observation of it is bounded by the
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extremes of the (0,1) interval. Nevertheless, these authors report obtaining the same
results when estimating their model by means of the OLS estimator107•
Both Brickley, Dark and Weisbach (1991), and Lafontaine, 1992, regard the lower
limit of truncation as being "0". However, since the data adopted by those studies, as
well as ours, come from information sources on franchise chains, their samples, as
ours, do not include the "0" cases, that is, they do not include entirely 'vertically
integrated' chains, hence the lower truncation on the observations on the dependent
variable cannot be regarded as being zero, but is rather represented by the minimum
value p(F) takes on.
5.5. The Results
We estimated model (5.1) by means of both a Maximum Likelihood, Tobit, estimator
and by OLS. These estimations gave similar results.
I07Notall empirical works on this issue adopting the same dependent variable (percentage of franchised
outlets) adopt this Tobit methodology. Some works make use of OLS (Brickley and Dark, 1987; Scott,
1995), some adopt the Weighted Least Squares (Norton, 1988; Martin, 1988; and Michael, 1995, this
last author reports obtaining the same results when adopting OLS).
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Table 5-2 Tobit Results
Variable Coefficient t-stat Standard
(significance level) Error
Constant 87.240 20.752 (0.000) 4.20
Year 0.547 3.98 (0.000) 0.137
I -0.10 -4.189 (0.000) 0.025
Fee -0.000355 -7.385 (0.000) 0.00004
R, 12.235 0.602 (0.547) 20.317
LR test (all slope coefficient ~=O) 26.052 (0.001)
Since cross sectional data often suffer from a heteroscedasticity problem, we tested for
this hypothesis in the above model. We estimated the same model assuming the
presence of heteroscedasticity and then performed a LR test. The calculated value
(Chi-square) for this statistic did not allow us to reject the null hypothesis of
dastici 108homosce bctty .
The results obtained from the estimation of model 5.J are consistent with the
hypotheses formulated. The older the company, the higher the percentage of
franchised outlets. This is due to a 'reputation effect' that positively affects the
willingness to participate to this contract on the part of 'better skilled' agents. The
better established the company, the lower would be the risk that such a potential agent
(entrepreneur) has to incur. The risk of business failure can therefore be considered as
lO'The calculated value for this statistic was 6.73, which lies below the critical value at 0.1 probability
ofa chi-square (with 4 degrees of freedom), this being 7.79.
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decreasing in the 'brand name value', which is strictly increasing in the number of
years the company has been in business. Analogously, if we assume that the market
can be self-regulatory with respect to franchisor's moral hazard, as we do here, the
risk of opportunistic behaviour from the franchisor can be seen as decreasing in the
years of the company, thus reinforcing our prediction of a positive relationship
between the age of the company and its percentage of franchised outlets. The evidence
for this assumption is found in our results. Also Lafontaine (1992), contrary to her
expectations, finds this variable to present a positive coefficient. Martin (1988) finds
an increasing tendency to adopt franchise by a firm in the long-run. He explains this
finding as a solution to monitoring costs (the new units will be more geographically
spread hence more difficult to monitor), and risk diversification problems (the
principal will try to shift the risk on the franchisee). Both these hypotheses were
proved inconsistent in the preceding chapter of this study. We showed there that, first,
outlets heterogeneity cannot explain contract heterogeneity, and, second, that the
positive relationship found by some authors, between risk and vertical separation is
not reliable in that the proxies used to measure risk are all affected by a strong
endogeneity problem (see above for a deeper discussion).
Norton (1988), focuses on the growth of 'sales' rather than age of the company in
exploring the firm's organisational dynamics (we could not follow this route because
of lack of availability of financial data). In his investigation Norton finds a positive
effect of 'growth of sales' on 'growth of franchising', which he explains with human
and financial capital motives. More specifically,Norton suggests that since it is costly
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for the finn to find talented non shirking local managers as it tries to expand rapidly, it
will resort to franchise. Although these results are consistent with the hypotheses set
out in our study about 'human capital', they diverge on their 'financial capital'
implications. Rather than a bundling of human and financial capital, we found so far
that human capital selection motives drive the firm's contractual choice, and argued,
consistent with Cressy (1996) findings, that the provision of finance requested to the
agent downstream can be regarded as an additional constraint set on risk averse agents
by a risk neutral principal in order to pursue the same target, i.e., select the 'right
agents'. Indeed, the results presented in Table 5-2 show that an increase in the initial
investment (I), has a negative impact on the percentage of franchised outlets, thus
providing further evidence to the existence of a binding financial constraint on the
franchisees, already resulted from our outlet-level empirical study (see previous
chapter). Analogous findings on the franchise fee (Fee) strengthen this result.
Last, also the findings on the royalty rate (Rr) obtained in these estimations at
company level, prove consistent with our previous findings at outlet level where this
variable did not present a coefficient significantly different from zero.
5.6. Conclusion
In this chapter we proceeded in testing the hypotheses proposed by the theoretical
model presented in the first part of this study.
While the preceding chapter tested this model by means of outlet level data, the
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investigation performed here made use of company level data. Since the source for
these data (Franchise World Directory) does not report very detailed information, this
restricted the number of hypotheses we could investigate, and limited the size of the
sample investigated to 46 companies.
The hypotheses deriving from the analysis presented so far, and tested in this chapter,
predicted that the extent of vertical separation (franchise) in a firm, is positively
correlated to the age of the firm, i.e., the number of years the firm has been in
business. As a firm becomes more established on the market, this reduces the risk
shifted on the potential franchisees, thus increasing their willingness to participate to a
franchise contract. This resulted from the data adopted by this model, which showed
the percentage of franchised outlets to be increasing in the age of the company.
Furthermore, our data furnished evidence on the other main hypothesis tested here,
which assumed the existence of a binding financial constraint on the agents rather
than on the principal, as some part of the literature predicted. This was shown by the
negative relationship found between the initial investment and the extent of adoption
of franchise contracts. More evidence on this hypothesis was provided by the variable
measuring the franchise fee, which, analogously to the initial investment resulted
having a negative impact on the extent of the adoption of franchising. The principal-




The remarkable increase in heterogeneous contractual arrangements within the firm,
and more particularly, in the adoption of franchise contracts mixed with some degree
of vertical integration, Partial Vertical Integration, PVI, is arguably one of the most
important organisational innovations of the last decades. The large growth in the
adoption of mixed organisational structures has posed a theoretical puzzle that 'the
theory of the finn' has so far failed to explain. In fact, although this has lately given
rise to a large amount of research, still no unitary framework has been provided to
explain this phenomenon.
Existing research, as was showed in the literature overview presented in the first
chapter of this study, has been unable to formally address this question by failing to
provide a thorough explanation to PVI. Instead, most analyses have been limited to a
description of some particular features of the problem, failing to address the general
issue. Such is the case of double sided moral hazard models, 'monitoring costs
hypothesis', signalling models, transaction costs approach, and other theories
described above, that mostly draw on the idea of a misalignment of incentives
between the upstream and downstream operation.
Along these lines, these theories mostly argue that contractual heterogeneity within
the firm can be explained as due to heterogeneous characteristics of the units
downstream. Such correspondence, however, is not what is generally observed in
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reality. In fact, where this heterogeneity of outlets is missing, these models predict that
the firm will be wholly vertically integrated or disintegrated, which is clearly at odds
with empirical observation.
Another recurrent explanation provided by the literature views the provision of capital
by the downstream agents as one of the main features that appeal the upstream
principal and induce him to introduce partial vertical separation within his firm.
This theory, however, is seriously flawed in its risk-sharing implications, i.e., it would
only make sense if the principal were to be more risk averse than the agent which,
again, seems to be at odds with the real case. Nevertheless, most works have either
been promoting this hypothesis, without finding evidence to support it, or they
abstracted from it. Infact, by assuming the agents to be risk averse and the principal to
be risk neutral, as would be a closer representation of the real case, still, these models
would -wrongly- predict a full vertical integration outcome.
In this study, we were able to provide an answer to the existence of mixed
organisational structures that received strong empirical support.
In the first part we suggested some new hypotheses mostly drawing on the human
capital implications of the firm's organisational choice. Within a principal agent
framework, characterised by the presence of both uncertainty and information
asymmetries, of the hidden action and hidden information type, we showed that in the
presence of agents heterogeneity on the market for managerial talents moral hazard
and adverse selection can explain contract mixing even in the case of homogeneous
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outlets. In particular, the results of our analysis led us to conclude that the
manufacturer will optimally design a menu of contracts that not only causes agents to
self-select (to solve the adverse selection problem), but also provides them with the
appropriate incentives to supply the maximum effort in their activity, to overcome the
moral hazard problem.
Hence, we showed that contract mixing represents a 'truth-telling' separating
equilibrium which enables the principal to overcome problems related to hidden
action, hidden information and uncertainty downstream. Such organisational structure
represents the 'optimal choice' for the principal (upstream) in the trade-off between
incentives and risk sharing. At the same time, it proves to be optimal for the
heterogeneous agents (downstream) by providing them with their maximum level of
expected utility.
This result is of extreme relevance for a number of reasons. First, it does not need to
assume outlets heterogeneity in order to explain contract heterogeneity, as the existing
literature so far has been doing. Second, it obtains this result in a context characterised
by risk-averse agents and risk neutral principal. Such result had not been obtained by
the literature so far. Some recent research stepped away from the previous fallacies of
r
the capital constraint argument, see Lafontaine and Bhattarch,ha, 1995, but still,
could not obtain this result in such a framework. These authors, in fact, assume both
parties to be risk neutral.
Although it might seem at odds with risk-sharing theory to obtain an 'optimal
solution' where risk averse agents provide finance, we proved that this can be
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explained by the 'entrepreneurial features' of the downstream agents. This has two
main implications. First, that these agents are willing to set up an independent
business, but franchise is to them an economic alternative in that it reduces the risk the
'independent' option would involve. Second, this financial arrangement has strong
human capital implications (Cressy, 1996). In other words, a binding financial
constraint on risk-averse agents will induce a self-selection process of these agents
according to their skills. This share contract proves then appealing to these agents in
that it will generate quasi-rents downstream (Kaufmann and Lafontaine, 1994,
Michael and Moore, 1996).
This financial allocation proves then optimal for the principal also because this
financial commitment can, to some extent, be regarded as a bond posted by the agents
on their future performance. Moreover, this ownership structure determines the
structure of the incentives (Grossman and Hart, 1986), and thereby its efficiency, by
aligning the interests of the principal upstream and of the agent downstream.
However, the high-power incentives coming from the franchise contract, cost the
principal the delegation of the downstream ownership, thereby inducing the retention
of a minor share of the profits -reduced even further by the need to provide risk-
insurance to these agents-. Nevertheless, this is optimal as long as this insurance does
not become too costly. Hence, the principal will tum to partial vertical integration.
Although vertical integration has the advantage of enabling the firm to keep all
downstream returns, it is costly for two main reasons. First, the management contract
will appeal to 'low-skilled' agents, and, second, the managers of the company-owned
259
outlets will have a larger incentive to indulge in opportunistic behaviour. Extracting
the right effort from the agent could in certain circumstances, be even more costly
than delegating part of the ownership. We showed that the payment of efficiency
wages to these agents (Krueger, 1991), and the contemporaneous presence of
unemployment on the market for these agents (a' la Shapiro Stiglitz, 1984), make the
'lay-off threat for these agents work as a disciplinary device.
To sum up, when the market is characterised by the presence of differently 'skilled'
agents, the principal will implement a menu of contracts (franchising and
management) for both incentive and self-selection purposes.
PVI is therefore, a sort of hybrid organisational form, lying somewhere in between
'market' and 'hierarchy'. This is especially so in the light of the results obtained here,
which showed that PVI is a local 'optimum'. The fact that this hybrid solution does
not represent a 'global' optimwn suggests that, consistent with empirical observation,
when the parameters of the problem change, the firm might revert to one or the other
extreme of the organisational spectrum, as the mixed structure might no longer
represent an 'optimum'. This result brings us to stress, in unison with other authors
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994) that there is not an 'overall' model capable of
explaining the firm's organisational choice. Rather different cases have to be
analysed independently where different factors shape up this forms. In this study we
looked at the case of retailing, which was represented by means of a model
characterised by monopolistic competition -as seems to be the case for this market-.
The results obtained proved consistent with all the hypotheses proposed by our model.
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This discussion proved to have 'real-world' validity when empirically investigated.
The empirical investigation, presented in the second part of this study, greatly differs
from existing empirical research on the topic. This difference mainly stands in the fact
that existing research has always limited its study to the principal's choice, leaving in
the shade the contractual decision of the agent, thereby implicitly assuming that this
would quietly follow, and conform to, the principal's choice. Our empirical study
showed that this is not the case. It proved that this issue can only be properly
investigated with single contract data, which, despite the predicted correspondence
between outlets and contract characteristics, is not the route generally followed. In
fact, curiously enough, most empirical works on the topic make use of company level
or even industry level data. This does not seem appropriate to investigate the issue.
The lack of data is certainly one of the main impediments that keeps researchers from
attempting this path. Therefore, in order to overcome this problem, we carried out our
own survey of UK retailing firms. The data collected in this way enabled us to test a
discrete choice model explaining the mix of franchised and company-owned outlets
among firms according to the hypotheses suggested by the theory proposed. The
hypotheses proposed here enjoyed support by these data.
Unfortunately, these cross-section data did not allow us to test of all the predictions
deriving from our model. This however, did not affect the validity of our propositions,
which could derive support from results of existing research. Such was the case of our
comparative statics results, showing the changes of this organisational structure over
the cycle (Stigler, 1951). We also tested some of these hypotheses at company level
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on a different data set (Franchise World Directory, 1994). The results confirmed the
findings obtained at outlet level.
The findings obtained by this study present interesting policy implications. By
showing that in a competitive framework this contract mix is 'socially optimal', we
were able to suggest that vertical restraints do not necessarily, and always, hurt
consumers. Sometimes, indeed, they can be the most efficient contractual
(organisational) form for a firm facing several constraints, i.e., facing different trade-
offs in a world where bounded rationality becomes the rule in the presence of
uncertainty and information asymmetries. This is especially true when the firm does
not enjoy any monopoly power. In such instances, the delegation of downstream
property rights may even prove welfare enhancing. To sum up, we showed the reasons
why economic agents (principals and agents) wish to enter these contractual
arrangements as not being driven by any 'competition restricting' targets. The main
policy implication that can be derived from this result is that vertical restraints
(franchising), are not 'per se' competition reducing or welfare reducing devices.
Sometimes, as in our context, they can even be welfare enhancing.
This leads us to conclude that public policy on vertical restraints should be open to ad
hoc assessment, "legality or illegality per se seems unwarranted," (Tirole, 1988,
p.186). Task of the economist is then to identify the environment in which a particular
form of vertical restraint has no adverse impact on competition, (Seabright, 1996).
This study represents an attempt along this way.
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